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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis uses the figure of the philistine to stage a critical encounter between 
the aesthetic theory of Theodor Adorno and the anti-art of Dada. The 
introduction prepares for this argument by tracing the development of the 
concept of the philistine over time. In the first chapter, Adorno’s aesthetic theory 
is delineated negatively, reconstructed on the basis of a wide-ranging survey of 
the references to the philistine in his work. His dialectical conception of this 
figure is pushed further, and brought to bear critically on his own blindnesses, 
aporias and exclusions. The second chapter explores how these limitations are 
manifested in his flawed interpretation of Dada, advancing an alternative reading 
of the movement, with recourse to counterexamples of its creative practice. The 
third chapter deepens this interpretation through a series of case studies, in which 
the philistine acts as the symbolic representation of different versions of anti-art. 
These analyses extend the theorization of the philistine to complete the critique 
of Adorno. However, Dada is also critically evaluated according to the model of 
the philistine derived from him, conceptualized as the immanent negation of art, 
now amended slightly to the immanent negation of the institution of art. The 
conclusion reflects on the methodological implications of this argument, and 
considers the wider applicability of the revised aesthetic theory which has 
emerged from it. In this critical encounter, Adorno’s and Dada’s shared 
negativity is the point of convergence in which the opposed notions of aesthetic 
autonomy and the institutionality of art are mediated as extremes. 
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Adorno, Dada and the Philistine: 
The Immanent Negation of the Institution of Art 
 
 
[T]o dismiss anti-art as pretentious cabaret and humour would be as great an 
error as to celebrate it. 
 
–– Theodor Adorno, Quasi una Fantasia [1963]1 
 
 
The dialectic is an amusing mechanism which guides us / in a banal kind of way 
/ to the opinions we had in the first place. 
 
–– Tristan Tzara, Dada Manifesto [1918]2 
  
																																																								
1 Theodor Adorno, Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music [1963], trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Verso, 2002), p.314. 
2 Tristan Tzara, “Dada Manifesto” [1918], trans. by Ralph Manheim, in The Dada Reader: A 
Critical Anthology, ed. by Dawn Ades (London: Tate Publishing, 2006), p.39. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis uses the figure of the philistine to stage a critical encounter 
between two bodies of work which are not often thought of together, the 
aesthetic theory of Theodor Adorno, and the anti-art of Dada. Unfinished at the 
time of his death, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory [1970] was assembled and 
published posthumously, the culmination of a lifetime of investigation into this 
topic, reprising many themes present since the start of his career in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s.3 He wrote widely on music and literature, and to a lesser extent 
on visual art and other disciplines, in an array of essays and book-length studies, 
but he is remembered chiefly as an advocate for a particular brand of modernism, 
characterized by uncompromising formal complexity, and epitomized by the 
composer Arnold Schoenberg. Founded in Zurich in 1916, Dada was an avant-
garde art movement which quickly established centres in Berlin, Cologne, 
Hannover, Paris and New York, as well as inspiring activity as far afield as the 
Low Countries, Eastern Europe and Japan, burning out in most of these locations 
by the mid-1920s. It was best known for its provocative rhetoric and absurdist 
stunts, though in recent years it has also been celebrated as an important 
precursor to the diversity of contemporary art, responsible for inaugurating or 
refining innovations including sound poetry and bruitist music, happenings and 
performance, collage and photomontage, and readymade sculpture. Adorno and 
Dada are then largely chronologically distinct entities, which might seem to have 
little in common, but which in fact converge in the negativity that in different 
ways they each bring to bear on culture, art and aesthetics. In what follows, I 
explore this shared attitude in relation to their respective versions of the figure of 
the philistine, a construct of aesthetic discourse which it defines itself against, 
and which therefore offers another negative perspective on that field. 
The argument is structured around the mutual imbrication of Adorno, 
Dada and the philistine. In the first chapter, Adorno’s aesthetic theory is 
elucidated through a wide-ranging survey of his references to the philistine, from 																																																								
3 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory [1970], ed. by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by 
Robert Hullot-Kentor (New York, New York: Continuum, 2007). All references are to this 
edition except where otherwise stated. 
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which the main features of the former are derived negatively. Variants of 
“Philister” “Spießbürger” and “Banause” recur frequently in his work, close 
enough in meaning to designate a more or less unified concept, equivalent to the 
English “Philistine”. The philistine is supposed to function as the other of art, or 
as the ideal embodiment of everything the aesthetic subject is not, however there 
is some distance separating the critical potential he claims for them from the way 
they are actually manifested across his oeuvre. My contention is that his model 
of the philistine needs to be pushed further, fully realizing their promise as the 
immanent negation of art, before they are applied as a corrective to the 
blindnesses of his aesthetic theory, a preliminary assessment of which concludes 
this chapter. Next, I turn directly to Adorno and Dada. His fragmentary 
interpretation of the latter is reconstructed, and with recourse to counterexamples 
of its creative practice revealed to be limited in a number of respects. He places 
undue emphasis on the themes of alienating infantilism, subjective expression 
and anarchic destruction, neglecting the critical engagement with the 
institutionality of art which is central to my alternative reading. My aim is to 
build on the previous chapter in putting pressure on his aesthetic theory, by 
accentuating its potentially productive tension with Dadaist anti-art. The third 
chapter examines key moments in the history of the movement, in the light of its 
core objective of the destruction of art by artistic means, which finds expression 
in the pose of the philistine against philistinism. There is a focus on this 
paradoxical formulation, lending coherence to a complex figure with appetitive, 
insensitive and destructive aspects, which are evident in the different versions of 
the philistine mobilized by Dada. The German terms are also important for this 
transnational coalition, occasionally appearing in the titles of texts, paintings and 
sculptures, but it is as a symbolic representation of the anti-artistic orientation 
that the philistine is chiefly considered here. These reflections on that 
multifaceted construction – in combination with the conceptualization of the 
immanent negation of art, now amended slightly to the immanent negation of the 
institution of art – complete the critique of Adorno’s blindnesses. 
 For methodological reasons, I do not provide at the outset an overview of 
either Adorno or Dada. Instead, Adorno’s aesthetic theory emerges ex negativo, 
from close but critical readings of relevant passages in the primary texts, with the 
organizing principle of the philistine suggested by his insight that they might be 
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studied as a way into the problematic of culture, art and aesthetics. This 
undertaking is broadly consistent with his own method of immanent analysis, 
weaving together quotations in a sympathetic immersion in his aesthetic theory, 
which reconfigures its elements to form a new constellation. Similarly, Dadaist 
anti-art is brought in initially to supplement his inadequate account of the 
movement, then elaborated on its own terms, with sustained meditations on three 
examples. These case studies foreground the anti-artistic orientation, once again 
crystallized through the figure of the philistine, thereby connecting the specific 
investigations to the wider discussion. Ultimately, I posit an expanded aesthetic 
theory, which preserves the attention to the integral structuration of the artwork 
insisted on by Adorno, while incorporating into that formal complex the art-
institutional dimension highlighted by Dada. My intention is to go beyond the 
blindnesses of the former, without lapsing into an error commonly prompted by 
the latter, that is, to abandon the focus on the internal structure of an artwork in 
favour of a description of the external structure of the institution of art. This 
would be to subordinate the artwork to extra-aesthetic imperatives, an 
illegitimate manoeuvre against which we have the bulwark of Adorno. However, 
where the art-institutional dimension is consciously manipulated as one aspect of 
the artwork among others, then perhaps it may be treated as part of the inner-
aesthetic nexus in which meaning consists. Indeed, Dadaist anti-art might lead us 
to think that in certain instances a form of interpretation flexible enough to 
accommodate such a relationship is demanded by the object. Adorno and Dada, 
the main conceptual blocs making up the thesis, are dialectically mediated in the 
course of it, with their mutually transformative interpenetration proceeding on 
the basis of reciprocal negation. In this Introduction, I prepare for the argument 
summarized here, by sketching a brief history of the philistine, the theoretical 
component which by acting as a foil for both sides enables the critical encounter 
between Adorno and Dada. 
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A Brief History of the Philistine 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
 Who is the philistine? This thesis describes them in gender-neutral terms, 
though in the past they have typically been cast in the masculine universal, and 
that historical designation should be understood as informing the present version 
of the concept. The philistine is not actually embodied, however they sometimes 
stand for immediate gratification in opposition to the deferral of pleasure, among 
the many positions they are taken to represent. They are at most a 
personification, the abstract bearer of a changing set of qualities, perhaps even a 
content-free cipher for different objects of derogation. They are founded on 
contradiction, fulfilling their main role as the other of art, while themselves being 
a product of aesthetic discourse. They are principally a discursive construct 
rather than an empirical entity, but the label has been applied to a range of social 
groups existing in reality, normally as a means of denigrating them. The 
philistine is identified variously with alien outsiders and the dominant culture, 
the uneducated rabble and the scholarly caste, the commercial bourgeoisie and 
the industrial proletariat. They are by definition excluded from the aesthetic 
sphere, and also a force destroying it from within, paradoxically its constitutive 
counterconcept and its immanent negation. They are likewise denied access to 
education, and implicated in its degeneration into rule-bound pedantry, both 
outside the university system and the hollowed out form of scholarship at its 
heart. They are the despised consumer of popular entertainment, and a vehicle 
for the avant-garde refusal of art and aesthetics, respectively an expression of 
elitist snobbery directed at the masses and the self-critique of the ruling class 
enacted by its dominated fraction. The philistine mindset encompasses diverse 
characteristics, but it is overwhelmingly narrow, superficial, inflexible, 
conservative and conformist. They are associated with a natural inclination 
towards violence, as well as the bloodlessness of a lack of passion, employed as 
police and soldiers and as artists and critics. They are motivated wholly by 
materialistic concerns, yet prone to empty moralism, at home in the trading 
house and at the pulpit. They are ruled by base desires, while being excessively 
constrained by convention, the condition of the general public and of an insular 
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clique. The philistine is simultaneously “masculine” and “feminine”, parochial 
and transnational, a reactionary and a visionary. All these features are added to 
the concept over time, and now coexist in an unstable amalgam, which has itself 
been subject to further theoretical elaboration. Building on previous overviews 
and genealogies by Estelle Morgan née McIlvenna, Dave Beech and John 
Roberts, and Esther Leslie, I here trace in broad outline the development of the 
philistine, ultimately focusing on the Anglophone context, but also covering the 
German prehistory of the term, which is of course especially pertinent to Adorno 
and Dada.4 My brief history of the philistine highlights how this figure combines 
contraries, effects reversals, and models dynamic relations, all of which makes 
them a promising tool for a dialectical analysis.  
 
UNCIRCUMCISED PHILISTINES 
 
The highpoint of philistinism, judging from its prevalence in printed 
sources, was probably the late nineteenth century, but the provenance of the 
word is ultimately ancient.5 Etymologically, “Philistine” is a borrowing from the 
Latin “Philistinus” or “Philisthiim”, derived from the Greek “Philistieím” and the 
Hebrew “Pĕlištīm”.6 Historically, the Philistines were one of the “Sea-Peoples”, 
who first appeared in the eastern Mediterranean, and subsequently settled on the 
																																																								
4 McIlvenna/Morgan’s numerous articles on the philistine are referenced throughout this 
Introduction. For Beech and Roberts’ genealogy of the philistine, see: Dave Beech and John 
Roberts, “Tolerating Impurities: An Ontology, Genealogy and Defence of Philistinism” [1998], 
in The Philistine Controversy, ed. by Dave Beech and John Roberts (London: Verso, 2002), 
pp.134-143. For Leslie’s overview of the German philistine, see: Esther Leslie, “Philistines and 
Art Vandals Get Upset” [2002], in The Philistine Controversy, pp.201-204. 
5 “Philistine”, Google Ngram Viewer, 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Philistine&case_insensitive=on&year_start=1
800&year_end=2015&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2CPhilistine%3
B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3BPhilistine%3B%2Cc0%3B%3Bphilistine%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BP
HILISTINE%3B%2Cc0 [accessed 21 October 2018]; “Philistines”, Google Ngram Viewer, 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Philistines&case_insensitive=on&year_start=
1800&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2CPhilistines
%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3BPhilistines%3B%2Cc0%3B%3Bphilistines%3B%2Cc0 
[accessed 21 October 2018]; “Philistinism”, Google Ngram Viewer, 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Philistinism&case_insensitive=on&year_start
=1800&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2CPhilistinis
m%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3BPhilistinism%3B%2Cc0%3B%3Bphilistinism%3B%2Cc0 
[accessed 21 October 2018]. 
6 “Philistine”, OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, June 2018), 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/142435 [accessed 7 June 2018]. 
 14 
southern coast of Palestine, establishing the land of Philistia.7 Indeed, 
“Philistine” shares its Hebrew root with “Palestine”.8 They were most active 
between the thirteenth and tenth centuries BC, and the earlier records of them are 
Egyptian, though they are known principally from the Bible, as indicated by the 
passage of the term through Hebrew, Greek and Latin.9 In both sets of sources, 
the Philistines are generally depicted as a hostile and warlike tribe, in keeping 
with their status as enemies of the Egyptians and the Israelites.10 In the Old 
Testament, Philistine–Israelite conflict, including an extended period of 
dominion over the latter by the former, provides a backdrop to key narratives, 
which are often violent: Samson is set upon and blinded by the Philistines; the 
Philistines slaughter the Israelites, and steal from them the Ark of the Covenant, 
before eventually being subdued by Samuel; Saul is beheaded and hung from a 
wall following his defeat by the Philistines; the Philistines are in the end 
decisively overcome, after many bloody battles with the Israelites, now under the 
leadership of David; Goliath is a Philistine, Delilah may be too.11 Delilah’s status 
is disputed, as it is possible she merely collaborated with the Philistines, 
delivering them her lover Samson. Goliath’s propensity for violence, reinforced 
by the hyper-masculinity of his legendarily gigantic proportions, has arguably 
proven more influential in shaping the modern sense of the philistine than her 
traditionally “feminine” combination of sexuality and duplicity. In addition to 
these gendered markers, the non-Semitic Philistines’ cultural alienness is 
emphasized in the biblical account. They are at one point referred to as “sooth-
sayers”, and repeatedly described as “uncircumcised Philistines”.12 In current 
usage, “Philistine” still conveys something of the brutish outsider imagined here, 
especially when it is applied to art-smashing iconoclasts, who continue the 																																																								
7 Trude Dothan, The Philistines and their Material Culture (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1982), p.1; KA Kitchen, “The Philistines”, in Peoples of Old Testament Times 
[1973], ed. by DJ Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.60. 
8 “Philistine”, OED Online; “Palestine”, OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/142435 
[accessed 7 June 2018]. 
9 Dothan, The Philistines and their Material Culture, p.1. 
10 For an overview of the Egyptian sources, see: Dothan, The Philistines and their Material 
Culture, pp.13-21. 
11 The Bible, Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), Judges 16:21; 1 Samuel 4:2, 4:10-11, 7:13; 1 Samuel 31:9-10; 2 Samuel 5:20, 25, 8:1; 1 
Samuel 17:4; Judges 16:4. 
12 The Bible, Isaiah 2:6; Judges 14:13; 1 Samuel 17:26, 17:36. For further acts of othering 
alluding to the Philistines’ non-practice of male circumcision, see: The Bible, 1 Samuel 18:25, 
27; 2 Samuel 1:20, 3:14. 
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tradition of philistine destructiveness. However, the Philistines are not yet 
identified with the absence of an aesthetic sensibility, and in fact in the 
archaeological field they are associated with a distinctive form of decorated 
pottery.13 At this stage, “Philistine” denotes the culturally other, rather than the 
other of culture. Its double-sidedness is however evident in retrospect, in the 
uncertainty over whether it was originally a name given to foreigners or a self-
description, an ambiguous relationship to inside and outside which is 
characteristic of the philistine.14  
 
THE PHILISTINES BE UPON THEE 
 
The ambiguity of the term in part rests on its multiple applications. Over 
time, the Philistines leant their name to any fearsome adversary, especially the 
opponents of the word of God, which was represented by Samson.15 The broader 
version of this figurative adaptation persists, usually deployed with humourous 
intent, according to the OED. It was previously redolent of debauchery and 
drunkenness as well, but these connotations are obsolete, as this sense has 
increasingly been subsumed under the most common meaning of “Philistine”.16 
Via the equivalent “Philister”, “Philistine” took on another of its secondary 
functions, as a derogatory expression for non-students or townspeople, in the 
context of German universities. This usage is historical, dating from seventeenth-
century town and gown disputes, and invoked principally to refer to that milieu.17 
There is a frequently cited though probably apocryphal account of its origins, 
tracing it to fighting which resulted in the death of a student at the University of 
Jena in 1689. The funeral oration is supposed to have quoted from the Book of 
Judges, supplying a rallying cry for the disorder that followed with the line 
repeated by Delilah: “The Philistines be upon thee, Samson.”18 It has been 
																																																								
13 Kitchen, “The Philistines”, p.61. 
14 “Philistine”, OED Online. 
15 Estelle Morgan, “Students and “Philistines””, The Modern Language Review 51.2 (1956): 
p.231. 
16 “Philistine”, OED Online. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “Philistine”, Oxford English Living Dictionaries, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/philistine [accessed 7 June 2018]; Leslie, 
“Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”, p.201; Morgan, “Students and “Philistines””, p.232; 
The Bible, Judges 16:12, 14, 20. 
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suggested that the term was already in use among the local university population 
as a label for members of the public, but that this incident may have contributed 
to its spread beyond Jena.19 Whatever the truth of the story, “Philister” entered 
the German student vocabulary as a class-based insult in the seventeenth century, 
denoting first the police and city-soldiers, then the citizenry at large, especially 
tradespeople and landlords.20 This it did by way of analogy with biblical 
precursors, presumably playing on their status as an enemy, and their reputation 
for violence. It also epitomized a specific form of cultural otherness, based on 
exclusion from the university system, or a lack of education in general. With this 
act of othering, “Philister” moves closer to the main definition of “Philistine”, 
once again according to the OED: “An uneducated or unenlightened person; one 
perceived to be indifferent or hostile to art or culture, or whose interests and 
tastes are commonplace or material; a person who is not a connoisseur.”21 The 
previous incarnations of the philistine fed into this formulation, conferring on it a 
pejorative charge and a class character, and providing the element of intellectual 
backwardness which is the complement to aesthetic incompetence. This set a 
pattern, as the term tends to retain the associations it accrues during its 
subsequent development, even where these appear to be divergent or 
contradictory. 
 
A HOLLOW GUT 
 
It was the literary movement Storm and Stress, and more broadly German 
Romanticism, which popularized the term “Philister”, bringing it nearer still to 
the modern sense of “Philistine”. They were also responsible for one of its first 
major reversals, departing from the established cohort of non-students or 
townspeople, and instead applying it to substandard scholars and conservative 
critics. Johann Gottfried Herder’s fables included some of the earliest examples 
of its admission into literary language, extending its usage beyond student slang, 																																																								
19 Morgan, “Students and “Philistines””, p.232. 
20 “Philister”, Duden: das grosse Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache in zehn Bänden, ed. by 
Günther Drosdowski (Mannheim: Dudenverlag, 1999); “Philister”, Duden Etymologie: 
Herkunftswörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed. by Günther Drosdowski (Mannheim: 
Dudenverlag, 2007); Morgan, “Students and “Philistines””, pp.231-232; Estelle McIlvenna, 
“The “Philistine” in “Sturm und Drang””, The Modern Language Review 33.1 (1938): p.31. 
21 “Philistine”, OED Online. 
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and beginning to broaden its scope.22 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe did much to 
promote and develop the concept, invoking it often in his letters, poems and 
other texts from the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards.23 The Sorrows 
of Young Werther [1774] refers to “some philistine [Philister], some man of 
public rank”, who confronted with an interlocutor analogous to the artist, whose 
infatuation with a woman is beyond all reasonable limits, advises him to divide 
up his time between work and leisure, and to spend only what he can afford on 
presents for his sweetheart, a principle of moderation that would be fatal for true 
passion.24 Satyros [1774] mentions a philistine who is practically minded and 
insensitive to the beauty of nature, prioritizing the potential financial reward of a 
successful crop above the effect of the spectacle of its growth on his 
imagination.25 Collaborating with Friedrich Schiller on Xenia [1797] and Votive 
Tablets [1797], Goethe reiterates the themes of narrow-mindedness and 
compartmentalization, and the tendency for philistinism to impede artistic 
genius. The philistine is depicted as prosaic, shallow in perception and 
understanding, and lacking a sense of humour. There is a strong association with 
tradespeople and merchants, and an emphasis on the philistinism of the middle-
class traits of materialism and moralism.26 In Tame Xenia [1820-1827], Goethe 
continues this campaign against the philistine well into the nineteenth century. 
He charges them with emptiness and appetitiveness: “What is a philistine 
[Philister]? / A hollow gut, / Filled with fear and hope / That God will have 
mercy.”27 These are key characteristics of the philistine, which contribute to the 
contemporary understanding of this figure, as does the identification with the 
emerging bourgeoisie, underlined by their shared habit of newspaper reading.28 
The most important shift was however towards a dearth of aesthetic feeling, 
which became the defining feature of philistinism. Goethe secured the position of 
the new art by rhetorically counterposing it to the philistine, a manoeuvre that 																																																								
22 McIlvenna, “The “Philistine” in “Sturm und Drang””, pp.32-33. 
23 Estelle Morgan, “Goethe and the Philistine”, The Modern Language Review 53.3 (1958): 
pp.374-375. 
24 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther [1774], trans. by Michael Hulse 
(London: Penguin, 1989), pp.32-33. 
25 McIlvenna, “The “Philistine” in “Sturm und Drang””, p.34.  
26 Morgan, “Goethe and the Philistine”, pp.374-378.  
27 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, cited and discussed in Morgan, “Goethe and the Philistine”, 
p.378. 
28 Morgan, “Goethe and the Philistine”, pp. 378-379. 
 18 
would be repeated many times. Writers from the same tradition took up the word 
and participated in the expansion of its meaning, among them Jakob Lenz, 
Novalis, Clemens Brentano, ETA Hoffmann and Joseph von Eichendorff.29 
Storm and Stress and German Romanticism thereby resituated philistinism 
squarely within aesthetic discourse. 
 
LAND OF THE PHILISTINES 
 
In nineteenth-century Germany, post-Romantic poets and thinkers 
invoked philistinism in the same way as their predecessors, and also broke new 
ground with the concept. Perhaps the most influential in this regard was Heinrich 
Heine, who arguably had a hand in the transmission of the German “Philister” 
into French as “Philistin” and into English as “Philistine”. Initially characterizing 
his native Germany as the “Land of the Philistines [Philister]”, by contrast with 
the potential represented by his adoptive France as the “Land of Freedom”, 
Heine was soon disappointed in the latter due to the consolidation of power by 
the bourgeoisie following the July Revolution of 1830, and the corresponding 
wave of anti-bourgeois sentiment which arose among his literary contemporaries 
there frequently found expression in the term “Philistin”.30 He was an explicit 
point of reference for the early discourse on philistinism in Britain, as the subject 
of essays by Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold, inspiring subsequent usage of 
the word “Philistine”.31 His oeuvre contains a number of satirical portrayals of 
the philistine, of which one of the best known is “The Philistine [Philister] of 
Berlin” [1828-1829]. This short prose sketch, from a volume of travel writing, 
reflects his view that philistinism, notwithstanding the acknowledged existence 
of other national varieties, is quintessentially a German phenomenon. “The 
Philistine of Berlin” depicts a tavern bore, whose preferred topic of conversation 
is the weather, reinforcing the prosaism, superficiality and banality already 
																																																								
29 McIlvenna, “The “Philistine” in “Sturm und Drang””, pp.37-38; Leslie, “Philistines and Art 
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and Letters 4.1 (1939): pp.56-57; Peter Bruning, “ETA Hoffmann and the Philistine”, The 
German Quarterly 28.2 (1955): p.111. 
30 Heinrich Heine, cited and discussed in Estelle Morgan, “Bourgeois and Philistine”, The 
Modern Language Review 57.1 (1962): pp.70-71. 
31 Morgan, “Bourgeois and Philistine”, pp.71-72. 
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established as familiar features of the philistine.32 In many respects, Heine’s 
body of work simply continues with the tradition of anti-philistinism developed 
by the German Romantics. His philistine is similarly narrow-minded, practical, 
mediocre, dull and humourless. They are likewise insensitive to the beauty of 
nature, lacking in intellectual curiosity, and without an appreciation for finer 
things. There is once again a strong association with the commercial bourgeoisie, 
in particular with wealthy tradespeople and merchants. Finally, Heine repeats the 
reversal whereby universities are themselves said to have become bastions of 
philistinism. What is distinctive about his account is the political dimension, with 
the philistine now identified as the enemy of progress.33 We have seen evidence 
of this shift in the opposition he sets up between philistinism and freedom, even 
if the latter is a source of disillusionment for him. The dynamic of definition by 
negation is essentially the same, regardless of whether the content is political or 
aesthetic. Interestingly, Immanuel Kant is held up as an example of the philistine 
in his personal life, notwithstanding his profound influence on philosophical 
aesthetics.34 As with the dialectic of art and its other, Heine’s progressive 
orientation is delineated through its constitutive counterconcept, the backward-
looking perspective of the philistine. This brings into focus the curious 
temporality of philistinism, which was first positioned as a hangover from the 
past, but which came to ride the wave of the future. 
 
PHILISTINE CULTURE 
 
 Key to this transformation was another important figure in the history of 
the philistine from nineteenth-century Germany, Friedrich Nietzsche. An admirer 
of Heine, Nietzsche pushed further his notion of the philistine as the enemy of 
progress, making them symptomatic and symbolic of a general regression. The 
vehicle for this broad social critique was an inherently paradoxical formulation, 
the “Bildungphilister”. In the posthumously published Ecce Homo: How to 
Become What You Are [1908], Nietzsche claims to have coined this term, which 																																																								
32 Heinrich Heine, “The Philistine of Berlin” [1828-1829], trans. by Charles Godfrey Leland, in 
The Library of the World’s Best Literature [1917], 
https://www.bartleby.com/library/prose/2520.html [accessed 7 October 2018]; McIlvenna, 
“Heine and the “Philistine””, p.63. 
33 Morgan, “Bourgeois and Philistine”, p.70; McIlvenna, “Heine and the “Philistine””, pp.56-60. 
34 McIlvenna, “Heine and the “Philistine””, p.61. 
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is usually translated as educated or cultivated philistine.35 He is referring back to 
the earliest of his Untimely Meditations [1873-1876], “David Strauss, the 
Confessor and the Writer” [1873]. In this polemical text, Nietzsche targets a 
middlebrow philosopher who had achieved some critical and popular success, 
taking him to be emblematic of the new subspecies of philistine. The latter is 
supposed to function as the immanent negation of the sphere of culture, lodging 
within it and establishing there what is dubbed a “philistine culture [Philister-
Kultur]”.36 By collapsing the distinction between culture and its opposite in this 
way, Nietzsche conveys his sense that philistinism has become generalized and 
hegemonic. He emphasizes the distance between the common conception of the 
philistine and his variant, who has occupied the position formerly held by their 
antitheses the “son of the muses” and the “man of culture”.37 The set of traits 
attributed to the cultivated philistine is however largely conventional, including a 
strong association with the German character. They are described as narrow-
minded and compartmentalizing, without any intellectual curiosity, 
understanding or taste. They are also said to be conservative, complacent and 
cowardly. They are once again identified as an impediment to artistic genius, 
siding with reality against creativity.38 Their class identity is bourgeois, 
specifically engaged in “business”, but the philistine culture that they propagate 
appeals to the “repellent need for entertainment characteristic of the exhausted 
worker”.39 This last observation anticipates the shift from middle-class to 
working-class philistinism, and the related idea of elite resistance to it, which 
developed in the course of the twentieth century, but has its roots in the student 
slang of the seventeenth century. In addition, Nietzsche repeats the inversion of 
the uneducated philistine into their scholarly equivalent, which had been 
pioneered by the German Romantics.40 He likewise continues the practice of 
using philistinism as a foil to articulate his sense of a true culture, if we read this 
essay in conjunction with subsequent Untimely Meditations, and their laudatory 																																																								
35 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are [1908], trans. by Duncan 
Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.51. 
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer” [1873], in Untimely 
Meditations [1873-1876], ed. by Daniel Breazeale, trans. by RJ Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.7, p.25, p.37, p.39. 
37 Ibid., p.7. 
38 Ibid., p.7-11, pp.21-22, p.29, p.33, pp.37-38. 
39 Ibid., p.11, p.35. 
40 Ibid., pp.37-38. 
 21 
treatment of Arnold Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner.41 Nevertheless, 
Nietzsche’s intervention was original and influential, in that he styled the 
cultivated philistine as a visionary, and generalized their condition from that of a 
particular group to society as a whole.42  
 
RESISTANCE TO LIGHT 
 
 The philistine was imported into the Anglophone world by the writers 
alluded to above in relation to Heine: Carlyle and Arnold. In eighteenth-century 
Britain, “Philistine” had denoted any fearsome adversary, but it was transformed 
during the Victorian era through its contact with the German “Philister”. In his 
essays on German literature including Goethe and Heine, Carlyle was the first to 
draw attention to this word, without finding a satisfactory equivalent for the 
concept in English.43 Disputing with Carlyle, Arnold sought to underline the 
continuity between Goethe and Heine, identifying as central to the work of the 
latter a “life-and-death struggle with Philistinism”.44 Heinrich Heine [1863] 
makes the case that philistinism is in fact particularly applicable to the English: 
“Perhaps we have not the word because we have so much of the thing.”45 By the 
time of Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social 
Criticism [1869], and certainly with the subsequent addition of the “Preface” 
[1875], “Philistine” had been established as an independent term in the British 
context, without having to rely directly on the authority of either Goethe or 
Heine.46 This book promulgates an ideal of culture, defined as an inward 
endeavour striving towards a harmonious and general perfection, to which is 
opposed philistine insensitivity to “sweetness and light”: “Philistine gives the 
notion of something particularly stiff-necked and perverse in the resistance to 
light and its children[.]”47 “Hebraizing” and “Hellenizing” instincts are said to be 																																																								
41 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator” [1874], in Untimely Meditations, pp.127-
194; Friedrich Nietzsche, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” [1876], in Untimely Meditations, 
pp.197-254. 
42 Nietzsche, “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer”, p.16. 
43 Morgan, “Bourgeois and Philistine”, p.71; McIlvenna, “Heine and the “Philistine””, p.56. 
44 Matthew Arnold, Heinrich Heine (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Frederick Leypoldt, 1863), 
pp.4-6, p.12. 
45 Ibid., p.12. 
46 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism [1869], ed. 
by J Dover Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), pp.100-101. 
47 Ibid., p.6, p.11, pp.53-54, pp.101-102. 
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in a state of imbalance in contemporary society, with undue weight given to the 
former, which is aligned with the philistine in an inversion of their Gentile status 
in the Bible.48 For this alleged bias in favour of the Hebrew qualities of correct 
conduct and obedience to the law, which he sees as to the detriment of the 
Hellenic pursuit of knowledge, Arnold blames the rise of the industrial 
bourgeoisie, given the title of “Philistines”, while the aristocracy is labelled 
“Barbarians”, and the proletariat is dubbed the “Populace”.49 Culture and 
Anarchy claims that the middle class is represented by the “commercial member 
of Parliament” and the “fanatical Protestant Dissenter”.50 In politics, 
Parliamentary Liberalism is the natural home of the philistine. In religion, they 
usually belong to Dissenting and Nonconformist sects.51 The philistine is in thrall 
to machinery, mechanical in their adherence to routine and convention, and 
narrowly and vulgarly materialistic in their values. Their outlook is provincial, 
with a limited, one-sided and inflexible mindset, which tends towards 
fundamentalism and fanaticism. They have a typically bourgeois preoccupation 
with money, and with quantitative growth as good in itself, as well as a 
corresponding interest in increasing the population, and an excessive emphasis 
on physical health.52 Culture and Anarchy casts the net wider, to take in 
historical characters, highlighting the “coarseness and lack of spiritual delicacy” 
of the “Philistine of genius” Martin Luther, and the contradictory “craving for 
forbidden fruit” and “craving for legality” of the “crowned Philistine” Henry 
VIII.53 The USA as a whole is also charged with philistinism, as a country 
overwhelmingly dominated by its middle class.54 Building on the development of 
the concept by Goethe and Heine, adapting it to the cultural specificities of 
nineteenth-century Britain, Arnold further refines the class identity of the 
philistine, updating it from the earlier association with tradespeople and 
merchants to cover prosperous industrialists, who are presented as a hegemonic 
force in a similar way to the “Bildungphilister”. The barbarians and the populace 
are both to some extent assimilated into the ranks of the philistines, and he is also 																																																								
48 Ibid., p.20, p.138.  
49 Ibid., p.20, p.61, p.102, p.105, pp.131-132. 
50 Ibid., pp.100-101. 
51 Ibid., p.14. 
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quite clear about his own class position, in a rare instance of self-identification 
with this figure: “I myself am properly a Philistine.”55 The Anglophone tradition 
of philistinism inaugurated here also adopted the manoeuvre of constructing a 
positive vision of culture on the basis of its negation. 
 
BLIND PHLISTINES 
 
 Working with this inheritance, British artists and critics in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mobilized the philistine in order to 
articulate their ideal of culture. Alongside Arnold, John Ruskin and William 
Morris railed against the philistinism of an emerging modernity.56 These 
Victorians held to the value of creative activity as in some way socially useful, 
but that principle fell away with the development of the programmatic 
aestheticism they influenced. The insistence on the autonomous status of art, and 
on the aesthetic as a specialized realm of experience, were concretized with 
reference to a definitional other, the figure of the philistine. Indeed, the slogan of 
l’art pour l’art was probably taken from Théophile Gautier, who had himself 
been a prominent critic of the “Philistin” in France.57 In Britain, Oscar Wilde 
was the most recognizable representative of the movement, promoting an 
appreciation of beauty wholly independent of morality, and the belief that art 
should serve as a model for life rather than be a faithful copy of it. This was 
counterposed to the outlook of the philistine, whose insensitivity to the aesthetic, 
and subordination of it to other imperatives, were already well established.58 De 
Profundis [1905] underlines the allegiance of the philistine to society, once again 
drawing on a familiar set of associations, including a blindness that would 
become constitutive: “He is the Philistine who upholds and aids the heavy, 
cumbrous, blind, mechanical forces of Society[.]”59 There was an implicit 
gendering of the philistine as “masculine”, by contrast with the quasi-feminized 
aesthete, a pose central to aestheticism. The transition to modernism was a site of 
struggle in which accusations of philistinism continued to be a resource, for 																																																								
55 Ibid., pp.51-52, p.61, p.65, p.101, pp.104-106. 
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example in the high-profile dispute over the didactic function of realist art 
between JA Spender and DS MacColl, where the former looked back to Ruskin, 
while the latter anticipated the New Criticism.60 In their theory of the mode of 
perception appropriate to modern art, the New Critics Clive Bell and Roger Fry 
prioritized close attention to pure form, as distinct from moral and technical 
judgements, naturalizing this perspective as a special quality inscribed in 
individuals, in turn suggesting a philistine afflicted by a fundamental incapacity 
akin to blindness. This fed into the social chauvinism of the modernist elite, who 
styled themselves as the defenders of the aesthetic in the face of universal 
philistinism, in this regard also taking something from Nietzsche. The context for 
this institutionalized snobbery was the rise of mass society, which brought with it 
a shift from an understanding of the philistine as a bourgeois phenomenon, to a 
situation in which they were primarily identified with the industrial proletariat, a 
partial return to the origins of the term as a class-based insult directed at 
uneducated townspeople.61 Virginia Woolf is a borderline case, highly attuned to 
the philistinism of her own class, while sharing in its aversion to the vulgarity of 
the masses.62 The appetitive aspect of philistinism was increasingly emphasized, 
through the expression of disgust at the consumption of mass-produced 
entertainment like cinema and radio, setting up an opposition between the 
deferral of pleasure in modernist art and the immediate gratification of the 
culture industry. There was a related reversal in the gendering of the philistine, 
with the machismo of modernist asceticism set against the dominant attitude to 
mass culture, which was denigrated as passively “feminine”.63 The first half of 
the twentieth century therefore saw another significant transformation of the 
philistine, one bound up with the increasing importance accorded to aesthetic 
autonomy by aestheticism and modernism.64 																																																								
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REVENGE OF THE PHILISTINES 
 
 We ought to avoid speaking too glibly of the institutionalization of 
modernism, given that its leading proponents were consciously engaged in 
institution building from the outset, though it is true to say that its status shifted 
from that of an emerging to a consecrated avant-garde as the twentieth century 
progressed. This involved a paradox, as the principle of aesthetic autonomy was 
instrumentalized, promoted as a platitude by the same mechanisms of cultural 
production in opposition to which it originally had been developed. The 
philistine likewise rose in prominence, but with their critical content hollowed 
out, no longer mobilized in support of an insurgent movement, instead used to 
defend an aesthetic regime now established as the official form of high art within 
the internal hierarchy of the culture industry. This is apparent in the observations 
of the mainstream modernist Vladimir Nabakov, who writes in his post-war 
essay “Philistines and Philistinism” [1981]: “A philistine is a full-grown person 
whose interests are of a material and commonplace nature, and whose mentality 
is formed of the stock ideas and conventional ideals of his or her group and 
time.”65 His definition is itself conventional, despite the nod to gender neutrality, 
and he adds to it other familiar features, such as conformism, pretentiousness and 
vulgarity, as well as an association with advertising and with commodity culture 
more generally. The philistine is thus deployed to shore up the position of high 
art, in an account which is essentially conservative, subtracting from the concept 
any of its class politics, even understanding the bourgeoisie as a cultural rather 
than an economic category.66 This depoliticizing tendency is also evident in the 
work of Hilton Kramer, long-time art critic at The New York Times, who 
explicitly thematizes the institutionalization of modernism in his collection of 
essays The Revenge of the Philistines: Art and Culture 1972-1984 [1985]: “No 
sooner had modernism completed its difficult and much-contested passage into 
the mainstream of cultural life than it found itself under fire again. Only this time 
the attack upon it did not come from its traditional enemies among the 																																																																																																																																																						
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philistines, who by now had either been won over to its cause or effectively 
silenced by modernism’s overwhelming success.”67 The attack in fact originated 
within the sphere of high art, with the critiques mounted by an insurgent 
postmodernism, against which he makes the case for the continuing relevance 
and lasting value of modernism, a backward-looking perspective that arguably 
has something philistine about it.68 It is also worth mentioning the avant-garde 
artists who strategically adopted the persona of the philistine, the most obvious 
examples from the twentieth century being Marcel Duchamp, Andy Warhol and 
the Young British Artists (YBAs). They all embodied this figure, whether by 
affecting indifference to the distinction between art and non-art, embracing the 
imagery and indeed the production methods of the culture industry, or unleashing 
the destructive energies of iconoclasm and bodily pleasure. There are other 
currents in the history of art which connect to these aspects of an insurgent 
philistinism, including the channelling of iconoclasm in the auto-destructive 
practice pioneered by Gustav Metzger, and the exploration of bodily pleasure in 
experiments with pornography by Carolee Schneemann. The tradition of the 
avant-gardist philistine could be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century 
and the little magazine The Philistine: A Periodical of Protest, as well as being 
extended into twenty-first-century literature with flarf poets like Nada Gordon, 
Sharon Mesmer and Gary Sullivan, and the conceptual writing associated with 
Kenneth Goldsmith, Craig Dworkin and Vanessa Place.69 I return to that longer 
view in the Conclusion, but the main focus of my thesis is the refusal of art and 
aesthetics enacted through the performative philistinism of the Dadaists. 
 
THE PHILISTINE CONTROVERSY 
 
At regular junctures, I draw on the so-called “philistine controversy” of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This was a series of debates 
centred on the figure of the philistine, at first fought out principally in art 
journals like everything, Third Text and Art Monthly, then increasingly in the 																																																								
67 Hilton Kramer, The Revenge of the Philistines: Art and Culture 1972-1984 [1985] (London: 
Secker and Warburg, 1986), p.xii. 
68 Ibid., p.xii, p.11. 
69 For an account of The Philistine, see: Bruce A White, Elbert Hubbard’s The Philistine: A 
Periodical of Protest (1895-1915): A Major American “Little Magazine” (Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1989). 
 27 
pages of New Left Review, and finally in the collection of essays The Philistine 
Controversy [2002]. Roberts’ ““Mad For It!” Bank and the New British Art” 
[1996], subsequently expanded and retitled ““Mad For It!” Philistinism, the 
Everyday and the New British Art” [1996], inaugurated the first phase of the 
philistine controversy, in the context of widespread contention over the aesthetic 
and political value of the YBAs. He positively identifies some of this group with 
philistine attitudes, practices and modes of attention, defending their deployment 
of the rhetoric and iconography of mass culture.70 His intervention sparked bad-
tempered disputes with critics of this phenomenon, most notably Julian 
Stallabrass and Stewart Home.71 Beech and Roberts’ “Spectres of the Aesthetic” 
[1996] broadens the scope of the philistine controversy, with a critique of the 
renewed interest of the philosophical left in the intersection of ethics and 
aesthetics, in an argument over the contested legacy of Adorno. They take aim at 
what they dub the new aestheticism, accusing its representatives of constructing 
a transcendental ethics on the basis of a theory of art from which cultural 
contestation and bodily pleasure are excluded.72 Jay Bernstein and Andrew 
Bowie responded in exchanges often characterized by mutual misunderstanding, 
and there was also an alternative model of the philistine put forward by Malcolm 
Bull in “The Ecstasy of Philistinism” [1996].73 In the final phase of the philistine 
controversy, Beech and Roberts defended and extended their concept of the 
philistine, and brought together a number of contributions by different writers in 
The Philistine Controversy. This volume minimizes the original discussion about 																																																								
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contemporary art in favour of a focus on philosophical questions, overlooking 
Stallabrass and Home, but giving space to Bernstein and Bowie. It contains a 
critical assessment of the arguments involving the latter pair by Gail Day, as well 
as further elaborations of philistinism by Leslie, Nöel Burch and Malcolm 
Quinn.74 Beech and Bull have continued to make use of the figure of the 
philistine in their more recent work, and others have taken up the topic, whether 
or not they explicitly connect their endeavours to that background.75 These 
theoretical manoeuvres involve a recovery of the critical potential of philistinism, 
which is construed as a means to probe the gaps and closures of art and 
aesthetics, in a sense building on the previous interventions of the anti-artists. 
 
RESONANCES 
 
 In the twenty-first century, “Philistine” and other related terms appear to 
occupy a less prominent place in discourse generally, having seemingly become 
somewhat outmoded, perhaps on account of the elitism associated with the 
word.76 This despite the fact that the associated dynamics of elitism and anti-
elitism, conflicts ostensibly premised on cultural identity, differences of taste, 
and levels of educational attainment, have in recent years experienced a 
resurgence globally, with key examples including the rapid rise to hegemony of 
Narendra Modi in India, the campaign and presidency of Donald Trump in the 
USA, and elements of the vote for Brexit in the UK. There are echoes of the 
debates over philistinism in Modi’s plebeian public persona and appeals to 
chauvinism as contrasted with the patrician cosmopolitanism historically 
associated with the leadership of the Congress Party; in the use of the label 
“deplorables” to describe Trump’s supporters by his Democratic opponent Hilary 																																																								
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Clinton; and in the denigration of experts by the pro-Brexit Conservative 
Michael Gove.77 It is not the purpose of my thesis to engage with these 
contemporary resonances directly, but rather to draw on the full historical and 
theoretical inheritance summarized above, the successive modifications and 
transformations of the concept over time, which are intimately intertwined with 
the evolution of culture. There is further justification for returning to this topic, 
in that it was especially salient when my main subjects were active, and the 
treatment of it in their work may therefore be a fruitful area to explore. Dada 
emerged in the wake of the late nineteenth-century highpoint of philistinism, 
appropriating and redeploying that discursive construct in the service of an anti-
artistic project, reacting against the elevation of aesthetic autonomy by 
aestheticism and modernism. Adorno was writing in the context of the 
popularization of philistinism by a culture industry that was fully fledged by 
around the middle of the twentieth century, exploiting the critical potential latent 
in the derogation while recognizing its unjust social basis. My investigation is 
informed by the theorization of the philistine developed towards the end of that 
century and at the beginning of the next, initially coinciding with the moment of 
insurgent philistinism represented by the YBAs. These three scenes in art history, 
roughly corresponding to the periodization of the historical avant-garde, the neo-
avant-garde and the post-avant-garde, are brought together here on the basis of 
that shared attitude. This brief history of the philistine has emphasized the 
exceptional mobility of the term, its application to a wide variety of groups and 
individuals, and its tendency to traverse antitheses and turn into its opposite, 
making it a suitable vehicle for a dialectical analysis, which must be attuned to 
fluidity, polyvalence and contradiction. The negative definition of culture, art 
and aesthetics, with reference to the philistine, is also well adapted to my 
method, in which this figure is mobilized to disclose the limits of the aesthetic 
sphere. For all these reasons, I believe that this is a suitable moment and 
occasion to revisit the problematic of philistinism. 
																																																								
77 Achin Vanaik, “India’s Two Hegemonies”, New Left Review 2.112 (2018): p.29, pp.35-36, 
pp.39-42; “Hilary Clinton Calls Many Trump Backers “Deplorables”, and GOP Pounces”, The 
New York Times, 10 September 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/politics/hillary-
clinton-basket-of-deplorables.html [accessed 29 October 2018]; “Britain Has Had Enough of 
Experts, Says Gove”, Financial Times, 3 June 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-
29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c [accessed 29 October 2018]. 
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Adorno’s Philistine: 
The Dialectic of Art and its Other 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of an extensive survey of the references 
to the figure of the philistine in the work of Adorno, for the most part read in 
translation into English, cross-referenced against the original German.1 The 
scope of this exercise covers nearly all the collections of essays and book-length 
studies published during his lifetime, as well as a wide selection of important 
standalone articles and posthumous texts. There are a range of German 
equivalents for “Philistine”, including variants of “Philister”, “Spießbürger” and 
“Banause”. As with the English term, “Philister” was derived from the Greek 
“Philistieím” and the Hebrew “Pĕlištīm”, referring to a non-Semitic people from 
the southern coast of Palestine, whose members feature as enemies of the 
Israelites in the Old Testament. It first entered into modern usage in the 
seventeenth century, in the context of town and gown disputes, acquiring the 
connotations of unacademic and intellectually limited. The term is also linked to 
petit-bourgeois narrow-mindedness in the Duden.2 “Spießbürger” and its 
contraction “Spießer” originated in the tenth century, to describe the citizens of 
towns (“Bürger”), who defended themselves with spears (“Spieße”). Their 
alleged persistence with this outmoded weaponry, after the invention of the rifle, 
led to the broadening of the terms to designate any parochial and backward-
looking mentality, once again in the student vocabulary of the seventeenth 
century. “Spießbürger” and “Spießer” also carry connotations of conservatism 
and narrow-mindedness, according to the Duden.3 Although his oeuvre includes 
many instances of “Philister”, “Spießbürger” and “Spießer”, Adorno 
overwhelmingly prefers “Banause”, derived from the Greek “Bánausos”. This 
was a term for the artisan class, denied access to education and culture, during 																																																								
1 Theodor Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften in zwanzig Bänden, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, with the 
assistance of Gretel Adorno, Susan Buck-Morss, Klaus Schultz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1970-1986); Theodor Adorno, Nachgelassene Schriften, ed. by Theodor W Adorno 
Archive (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993-). All cross-references to these volumes 
are given in square brackets in short-form, e.g. “GS7” or “NaS1:2”. 
2 “Philister”, Duden; “Philister”, Duden Etymologie. 
3 “Spießbürger”, Duden; “Spießer”, Duden; “Spießbürger”, Duden Etymologie; Leslie, 
“Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”, p.201. 
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the age of antiquity. It was adapted to denote intellectual and aesthetic 
incompetence, as well as a lack of depth and a failure to appreciate finer things, 
in nineteenth-century Germany.4 Its adjectival form is sometimes translated as 
“Banausic”, so that the figure of the philistine drops out of sight in English. 
Conversely, “Philistine” is introduced illegitimately by translators on a number 
of occasions, and the most egregious of these instances have been excluded from 
my survey.5 Derived from the Greek “Ámousía” (“Without the Muses”), 
“Amusie” – meaning unmusical, art-alien or the absence of an aesthetic 
sensibility – appears in a few of the passages quoted below, despite not being an 
exact analogue for “Philistine”.6 We sometimes encounter other related but 
distinct terms, such as “Unmusikalische” (“Unmusical”) and “Kunstfremde” 
(“Art-alien”). Throughout, I adopt the practice of specifying the original word in 
square brackets, and noting its particular associations where these are relevant, 
but my primary focus remains the content of the concept, rather than questions of 
translation. 
 
The Immanent Negation of Art 
 
As set out in the Introduction, Beech and Roberts’ “Spectres of the 
Aesthetic” inaugurated the main phase of the philistine controversy, which was 
conducted chiefly in New Left Review, a journal historically associated with the 
Anglophone transmission of Adorno. There they explain the emergence of the 
new aestheticism with reference to a number of causal factors, of which the most 																																																								
4 “Banause”, Duden; “Banause”, Duden Etymologie. 
5 See: Theodor Adorno, “Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukács’ Realism in our Time” 
[1958], in Notes to Literature, Volume 1, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p.235 [GS11, p.273]; Theodor Adorno, Sound Figures 
[1959], trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 
p.177 [GS16, p.206]; Theodor Adorno, “Ernst Bloch’s Spuren: On the Revised Edition of 
1959” [1960], in Notes to Literature, Volume 1, p.203 [GS11, p.236]; Theodor Adorno, 
“Engagement” [1962], trans. by Francis McDonagh, in Aesthetics and Politics, ed. by New Left 
Books (London: Verso, 2007), p.193 [GS11, p.428]; Theodor Adorno, “Stefan George” [1967], 
in Notes to Literature, Volume 2, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), p.185 [GS11, pp.529-530]; Theodor Adorno, “Charmed 
Language: On the Poetry of Rudolf Borchardt” [1967], in Notes to Literature, Volume 2, p.198 
[GS11, p.542]. 
6 “Amusie”, Duden; “Amusie”, Harrap’s Standard German and English Dictionary, ed. by Trevor 
Jones (London: Harrap, 1963); Stephen Halliwell, “Amousia: Living Without the Muses”, in 
Aesthetic Value in Classical Antiquity, ed. by Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M Rosen (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), p.17. 
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certain is said to be the first publication in English of Aesthetic Theory, in the 
now superseded translation by Christian Lenhart of 1984. Beech and Roberts 
contend that the influence of this text has been problematic, with the key 
category of aesthetic autonomy misconstrued as entailing isolation and non-
partisanship, whereas aesthetic form is immanently permeated by the social, for 
Adorno. According to “Spectres of the Aesthetic”, Bernstein and Bowie seek to 
reclaim aesthetics from the right, but they are also reacting against a perceived 
reduction of the artistic to the social in structuralist Marxism, feminist theory and 
postcolonial studies. It is in opposition to their model of aesthetic autonomy, 
which allegedly denies the social character of art, that the figure of the philistine 
is mobilized by Beech and Roberts. The philistine controversy is in this way 
situated within the context of the contemporary reception of Adorno, and in 
particular Aesthetic Theory.7 
In addition to attempting to recover his work from interpretations that 
sever the link between his social theory and his philosophical aesthetics, Beech 
and Roberts advance their own critique of Adorno. The main thrust of it is that 
the concept of philistinism, as it is deployed in his writing, remains 
undertheorized. They aim to correct the supposed one-sidedness in his 
representation of the dialectic of art and its other, through the incorporation into 
aesthetic theory of the “truth-claims of the philistine”: 
 
Adorno draws together the love of art and the ressentiment of the 
philistine without proposing the resolution of their conflict by expressing 
this rivalry as a wound on the body of art. But his dialectic is not the 
dialectic of art and its other, it is merely the dialectic of art inscribed by 
its other. Adorno assimilates the moment of philistinism to art; he does 
not assimilate the moment of art to philistinism. Therefore, Adorno 
underestimates the critical potential of philistinism by failing to allow 
voluptuous pleasures and inexpert forms of attention to distract art from 
its intellectual duties.8 
 
																																																								
7 Beech and Roberts, “Spectres of the Aesthetic”, pp.13-47. 
8 Ibid., pp.43-44. 
 33 
“Spectres of the Aesthetic” proposes placing greater emphasis on those moments 
in his work when he explicitly affirms the critical potential of philistinism, citing 
as an example his admission that “the philistine [Philister] is not completely 
wrong to sneer at art” in Aesthetic Theory.9 Robert Hullot-Kentor, whose 
standard translation of the text came out a year after this article in 1997, renders 
the same passage as follows, given here in full: “Ridiculousness is the residue of 
the mimetic in art, the price of its self-enclosure. In his condemnation of this 
element, the philistine [Philister] always has an ignominious measure of 
justification.”10 I will return to this quotation later in the chapter. 
Bull’s “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, subsequently repurposed for his 
book Anti-Nietzsche [2011], was originally framed as an intervention in the 
philistine controversy, also published in New Left Review. The fact that the 
philistine, though often invoked rhetorically as an object of abuse, is not a type 
with which people tend to identify willingly, indicates that it occupies a specific 
position in relation to positive value, according to Bull. He elaborates this claim 
through a speculative history of negation, encompassing the successive phases of 
atheism, anarchism and nihilism. His hypothesis is that each of these first 
emerged as the imaginary other of the dominant discourse, before a series of 
transpositions took place, in which what began as an abstract negation was made 
concrete and progressively legitimized, before finally instituting its own form of 
positive value. In the case of atheism this was the state, for anarchism it was 
morality, and for nihilism it was beauty. The next stage in the sequence is 
supposed to be philistinism, which as with previous forerunners of positive value 
is now delineated mainly through the language of its detractors, as a discursive 
construct which does not yet correspond to an empirical reality. Bull champions 
the philistine as the means by which the aesthetic might be eliminated, merging 
the conceptions of them found in Nietzsche and Arnold, and mapping that 
composite figure onto the reconstruction of the myth of Odysseus by Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments 
[1944].11 
																																																								
9 Ibid., p.43. 
10 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.158 [GS7, p.181]. 
11 Bull, “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, pp.48-72; Bull, Anti-Nietzsche, pp.1–26. For an alternative 
reading of the same scene from Dialectic of Enlightenment, which also reflects on the function 
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 “The Ecstasy of Philistinism” develops a radically different version of 
the dialectic of art and its other to “Spectres of the Aesthetic”. However, Bull 
takes as his starting point another moment in which the critical potential of 
philistinism is explicitly affirmed by Adorno in Aesthetic Theory. Like Beech 
and Roberts, Bull quotes from the only translation available at the time of his 
original article: 
 
Believing that philistinism was not mere vulgarity but “the antithesis par 
excellence of aesthetic behaviour”, Adorno expressed interest in studying 
the phenomenon as a via negativa to the aesthetic. But the project 
remained unrealized, and although he frequently made dismissive or 
insulting remarks about philistines, Adorno never bothered to investigate 
what, if anything, philistinism might be. In this respect, his attitude was 
characteristic of the discourse against philistinism that had been in 
circulation since the nineteenth century. But in his unfulfilled desire to 
study the philistine, Adorno opened the way to a revaluation of that 
tradition, for upon closer examination the philistine proves to be a figure 
of greater historical and intellectual importance than Adorno imagined.12 
 
Hullot-Kentor’s expanded version of the embedded quotation at the beginning of 
this passage reads: “The counterconcept to aesthetic comportment is, quite 
simply, the concept of the philistine [Banausischen], which often overlaps with 
the vulgar [Vulgäre] yet remains distinct from it by its indifference or hatred, 
whereas vulgarity [Vulgäritat] greedily smacks its lips.”13 I will also return to 
this quotation later in the chapter. 
In “Spectres of the Aesthetic”, Beech and Roberts present a version of the 
dialectic of art and its other which gives a central role to the philistine: “[T]he 
concept of the philistine is peculiarly well placed, as the definitional other of art 
and aesthetics, to bring to bear on art and aesthetics the cost of their exclusions, 
blindnesses and anxieties. Indeed it could be said the philistine is the spectre of 
																																																																																																																																																						
of philistinism for Adorno, see: Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or: The Persistence of 
the Dialectic [1990] (London: Verso, 2007), pp.123-154. 
12 Bull, “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, p.48. 
13 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.314 [GS7, p.357]. 
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art and aesthetics.”14 The philistine is both discursive and empirical, as the ideal 
representation of what art and aesthetics are not, embodying the derogations and 
delegitimizations through which their boundaries are secured in reality. The 
practices excluded from the aesthetic sphere return to haunt it in the spectre of 
the philistine: “As an empirical and discursive construction, philistinism has a 
dialectical identity which shifts and slides along the edges of what is established 
as proper aesthetic behaviour. Consequently, values, categories and forms of 
attention once described as philistine can become incorporated into artistic and 
aesthetic practices through intellectual and practical struggle, but this will not 
diminish philistinism, only redraw the lines of demarcation.”15 The figures of the 
voluptuous and the partisan, respectively associated with bodily pleasure and 
cultural contestation, are subsumed into the concept of philistinism. The 
philistine then exerts pressure on art and aesthetics, reconstituting their autonomy 
in a continuous cycle of exclusion, assimilation and transformation: “[T]he 
autonomy of art and aesthetics is understood as perpetually rewriting their 
borders against the voluptuous and practical demands of the philistine.”16 In their 
version of the dialectic of art and its other, Beech and Roberts position the 
philistine as internal to the aesthetic sphere, and ultimately productive of new 
forms of aesthetic value. 
In “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, Bull differentiates his version of the 
dialectic of art and its other from that contained in “Spectres of the Aesthetic”: 
“Art is not […] assimilated to philistinism but annihilated by it, and although the 
resulting void may yet contain some positive value, that value need not be 
aesthetic.”17 With regard to Adorno, Beech and Roberts are said to do no more 
than invert his theory of art, substituting the philistine for the avant-garde. Bull 
insists that the philistine should be imagined as destructive, rather than 
deconstructive: 
 
Imagining philistinism as the deconstructive, rather than the destructive 
negation of the aesthetic bestows on philistinism a role that Adorno gave 
to art itself – negating the negation within the discourse of the aesthetic. 																																																								
14 Beech and Roberts, “Spectres of the Aesthetic”, p.45. 
15 Ibid., p.45. 
16 Ibid., p.47. 
17 Bull, “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, p.72. 
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So rather than offering an alternative to Adorno’s dialectic, Beech and 
Roberts are therefore taking up a position that is already implicit within 
it. […] For Adorno, as for his critics, the dialectic of art and its other 
involves not the destruction of art but its continuation in other forms.18 
 
By contrast, Bull’s philistine negates aesthetic value as such, replacing it with a 
new form of positive value, as yet unspecified. This dialectic is imagined as an 
external force acting on art, and indeed its externality is what guarantees its 
negativity: “[A] way of seeing art that stands outside the discourse it negates and 
so promises not just an end to aesthetic ideology, but a liberation from art 
itself.”19 According to Bull, Beech and Roberts misconstrue the dialectic as a 
medium through which art operates, instead of a process to which it is subject. 
In their follow-up essay in New Left Review “Tolerating Impurities: An 
Ontology, Genealogy and Defence of Philistinism” [1998], Beech and Roberts 
confirm that their concept of the philistine is immanent to art and aesthetics: 
“[O]ur critique of the new aestheticism and our concept of the philistine are 
internal to the philosophy of aesthetics and the criticism and practice of art.”20 
They distance themselves from Bull: “[W]e take our distance from Malcolm 
Bull’s essay, “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, because for him the philistine is 
merely the name given to the imagined agency of art’s formal negation, that is, a 
concept which is no more than a counter-factual token given form by utopian 
longing. Our philistine, on the other hand, is emphatically relational, remaining 
deeply entangled in the alienated conditions of art’s production and reception.”21 
They also maintain that the complete destruction of the aesthetic would be a 
disavowal of the relationality on which philistinism is predicated. “The Philistine 
and the Logic of Negation” [2002], their final joint essay on the topic, 
recapitulates this model of the dialectic of art and its other, and reaffirms its debt 
to Adorno: “If our theory of the philistine has explanatory power […] it rests on 
																																																								
18 Ibid., p.71. 
19 Ibid., p.72. 
20 Beech and Roberts, “Tolerating Impurities”, p.126. 
21 Ibid, p.126. 
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the recovery of the emancipatory negation at the heart of Adorno’s philistine as 
the spectre of art and aesthetics.”22 
Beech and Roberts’ philistine is immanent to art and aesthetics, and in the 
end only transformative of them. Bull’s philistine effects their complete 
negation, but does so from a position external to them. The first of these versions 
of the dialectic of art and its other conceptualizes the philistine as an immanent 
non-negation, and the second as a non-immanent negation. Adorno’s philistine is 
already a sublation of these positions, as the immanent negation of art and 
aesthetics. This is not explicitly set out in his work, but instead emerges from his 
treatment of the double-sided concept of philistinism. He deploys the term to 
secure the borders of art and aesthetics, while at the same time disclosing their 
investment in exploitation and domination. This manoeuvre underlines the role 
of art as a privileged site of resistance, where the possibility of truth is 
inextricable from elitism, according to Adorno. However, Beech and Roberts are 
correct in identifying definite limits to the incorporation of the truth-claims of the 
philistine in his work. Likewise, Bull is right to point to a resistance on his part 
to following through with the destruction of art. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
Adorno’s philistine embodies the promise of the immanent negation of art and 
aesthetics, but still requires further theoretical development if that critical 
potential is to be realized. 
“Spectres of the Aesthetic” and “The Ecstasy of Philistinism” both seek 
to work through Adormo’s allegedly undeveloped insight that the philistine is the 
counterconcept to aesthetic comportment. The assumptions behind this shared 
objective require further interrogation. How undertheorized is the concept of 
philistinism in Adorno? Is it accurate to state that “Adorno assimilates the 
moment of philistinism to art; he does not assimilate the moment of art to 
philistinism”? Likewise: “[A]lthough he frequently made dismissive or insulting 
remarks about philistines, Adorno never bothered to investigate what, if 
anything, philistinism might be”? There are undoubtedly examples of apparently 
straightforward dismissive or insulting remarks about philistines in his work, 
which draw on established associations of cultural backwardness and aesthetic 
																																																								
22 Dave Beech and John Roberts, “The Philistine and the Logic of Negation” [2002], in The 
Philistine Controversy, p.273. 
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incompetence.23 These seemingly one-dimensional references to philistinism are 
however much less frequent than asserted by Bull. Conversely, Beech and 
Roberts could have chosen from a number of other occasions when the critical 
potential of philistinism is explicitly affirmed, or the perspective of the enemies 
of advanced art is partially admitted.24 In any case, Bull is wrong to treat the 
pejorative tenor of individual statements as unreflexively conventional, and as 
such incompatible with the desire to study philistinism as a via negativa to the 
aesthetic. Similarly, Beech and Roberts are mistaken in their call to focus on 
those passages which heavily accent the moment of truth in philistinism, at least 
if this entails considering the term in isolation from its other applications. If we 
are to realize the critical potential identified above, Adorno’s derogatory 
comments about philistines must be read in conjunction with the instances in 
which he makes use of the concept to negate the ideological aspects of culture, 
art and aesthetics. 
 
Culture 
 
PURE CULTURE AND POPULAR CULTURE 
 
What is Adorno’s model of the field of culture, at the point in his career 
when he pays most attention to this topic, that is, during and immediately 
following the period of exile occasioned by the rise of the Nazis and WW2, the 
most famous product of which is Dialectic of Enlightenment? He often describes 
it as comprising two antagonistic but interdependent realms, sometimes referred 
to as the domains of pure culture and popular culture. The former encompasses 
the bourgeois art which is officially sanctioned as well as the radical art of the 																																																								
23 See: Theodor Adorno, Philosophy of New Music [1949], trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), pp.181-182 [GS12, p.93], 
p.192 [GS12, p.181]; Theodor Adorno, “Bach Defended Against his Devotees” [1951], in 
Prisms [1955], trans. by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 1983), p.137 [GS10.1, p.141]; Theodor Adorno, “Music, Language, and Composition” 
[1956], trans. by Susan H Gillespie, in Essays on Music, ed. by Richard Leppert (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 2002), p.122 [GS16, p.659]; Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory, p.276 [GS7, p.314]. 
24 See: Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life [1951], trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), p.218 [GS4, p.247]; Adorno, Sound Figures, p.29 
[GS16, p.40]; Adorno, “Music, Language, and Composition”, pp.119 [GS16, p.656]; Theodor 
Adorno, “Difficulties” [1964], trans. by Susan H Gillespie, in Essays on Music, p.657 [GS17, 
p.269]; Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.375 [GS7, p.436]. 
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avant-garde, while the latter extends from surviving folk forms to mass-produced 
entertainment. This dichotomy is roughly equivalent to those between high and 
low art, serious and light art, autonomous and commercial art, and so on. In each 
case an elevated aesthetic, which is the preserve of the ruling class, is set against 
the cultural products preferred by the masses. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Adorno and Horkheimer map out the class dynamics of this internally conflicted 
field in a passage from the chapter “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as 
Mass Deception”: 
 
The purity of bourgeois art, hypostatized as a realm of freedom 
contrasting to material praxis, was bought from the outset with the 
exclusion of the lower class; and art keeps faith with the cause of that 
class, the true universal, precisely by freeing itself from the purposes of 
the false. Serious art has denied itself to those for whom the hardship and 
oppression of life make a mockery of seriousness and who must be glad 
to use the time not spent at the production line in being simply carried 
along. Light art has accompanied autonomous art as its shadow. It is the 
social bad conscience of serious art. The truth which the latter could not 
apprehend because of its social premises gives the former an appearance 
of objective justification. The split between them is itself the truth: it 
expresses at least the negativity of the culture which is the sum of both 
spheres.25 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that the independence of the sphere of pure 
culture is premised on the unjust organization of society, as its artworks are only 
accessible to those with the economic means, leisure time and aesthetic 
competence to appreciate them, forms of class privilege which enable a critical 
perspective, but which also block the ability to see the whole truth of this 
situation. That the sphere of popular culture is instead oriented towards the 
exploited and oppressed does not confer on it any special insight though, as it 
merely provides them with distraction and relaxation, compensatory pleasures 																																																								
25 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments 
[1944], ed. by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), pp.107-108. All references are to this edition except where 
otherwise stated. 
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which might seem justified given the conditions of their lives, but which 
ultimately serve the maintenance of the status quo. There is undoubtedly a 
correspondence between light art as the shadow of autonomous art and the 
philistine as the counterconcept to aesthetic comportment, but in my view these 
categories should not simply be conflated. The opposition of pure culture and 
popular culture is related to but distinct from the dialectic of art and its other, as 
demonstrated below. 
For the most part, Adorno depicts the philistine as bourgeois, in keeping 
with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century characterizations of this figure, however 
at times he does associate them with the masses, which was the dominant 
approach by the middle of the twentieth century, as summarized in the 
Introduction. Etymologically, “Banause” is derived from a derogatory expression 
for the artisan class in Ancient Greece, and he directly connects it to that 
classical context in “Cultural Criticism and Society” [1951]. He argues in this 
essay that the realm of pure culture, dependent on the labour of others for its 
aesthetic autonomy, is nevertheless the sole position from which an alternative to 
the given order might be articulated, through its ambivalent embodiment of the 
idea of freedom. The figure of the philistine is admitted only negatively, as the 
implicit obverse of anti-philistinism: 
 
The anti-philistinism [Antibanausie] of Athens was both the most 
arrogant contempt of the man who need not soil his hands for the man 
from whose work he lives, and the preservation of an image of existence 
beyond the constraint which underlies all work. In projecting its own 
uneasy conscience onto its victims as their “baseness”, such an attitude 
also accuses that which they endure: the subjugation of men to the 
prevailing form in which their lives are reproduced.26 
 
The guilt of the ruling class is said to motivate its defensive attribution of 
philistinism to the adherents of the realm of popular culture, who lack the 
educational and cultural capital to understand the productions of pure culture. 
Adorno’s characteristic technique of casting light on the present through an 																																																								
26 Theodor Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society” [1951], in Prisms, pp.26-27 [GS10.1, p.20]. 
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excursus into the distant past is repeated in “Culture and Administration” [1960], 
which also alludes to the roots of the term “Banause”: “The scent of philistinism 
[Banausischen] which clings to administration is of the same type – and not only 
philologically – as the odium attached to low, useful, and, in the final analysis, 
physical labour by antiquity.”27 
In “Cultural Criticism and Society”, Plato and Aristotle are identified as 
representatives of power, who are discomforted by the notion of pure culture, 
and instead adopt a pragmatic approach to the role of art in society. Adorno 
differentiates the cultural criticism practiced by the modern bourgeoisie from 
these philosophers on the basis of that pragmatism, while the anti-philistinism 
directed at the lower class is said to intensify with the development of an 
industrial proletariat: 
 
Modern bourgeois cultural criticism has, of course, been too prudent to 
follow them [Plato and Aristotle] openly in this respect. But such 
criticism secretly finds a source of comfort in the divorce between “high” 
and “popular” culture, art and entertainment, knowledge and non-
committal Weltanschauung. Its anti-philistinism [antibanausischer] 
exceeds that of the Athenian upper class to the extent that the proletariat 
is more dangerous than the slaves. The modern notion of a pure, 
autonomous culture indicates that the antagonism has become 
irreconcilable.28 
 
He again emphasizes the contempt of the ruling class for physical work, and the 
irreconcilable antagonism referred to here is based on the division of intellectual 
and manual labour, in which culture itself is supposed to originate.29 His use of 
the concept of philistinism is dialectical, adopting it as a means to invalidate the 
sphere of popular culture, while remaining conscious of its complicity with 
exploitation and domination, and allowing its critical force to rebound on the 
																																																								
27 Theodor Adorno, “Culture and Administration” [1960], trans. by Wes Blomster, in The Culture 
Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. by Jay Bernstein (London: Routledge, 2001), 
p.115 [GS8, p.130]. 
28 Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society”, p.27 [GS10.1, p.21]. 
29 Ibid., p.26. 
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sphere of pure culture. This dual movement is consistent with his belief that truth 
cannot be expressed positively within the false whole of contemporary society. 
 Adorno does concede that there may be moments of truth in low forms 
like the circus, but in his opinion their critical potential is lost with their 
incorporation into the culture industry.30 This is an integrated system for the 
exchange of standardized cultural commodities, which as it develops wholly 
subsumes the realm of popular culture, and brings about a concomitant 
deterioration of the realm of pure culture. The examples cited so far may 
associate the former domain with philistinism, but it is worth noting that they do 
so only indirectly, in reporting that this label is applied to the lower class by the 
ruling class. Similarly, “Perennial Fashion – Jazz” [1953] does not call the 
audience of mass-produced entertainment philistine, but rather those sections of 
the intelligentsia which act as cheerleaders for the culture industry: 
 
Among the symptoms of the disintegration of culture and education, not 
the least is the fact that the distinction between autonomous “high” and 
commercial “light” art, however questionable it may be, is neither 
critically reflected nor even noticed any more. And now that certain 
culturally defeatist intellectuals have pitted the latter against the former, 
the philistine [banausischen] champions of the culture industry can even 
take pride in the conviction that they are marching in the vanguard of the 
Zeitgeist. The organization of culture into “levels” such as the first, 
second and third programmes, patterned after low, middle and highbrow, 
is reprehensible. But it cannot be overcome simply by the lowbrow sects 
declaring themselves to be highbrow.31 
 
Adorno here reflects on the breakdown in the distinction between pure culture 
and popular culture, which is accelerated by the collaboration of a faction of the 
former, as when he refers to the expert engaging in “philistine [banausisches] 
collusion” in Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music [1963].32 The 
previous stratification of culture is described as “questionable” and 																																																								
30 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.108, p.114. 
31 Theodor Adorno, “Perennial Fashion – Jazz” [1953], in Prisms, p.127 [GS10.1, p.130]. 
32 Adorno, Quasi una Fantasia, p.72 [GS16, p.316]. 
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“reprehensible”, but it at least had the advantage of making visible its 
dependence on a similarly hierarchical class structure. The unjust organization of 
society on which the field was always based has not been overcome, and so the 
pseudo-democratization of culture really involves the subordination of the 
“autonomous” to the “commercial”. According to Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
“What is new […] is that the irreconcilable elements of culture, art and 
amusement, have been subjected equally to the concept of purpose and thus 
brought under a single false denominator: the totality of the culture industry.”33 
In what follows, I focus on this phenomenon in relation to the problematic of 
philistinism, before turning to the specific type of the cultivated philistine, and 
their confrontation with advanced art. 
 
THE CULTURE INDUSTRY 
 
It is worth stressing that in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and 
Horkheimer never describe the audience of mass-produced entertainment as 
philistine, contrary to what might be expected, given their reputation for elitism. 
Translator Edmund Jephcott records just one instance of the term in the whole 
book, which does in fact occur in the chapter on the culture industry, but is not 
aimed directly at the consumers: “The resurrection of Hans Sonnenstöer, the 
enemy of bourgeois philistines [spießerfeindlichen], in Germany, and the smug 
cosiness of Life with Father have one and the same meaning.”34 John Cumming’s 
earlier version of the text excises this sole reference to philistinism, choosing to 
translate the original “Spießerfeindlichen” as “Anti-bourgeois”.35 As indicated by 
the presence of the middle-class “Bürger” in “Spießbürger”, the “Spießer” is 
conventionally associated with the bourgeoisie, and this class content becomes 
visible in the slippage between the translations. In his wider body of work, 
Adorno tends to depict the philistine as bourgeois, regardless of the etymology of 
“Banause”. Proletarians are only charged with philistinism when they attempt to 
appropriate the cultural heritage for themselves, as in this passage from Minima 
Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life [1951], a book mostly written during 																																																								
33 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.108. 
34 Ibid., p.120 [GS3, p.172]. 
35 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], trans. by John 
Cumming (London: Verso, 2008), p.149 [GS3, p.172]. 
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the same period of exile as Dialectic of Enlightenment: “[Their] philistinism 
[Banausie] […] lies less in their incomprehension of culture than in the alacrity 
with which they accept it at face value, identify with it and in so doing, of course, 
reverse its meaning.”36 The class content of the concept is never entirely fixed, 
but instead shifts according to the context in which it is deployed. He even 
suggests that the philistine as a class-bound category, identified with a specific 
stratum of society, is superseded under advanced capitalism, as such distinctions 
are obscured by the increasing convergence between the subjective worldviews, 
though not the objective interests, of the different levels. According to Minima 
Moralia: “The perpetuation of the real difference between upper and lower strata 
is assisted by the progressive disappearance of differences in the mode of 
consciousness between the two.”37 This perhaps forms part of the reason why the 
philistine, as a discursive construct approximating a particular mode of 
consciousness, is not a more prominent figure in his polemics against the culture 
industry. 
Writing in English, Adorno refers to philistinism in connection with the 
culture industry slightly more often in Current of Music: Elements of a Radio 
Theory [2006], a posthumously published analysis of radio listening also drafted 
while he was in the USA, working under Paul Lazarsfeld on the Princeton Radio 
Research Project. In a taxonomy of gestures of opposition to the “ubiquity-
standardization” inherent in the medium, Adorno comments on the action of 
emphatically switching off the set: 
 
The author has observed that people switch off their radios with a sort of 
wild joy, just as if they were shouting, “I shut his mouth for him!” This 
gesture of opposition is the most fruitless of all. It creates the illusion of 
might and power, but it really means only that the rebel is withdrawing 
from contact with the very public events he believes he is altering. Of 
course they really go on without taking any notice of him. It is a more 
modern form of the attitude of the philistine, talking politics in his tavern, 
pounding the table with his fist, shouting “It can’t go on like this any 
longer!” and ordering another glass of beer. As soon as the listener, the 																																																								
36 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.53 [GS4, p.59]. 
37 Ibid., p.187. 
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man who says proudly “I just can’t stand this stuff any longer”, triumphs 
over ubiquity-standardization and changes the phenomenon, he loses his 
apparent power because the phenomenon ceases to exist and he is left 
alone.38 
 
This philistine is more likely petit-bourgeois than bourgeois, perhaps even a 
peasant. The label is not directly applied to the radio listener, who is merely 
described as exhibiting, in an updated form, an attitude characteristic of the 
outmoded archetype of the drunken philistine, recalling the obsolete connotations 
of the English word mentioned in the Introduction. This is not the only time he 
refers to this variant of the philistine in his oeuvre.39 Nevertheless, Adorno 
generally presents the philistine as a member of the dominant rather than the 
dominated classes. 
Elsewhere in Current of Music, Adorno suggests that philistinism has 
been near-universalized: “The mistaken idea of democracy, which makes it 
imperative for most people to conform to philistine cultural standards, finds 
musical refuge in the readiness of the audience to be taken in by the cult of an 
already achieved success promoted by plugging.”40 The universalization of 
philistinism is effected through the transmission of its cultural standards to the 
masses, for example via the “benevolently patronizing statements” of the NBC 
Music Appreciation Hour: 
 
“Yet, in early times, much music was produced whose artistic perfection 
compares favorably with that of the great works of recent years.” Though 
there were no skyscrapers in Bach’s time, his music was, after all, not so 
bad. The complement of this idea is, of course, that any contemporary 
composer who actually dares to write skyscraper music – as it were – is 
an intellectual ultra-modernist. These gaucheries are characteristic of the 
thinking of the musical Babbitt. We cannot here discuss the results of this 
sort of instruction upon the Hour’s actual listeners. We can only say that 																																																								
38 Theodor Adorno, Current of Music: Elements of a Radio Theory [2006], ed. by Robert Hullot-
Kentor (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p.113. 
39 See: Theodor Adorno, “Expression and Artistic Truthfulness: Toward a Critique of Recent 
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40 Adorno, Current of Music, p.292. 
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if such philistinism crops up in the thinking of the musically-educated, 
then how can we hope that the musically-unaware will become better 
educated than their teachers?41 
 
The same section of the book also contains this passage, which analyses such 
popular instruction in terms of its accompanying pedagogical material, charging 
it with pandering to universal philistinism by suggesting that music ought to be 
equally intelligible to all: “This would mean that the inauguration of the line of 
least resistance as the ultimate quality of music and philistine self-satisfaction 
and ignorance would be the judge of its aesthetic value.”42 The universalization 
of philistinism further accounts for its near-invisibility in the texts on the culture 
industry, as the absolute dominance of philistine cultural standards means that 
their personification by one social type among others is no longer appropriate. 
The German-language texts contain partial exceptions to this tendency, 
including those already cited from “Cultural Criticism and Society” and 
“Perennial Fashion – Jazz”. In another passage from the second of these essays, 
Adorno diagnoses the castration anxiety underlying the terminology of long- and 
short-haired musicians, playing on the biblical provenance of the word 
“Philister”, by alluding to the “uncircumcised Philistines” who set upon Samson 
in Judges: “In jazz, the Philistines [Philister] standing over Samson are 
permanently transfigured. In truth, the Philistines [Philister]. The castration 
symbolism, deeply buried in the practices of jazz and cut off from consciousness 
through the institutionalization of perennial sameness, is for that very reason 
probably all the more potent.”43 “A Title” [1952] uses the term to describe the 
eponymous antihero of Heinrich Mann’s Professor Unrat [1905], detailing how 
the critical force of the book is neutralized by the film adaptation The Blue Angel 
[1930]: “Pure delight in the carefully dished out sex appeal leads people to 
overlook the fact that the committee removed every social barb and turned the 
philistine devil [Spießerdämon] into a figure of sentimental comedy.”44 
“Prologue to Television” [1953] dismisses the public service value that the 
institutions of the culture industry claim to provide, quoting Goethe: “Our 																																																								
41 Ibid., p.210. 
42 Ibid., p.194. 
43 Adorno, “Perennial Fashion – Jazz”, p.130 [GS10.1, p.134]; The Bible, Judges 14:3. 
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participation in public affairs is mostly only philistinism [Philisterei].”45 There is 
also a passing reference to the contemporary “deluge of philistinism [Banausie]”, 
presumably synonymous with mass-produced entertainment, in Aesthetic 
Theory.46 These examples are however rare, and in most cases it is not the 
masses themselves who are called philistine, but rather the cultural standards 
forced upon them, which they in turn demand. Notwithstanding this mutually 
reinforcing dynamic, Adorno regards the ruling class, which retains control of 
the apparatuses of the culture industry, as chiefly responsible for spreading the 
traditionally bourgeois condition of philistinism among the proletariat, insofar as 
that process can still be discerned given the increasing convergence of their 
modes of consciousness, itself exacerbated by the standardization of cultural 
products. 
 
THE CULTIVATED PHILISTINE 
 
By contrast with the relative scarcity of references to the philistinism of 
the masses in his writings on the culture industry, Adorno regularly invokes the 
unambiguously bourgeois figure of the “Bildungphilister”, a subspecies of the 
philistine covered in the Introduction. The cultivated philistine, variously 
translated as the cultural philistine, the cultured philistine or the educated 
philistine, appears in a number of different guises across his oeuvre, for example 
as a source of received ideas and stock vocabulary in “The Essay as Form” 
[1958]; as a supporter of the position that technical mastery of traditional skills 
equates to aesthetic importance in Sound Figures [1959]; and as a poseur who 
derives social status from their conspicuous consumption of artworks in 
Aesthetic Theory.47 He has a penchant for combining contraries in compound 
words, coining such paradoxical formulations as “noble philistinism 
[Edelbanausie]” and “philistine wisdom [Spießbürger-weisheit]”.48 As we have 																																																								
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seen, “Bildungphilister” was originally devised by Nietzsche, to illustrate how 
the idea of culture had turned into its opposite and become hegemonic in 
nineteenth-century Germany. “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer” 
describes a universal philistinism imposed from above, which arguably 
anticipates the accounts of the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment and 
Current of Music. Adorno explicitly takes up the figure of the cultivated 
philistine, and they also serve as an implicit model for his sense of philistinism 
more generally, not least in terms of their class identity. Like Nietzsche, Adorno 
sometimes situates the philistine within the community of scholars, inverting the 
historical usage of the term derived from town and gown disputes, as when he 
highlights the “philistine [philiströser] zeal” of “German academicians” in 
“Spengler After the Decline” [1941].49 Their versions of the philistine overlap on 
a number of other points as well, including narrow-mindedness, 
compartmentalization, conservatism, complacency and cowardice, intellectual 
and aesthetic incompetence, and a commitment to the primacy of reality. 
These traits are however so prevalent in the wider discourse on 
philistinism that they do not necessarily indicate a direct link between the two 
philosophers. The connection becomes evident in texts such as Adorno’s “On the 
Crisis of Literary Criticism” [1952], which praises Nietzsche: “[W]hen Nietzsche 
exposed the language of the cultured philistine [Bildungsphilisters], […he was] 
participating in objective spirit.”50 The insight that is acknowledged here requires 
updating in the light of changed circumstances, according to Adorno. Minima 
Moralia details how the cultivated philistine has been transformed over time: 
 
Just as in Nietzsche’s day educated philistines [Bildungphilister] believed 
in progress, the unfaltering elevation of the masses and the greatest 
possible happiness for the greatest possible number, so today they 
believe, without quite knowing it themselves, in the opposite, the 
revocation of 1789, the incorrigibility of human nature, the 
anthropological impossibility of happiness – in other words, that the 																																																																																																																																																						
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workers are too well-off. The profound insights of the day before 
yesterday have been reduced to the ultimate in banality.51 
 
This reversal is for him indicative of the barbarism of his own era, which 
outstrips that described by Nietzsche. As early as “The Sociology of Knowledge 
and its Consciousness” [1937], Adorno makes the case that the cultivated 
philistine, as conceived by his forerunner, has been historically superseded: “The 
cultural philistine [Bildungsphilister] has long ceased to be the man of progress, 
the figure with which Nietzsche identified David Friedrich Strauss.”52 This 
represents another fluctuation in the temporal orientation of the philistine, who is 
both a reactionary and a visionary, nostalgic for an idealized past, and the 
harbinger of a dystopian future, in Adorno as in Nietzsche. 
If WW2 was the central historical event of the period when Adorno 
focused most intensively on questions of culture, then this context is also 
relevant to his reading of Nietzsche. In the section of Minima Moralia “A word 
for morality”, Adorno comments obliquely on the Nazis’ appropriation of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy: “Amoralism, with which Nietzsche chastised the old 
untruth, is itself now subject to the verdict of history.”53 The formulation of the 
cultivated philistine fuses the apparent opposites of culture and philistinism into 
a single entity, a theoretical manoeuvre comparable to the strategy of amoralism 
insofar as both attempt to transcend the horizon of accepted meanings, 
defamiliarizing our mystified understanding of society: “Nietzsche […] turned 
the mask of evil upon the normal world, to teach the norm to fear its own 
perversity.”54 The Nazis crudely distorted his amoralism, mobilizing the concept 
of master-morality to justify their brutality, according to “A word for morality”: 
 
The implied meaning of the master-morality, that he who wants to live 
must fend for himself, has […] become a still more miserable lie than it 
was when a nineteenth-century piece of pulpit-wisdom. If in Germany the 
common citizen has proved himself a blond beast, this has nothing to do 																																																								
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with national peculiarities, but with the fact that blond bestiality itself, 
social rapine, has become in face of manifest abundance the attitude of 
the backwoodsman, the deluded philistine [Philisters], that same “hard-
done-by” mentality which the master-morality was invented to combat. If 
Cesare Borgia were resurrected today, he would look like David Friedrich 
Strauss and his name would be Adolf Hitler.55 
 
Adorno argues that with the rationalization and expansion of the production 
process it should now technically be possible to satisfy all material needs, 
however the fully administered society remains directed towards irrational ends, 
based as it is on the principle of exchange for its own sake. The Nazis’ brutality 
is justified by a narrative of the survival of the fittest against a backdrop of 
supposed economic scarcity, an untenable position in the light of these changed 
conditions of existence, which makes that attitude appear philistine. It is the 
evolution of advanced capitalism which is the ultimate ground of the philistinism 
identified here, incidentally associated with backwardness, credulity and 
resentment. This process of historical development, which is more widespread 
than just its extreme manifestation in the form of fascism, includes the extension 
of the culture industry to the point where it incorporates advanced art. 
 
THE CONFRONTATION WITH ADVANCED ART 
 
Let us now return to the distinction between the philistine and the 
vulgarian, proposed by Adorno in Aesthetic Theory, and cited by Bull in “The 
Ecstasy of Philistinism”: “The counterconcept to aesthetic comportment is, quite 
simply, the concept of the philistine [Banausischen], which often overlaps with 
the vulgar [Vulgäre] yet remains distinct from it by its indifference or hatred, 
whereas vulgarity [Vulgäritat] greedily smacks its lips.”56 The philistine, usually 
depicted as bourgeois, is indifferent or hateful towards art, disqualifying 
altogether the possibility of aesthetic experience. The vulgarian, more readily 
identified with the masses, by contrast approaches the artwork as a consumer, 
engaging in a degraded form of aesthetic experience. It is therefore the philistine, 																																																								
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rather than the vulgarian, who better represents the absolute negation of the 
aesthetic. Adorno acknowledges that the concepts of the philistine and the 
vulgarian overlap, and indeed the distinction between them is not rigorously 
demarcated throughout the book. The metaphorical conceit of eating the artwork, 
associated with the vulgarian through the characteristic gesture of lip-smacking, 
is occasionally extended to the philistine, for example the repeated condemnation 
of the expression “a feast for the ears”, and this defence of Kant’s principle of 
the disinterested judgement of beauty: “Kant was the first to achieve the insight, 
never since forgotten, that aesthetic comportment is free from immediate desire; 
he snatched art away from that avaricious philistinism [Banausie] that always 
wants to touch it and taste it.”57 Adorno nevertheless insists on the distinction 
between the philistine and the vulgarian, including its class component. The 
passage quoted at the outset of this paragraph continues: “Socially implicated in 
the guilt of those who lay claim to aesthetic nobility, the philistineʼs [Banausen] 
disdain grants intellectual labour an immediately higher rank than manual 
labour.”58 The philistine comes from the same social milieu as the connoisseur, 
and like them participates in the exclusion of the lower class from the aesthetic 
sphere, which is based on the foundational opposition of physical and mental 
labour. Adorno’s version of the dialectic of art and its other can be distinguished 
from the division of the field of culture into the realms of pure culture and 
popular culture, because it is principally an intra-bourgeois conflict, fought out 
between different fractions of the ruling class. 
His model of advanced art, which for him constitutes the only 
opportunity for an artistic response adequate to the historical situation, is situated 
within what once would have been recognized as the sphere of pure culture, a 
domain belonging to the bourgeoisie. He holds that the truth content potentially 
contained in these artworks, which is bound up with their elitism, is also 
extremely precarious, given the increasing pressure exerted on aesthetic 
autonomy by the culture industry. This reflects what he takes to be the 
progressively attenuated possibilities for resistance under advanced capitalism, 
the extent of which is registered in his updated version of the cultivated 
philistine. In a section headed “Addressee unknown”, Minima Moralia stages a 																																																								
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confrontation between this figure and a representative piece of radical art, in 
which its critical force is negated by the claims of the bourgeois spectator not to 
understand it and to get nothing out of it: 
 
Cultivated philistines [Kultivierte Banausen] are in the habit of requiring 
that a work of art “give” them something. They no longer take umbrage 
at works that are radical, but fall back on the shamelessly modest 
assertion that they do not understand. This eliminates even opposition, 
their last negative relationship to truth, and the offending object is 
smilingly catalogued among its kind, consumer commodities that can be 
chosen or refused without even having to take responsibility for doing so. 
One is just too stupid, too old-fashioned, one simply can’t keep up, and 
the more one belittles oneself the more one can be sure of swelling the 
mighty unison of the vox inhumana populi, the judging power of the 
petrified Zeitgeist. Incomprehensibility, that benefits no-one, from being 
an inflammatory crime becomes pitiable folly. Together with the barb one 
deflects the temptation. That one must be given something, apparently the 
postulate of substantiality and fullness, cuts both off and impoverishes 
giving.59 
 
Dropping the Nietzschean term “Bildungphilister”, Adorno here characterizes the 
cultivated philistine as demanding something from the artwork, in his view an 
attitude that is anathema to its autonomous status. The critical force of advanced 
art is contained and neutralized by a disingenuous display of false modesty, 
which acts as a cover for their strategies of disinvestment, as they say they find it 
incomprehensible, and therefore refuse to engage with it. This process 
contributes to the commodification of the artwork, reinforcing bourgeois self-
preservation by suppressing a truth content which might have challenged the 
given order. There was limited scope to articulate an alternative in any case, but 
even the slim possibility of doing so represented by advanced art is now 
cancelled, as illustrated by “Addressee unknown”.60 																																																								
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This emblematic scene is not an isolated occurrence in Adorno’s oeuvre. 
As part of a series of sketches of listeners in Current of Music, he presents an 
extended description of the erudite or informed type, which is suggestive of the 
cultivated philistine, and includes the following observation: “Generally this type 
is lost when faced with essentially new music. Then he always professes that he 
“does not understand it”, wishing therewith to confirm his understanding of 
genuine music.”61 The claim not to understand new music – for Adorno the 
exemplar of advanced art – is designed to delegitimize it, emphasizing its 
deviation from established aesthetic norms, in order to secure the status of the 
speaker as an arbiter of them. In Philosophy of New Music [1949], he points to 
the same pretensions to connoisseurship among critics of his favoured composer 
Schoenberg: “The cultured listeners almost seem to be the worst: those who 
promptly respond to Schoenberg’s music with “I don’t understand that” – a 
statement whose modesty rationalizes rage as connoisseurship [Kennerschaft].”62 
This bogus gesture of self-deprecation in fact indicts the alleged 
incomprehensibility of advanced art, from a position of elevated indifference. In 
a passage from his essay “Toward an Understanding of Schoenberg” [1955], in 
which he dubs Schoenberg’s opponents “Philistine [Banause]”, Adorno charts 
the different phases through which hostility to his music has moved: “[T]here 
was the era of the scandal, during which all worthy citizens were united in the 
observation that “that is not music” – a remark that still betrays a closer 
connection than “I don’t understand that”, which is now de rigueur.”63 The 
critical force of advanced art is countered more effectively by a glib profession 
of incomprehension than it is by the angry denial that it is art at all, because in 
the latter case its confrontational content is at least acknowledged, argues 
Adorno. There are also other examples of the philistine requiring that the artwork 
give them something, a strategy of disinvestment serving the interests of 
bourgeois self-preservation, to which we will return later in this chapter.64 
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“Addressee unknown” dramatizes the negation of advanced art, a 
theoretical manoeuvre complemented by the qualified affirmation of philistinism 
in the next section of Minima Moralia, “Consecutio temporum”. Here, Adorno 
acknowledges the ageing of the avant-garde, which is no longer an insurgent 
force: “The modern has really become unmodern.”65 He incidentally provides us 
with a little more detail about his preferred brand of modernism, noting that 
while it “cannot be reduced to abstract form”, it is nevertheless compelled to 
“turn its back on conventional surface coherence, the appearance of harmony, the 
order corroborated merely by replication”.66 “Consecutio temporum” 
retrospectively concedes a moment of truth to the philistine who always 
dismissed such formal innovation as technical regression, as with the 
development of a fully administered society advanced art itself comes to assume 
characteristics associated with philistinism like “provincialism” and 
“backwardness”: 
 
The stalwarts of the Fascist fighting leagues, thundering fulsomely 
against Futurism, saw more clearly in their rage than did the Moscow 
censors who placed Cubism on the Index because, in its private 
impropriety, it failed to measure up to the spirit of the collective age, or 
the brazen theatre critics who find a play by Strindberg or Wedekind 
passé but a piece of underground reportage up-to-date. All the same, their 
blasé philistinism [Banausie] utters an appalling truth: that the procession 
of total society which would like to force its organization on all 
expression, is in fact leaving behind the power which opposes what 
Lindbergh’s wife called the wave of the future, that is, the critical 
construction of being. This is not merely outlawed by a corrupt public 
opinion, but the prevailing absurdity affects its very substance. The might 
of what is, constraining the mind to follow its example, is so 
overwhelming that even the unassimilated expression of protest assumes 
in face of it a home-spun, aimless, inexperienced quality reminiscent of 
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the provincialism that once so prophetically suspected modernism of 
backwardness.67 
 
With this reference to Anne Morrow Lindbergh’s The Wave of the Future: A 
Confession of Faith [1940], a short tract arguing the inevitably of totalitarianism 
gaining the ascendancy and urging an accommodation between the USA and 
Germany, Adorno points to the continuity he perceives between the fully 
administered society in liberal democracies and under the dictatorial rule of the 
Nazis.68 The progress implied by the titular image really represents a general 
regression, and the capacity for critical thought, which alone could resist it, is 
increasingly circumscribed with the development of advanced capitalism, in 
particular the phenomenon of the culture industry. He spells out the 
consequences for advanced art, suggesting that the avant-gardist has been 
converted into a backwoodsman, while the future belongs to the conformist, both 
postures associated with philistinism: “This quid pro quo of progress and 
reaction makes orientation in contemporary art almost as difficult as in politics, 
and furthermore paralyses production itself, where anyone who clings to extreme 
intentions is made to feel like a backwoodsman, while the conformist no longer 
lingers bashfully in arbours, literary or horticultural, but hurtles forward, rocket-
powered, into the pluperfect.”69 
In the next part of this chapter, Adorno’s model of advanced art will be 
explicated in greater detail, but for now it is sufficient to note that he further 
complicates the temporal dimension of philistinism.70 He asserts that the modern 
has become unmodern, and the avant-gardist a backwoodsman, just as the 
philistine is recast as a visionary riding the wave of the future. This interplay of 
progress and regression might put us in mind of the dialectic of enlightenment 
itself, in which increasing rationalization, predicated on the domination of nature, 
is bound up with a reversion to mythology, which in any case already anticipated 																																																								
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it. The erosion of the distinction between pure culture and popular culture, as 
both are subsumed by the culture industry, is part of this historical process, in 
which the material basis of class antagonism is further entrenched even as its 
modes of consciousness increasingly converge. It has the effect of neutralizing 
advanced art, in Adorno’s estimation the only sector of the field of culture with 
the capacity for resisting the given order. He concedes no such critical potential 
to the mass-produced entertainment of the culture industry, as he does for certain 
forms of popular culture. His assumption is that the realm of pure culture, insofar 
as it is still clearly delimited, is the central arena for the struggle with 
philistinism. The confrontation between the cultivated philistine and advanced 
art is staged as an intra-bourgeois conflict, from which the masses are excluded. 
He accordingly places greater emphasis on the philistine than he does on the 
vulgarian in his account of the dialectic of art and its other. In terms of 
temporality, I would argue that the recognition of a moment of truth in the 
backward-looking perspective of the philistine logically implies a corresponding 
moment of falsity in the progressive orientation of advanced art.71 
 
Art 
 
ADVANCED ART AND ITS CRITICS 
 
In his oeuvre, Adorno frequently opposes the figure of the philistine to 
his preferred model of advanced art. He defends this brand of modernism against 
the critics who accuse it of incomprehensibility, which at times he attributes to 
their inability to understand it, as when he sides with Schoenberg in “On the 
Current Relationship Between Philosophy and Music” [1953]: “It is impossible 
to untangle the nonsense of all these statements, concocted from a mixture of 
pharisaism, philistinism [Banausie], incompetence and resentment.”72 He most 
often has recourse to terminology of this sort when talking about music, but it 
occurs in the context of literature as well, for example in “On Lyric Poetry and 
Society” [1957]: 																																																								
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As the contradiction between poetic and communicative language 
reached an extreme, lyric poetry became a game in which one goes for 
broke; not, as philistine [banausische] opinion would have it, because it 
had become incomprehensible but because in acquiring self-
consciousness as a literary language, in striving for an absolute 
objectivity unrestricted by any considerations of communication, 
language both distances itself from the objectivity of spirit, of living 
language, and substitutes a poetic event for a language that is no longer 
present.73 
 
Sound Figures contains a passage in which he differentiates between music and 
literature on the basis of the level of philistinism among critics in each field: 
“There is scarcely a philistine [Banause] still alive who would dare to praise a 
writer for his scintillating style; but in music the intellectual manners that resist 
such mental stereotypes have yet to be acquired by critics[.]”74 These quotations 
might be numbered among his dismissive or insulting remarks about philistines, 
but by virtue of their indirect relation to it they can also contribute to an 
exposition of his model of advanced art. 
The alleged incomprehensibility of advanced art is taken by critics to 
consist in its extreme abstraction, but this aspect of it is ultimately mimetic, 
according to Adorno in “Commitment” [1962]: “[T]he avant-garde abstractness 
to which the philistine [Spießbürger] objects and which has nothing to do with 
the abstractness of concepts and ideas is a reflection of the abstractness of the 
objective law governing society.”75 There is a similar argument in “Titles” 
[1962]: “[T]he phenomenal world itself is in the process of becoming as abstract 
as the principle holding it together internally has long been. That should help to 
explain why today art in all its genres must be something the philistines 
[Philister] respond to with the cry of “abstract”: to escape the curse that, under 
the domination of abstract exchange value, has fallen on the concrete, which 
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shelters it.”76 The references here are to art as an overarching category, not to 
music or literature alone. His sense of philistinism is usually the same for art in 
general as it is for specific disciplines, and neither does his application of the 
concept vary much between them. The substantive point is that advanced art, and 
the failure of critics to interpret it adequately, are located at a particular stage of 
historical development, as further demonstrated by “Presuppositions: On the 
Occasion of a Reading by Hans G Helms” [1960]: “Certainly the extreme 
philistine [Philister] is wrong when he intones that after the swing of the 
pendulum to the extremes of unconstrained subjectivism it is time to think about 
a middle-of-the-road objectivity which in actuality has already condemned itself 
as mediocre. On the contrary, after the Second World War all advanced art is 
moved to abandon that position[.]”77 This sense of compulsion is characteristic 
of the evolution of advanced art for Adorno. 
He comes close to conceding the alleged incomprehensibility of advanced 
art in this period, granting the perspective of the philistine a degree of 
justification, by extending it to an informed and well-disposed audience of new 
music in Sound Figures: 
 
Whoever listens to a lot of new music, particularly works that he knows 
well, will not lightly abandon his view that very many performances are 
incomprehensible, for all the sympathy he may feel for the players who 
have embarked upon a thankless task – incomprehensible not just to the 
layman, who does not expect anything else, and almost wants things that 
way, but specifically to anyone who is familiar with the music and who 
identifies with it. It often sounds in reality much as the indignant 
Philistine [Banause] expects it to: chaotic, ugly, and meaningless.78 
 
He pulls back from this affirmation of philistinism by attributing the effect of 
incomprehensibility chiefly to deficiencies in performances, while 
acknowledging that these are partly due to the undeniable difficulty of the 
compositions themselves. His view is that advanced art is compelled towards 																																																								
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complexity, or rather the repudiation of “conventional surface coherence” and 
the “appearance of harmony”, by the objective demands of the social situation.79 
 In “The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel” [1954], 
Adorno presses the case for his model of advanced art, which he claims does not 
merely reflect the social situation, but constitutes a form of resistance to it: 
 
There is no modern work of art worth anything that does not delight in 
dissonance and release. But by uncompromisingly embodying the horror 
and putting all the pleasure of contemplation into the purity of this 
expression, such works of art serve freedom – something the average 
production betrays, simply because it does not bear witness to what has 
befallen the individual in the age of liberalism. These products fall 
outside the controversy over committed art and l’art pour l’art, outside 
the choice between the philistinism [Banausie] of art with a cause and the 
philistinism [Banausie] of art for enjoyment.80 
 
He contrasts his version of advanced art to two aesthetic modes normally 
considered antithetical to each other, which are here equated rhetorically, 
through their joint designation as philistine. The philistinism of art with a cause 
and the philistinism of art for enjoyment negatively delimit his conception of 
advanced art, notwithstanding the claim that the latter is external to the 
opposition between them. We might therefore use these formulations as a guide 
to the type of modernism to which he attributes value, by way of an examination 
of the aesthetic modes which he denies possess value. 
 
THE PHILISTINISM OF ART WITH A CAUSE 
 
 The philistinism of art with a cause encompasses socialist realism in the 
East as well as committed art in the West, and its alleged inferiority compared to 
advanced art is expressed forcefully in Sound Figures: “[T]he claim of the 
Eastern bloc that what they produce emanates from socialism is refuted by the 																																																								
79 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.218. 
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music itself, which simply warms up late Romantic, philistine [spätromantisch-
spießbürgerliche] clichés and sedulously avoids everything that threatens to 
deviate from conformist consumer needs.”81 Negative Dialectics [1966] is 
similarly scathing about “materialism’s philistine [Banausische] and barbarian 
aspects”, contending that these have “spread throughout culture” in the USSR: 
“Materialism comes to be the very relapse into barbarism which it was supposed 
to prevent.”82 In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno suggests that the aesthetic 
regressiveness of dialectical materialism can be traced to the inheritance of GWF 
Hegel: “Hegel’s aesthetics of content [Inhaltsästhetik], an aesthetics of subject 
matter, in keeping with the spirit of many of his intentions, subscribes 
undialectically to the objectivation of art by way of a raw relation to objects. […] 
In German idealism the turn to the object was always coupled with philistinism 
[Banausie][.]”83 He argues that the turn to the object, which rightly opposed the 
empty play of formalism, results in an undue emphasis on content: “As a result, 
an art-alien [Kunstfremdes] and philistine [Banausisches] element entered 
Hegel’s aesthetics, which manifests its fatal character in the aesthetics of 
dialectical materialism, which in this regard had no more misgivings about Hegel 
than did Marx.”84 The dominant themes of the philistinism of art with a cause, 
also characteristic of his sense of philistinism more generally, are conservatism, 
conformism and insensitivity to form. 
This is reflected in the assertion that the importance of form has been 
overestimated in modernism, made by Georg Lukács in Realism in our Time: 
Literature and the Class Struggle [1958], and cited by Adorno in Aesthetic 
Theory: “Evident in this philistine [banausischen] call to arms is a discontent 
with art of which Lukács the cultural conservative is unconscious, as well as a 
concept of form that is inadequate to art.”85 In a review of the same book called 
“Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukács’ Realism in our Time” [1958], 
Adorno dismisses his “philistine [banausischen] evaluations of modern art”, and 
labels his theory of art “philistine [banausisch] and ideological at the same 
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time”.86 Disputing his interpretation of Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain 
[1924], Adorno describes a character in the novel as embodying the “reified 
consciousness of the philistine [Philisters]”.87 The affinity between philistinism 
and reification – an attenuated state of being in which dynamism, fluidity and 
interconnectedness give way to the stasis of rigidified categorizations, as social 
relations increasingly take on the character of things – is reinforced elsewhere in 
his oeuvre.88 The reference might appear to be incidental in this context, but it in 
fact recalls the influential account of the category of reification in Lukács’ 
History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics [1923], which is 
praised at the outset of “Extorted Reconciliation”.89 His subsequent 
accommodation to official dogma is said to bear the effects of reification on his 
own thought: “The dialectic is paid lip service, but for this kind of thought the 
dialectic has been determined in advance.”90 This type of reasoning is itself 
abstract and formalistic, the principal charges made against advanced art, while 
the content of the latter inheres in its immanent form, instead of being imposed 
upon it as it is with socialist realism, according to Adorno.91 
The figure of the philistine is deployed polemically throughout this 
review, to counter the accusations of decadence and degeneracy levelled at 
modernism by Lukács. His “blustering about decadence” and “indignation about 
degeneracy” are attacked as crude social Darwinism by Adorno: “Talk about 
decadence cannot be separated from its positive counterimage of a nature 
bursting with strength; natural categories are projected onto things that are 
socially mediated. The tenor of Marx and Engels’ critique of ideology, however, 
is directed against precisely that.”92 He is critical of the reduction of the aesthetic 
to the social in Philosophy of New Music: “The reduction of avant-garde music to 
its social origin and its social function scarcely goes beyond the hostile 
undifferentiating definition that it is a bourgeois and decadent luxury. That is the 																																																								
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language of banausic, administrative [banausisch-verwaltungsmäßiger] 
oppression.”93 He responds to negative reviews of this book by dissociating 
himself from the philistines, in a short piece called “Misunderstandings” [1950]: 
“I would never have imagined it possible that I would be counted in among the 
philistines [Philister] who work themselves into a rage over “insane” and 
degenerate modern art.”94 He also articulates the link between philistinism and 
health in Alban Berg: Master of the Smallest Link [1968]: “This concept of 
health, inherently as ineradicable a part of prevailing musical criteria as it is of 
Philistinism [Banausie], is in league with conformism; health is allied with what 
in life is stronger, with the victors.”95 In “Extorted Reconciliation”, Adorno 
states that judgements of art in terms of health or sickness are inadmissible: “If it 
is a question of historical relationships, words like sick and healthy should be 
avoided altogether. They have nothing to do with the progress/reaction 
dimension; they are brought in purely for the sake of their demagogic appeal.”96 
His own use of the concept of philistinism might seem on the face of it to rely on 
a similar demagogic appeal, and it is certainly the case that he seeks to 
delegitimize the reductive approach of his adversary. Perhaps the polemical style 
he adopts can be better understood as an attempt to ally himself with the sick 
against the healthy, the weak against the strong, and the victims against the 
victors, occupying the terms of debate established by Lukács. 
Adorno holds that the conservatism and conformism of the philistinism of 
art with a cause are obviously incompatible with any programme of social 
critique, while the insensitivity to form is bound up with a failure to recognize 
the political dimension of advanced art. Aesthetic Theory asserts that advanced 
art is prohibited from “tarnishing itself any further with the topical preferences of 
philistine [banausische] culture”, which are listed as “the true, the beautiful, and 
the good”: “Into its innermost core what is usually called art’s social critique or 
engagement, all that is critical or negative in art, has been fused with spirit, with 
art’s law of form.”97 Adorno contends that aesthetic autonomy is a precondition 																																																								
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for the social import of artistic productions, arguing that the formally 
autonomous artwork, by pursing a logic other than that which exists, is a priori 
radical as a negation of the given order, irrespective of the affirmative or 
oppositional stance of its creator. He sets this observation in the context of a 
society organized according to the principle of exchange, where every item is 
quantifiable in terms of a universal equivalent, and therefore potentially 
interchangeable. The formally autonomous artwork, by adhering strictly to its 
own law of construction, resists incorporation into that system. He claims that 
this immanent problematic, if it is negotiated with sufficient rigour, necessarily 
points beyond itself towards the extra-aesthetic sphere. The formally autonomous 
artwork, by responding solely to the requirements of the material, encodes a 
constellation of the reality of which it is a part, reconfiguring the force field of 
historical processes in its internal tensions. In “Commitment”, Adorno maintains 
that such a strategy is superior to an explicitly activist orientation in political as 
well as in aesthetic terms: “Literature that exists for the human being, like 
committed literature but also like the kind of literature the moral philistine 
[Philister] wants, betrays the human being by betraying what could help him 
only if it did not act as though it were doing so.”98 The passage repeats his 
technique of conflating the poles of an apparent antagonism, on this occasion the 
commitment of the left and the moralism of the right, whose representatives also 
share in the outrage at the alleged unintelligibility of advanced art.99 
 
THE PHILISTINISM OF ART FOR ENJOYMENT 
 
Adorno’s model of advanced art emerges in opposition to the philistinism 
of art with a cause, but it is also differentiated from the philistinism of art for 
enjoyment in “Commitment”. The reversal introduced in the very next line of 
this essay shifts focus to the absolutism of l’art pour l’art: “But anything that 
made itself absolute in response, existing only for its own sake, would 
degenerate into ideology.”100 The juxtaposition of these extremes, both of which 
are repudiated, delineates the dialectic of the aesthetic and the social, formulated 																																																								
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succinctly in Aesthetic Theory: “That art on the one hand confronts society 
autonomously, and, on the other hand, is itself social, defines the law of its 
experience. Whoever experiences only the material aspect of art and puffs this up 
into an aesthetics is philistine [banausisch], yet whoever perceives art 
exclusively as art and ensconces this as its prerogative deprives himself of its 
content [Gehalt].”101 The latter risk is that the formally autonomous artwork, in 
refusing to subordinate itself to an external imperative like the philistinism of art 
for a cause, deteriorates from radical self-sufficiency to the philistinism of art for 
enjoyment. This applies to figures from outside the ranks of programmatic 
aestheticism, extending as far as Schoenberg, in the notes collected 
posthumously as Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music [1993]: “Schoenberg to 
Eduard [Steuermann]: Music is there to be listened to, not criticized. But is this 
not to condescend? Is this not the talk of philistines [Banausen] who do not want 
their enjoyment spoiled?”102 
In “Valéry Proust Museum” [1953], Adorno compares the accounts of 
museums found in Paul Valéry’s Rooms of Art [1931] and Marcel Proust’s 
Within a Budding Grove [1919]. Valéry is said to be concerned that the forced 
coexistence of qualitatively unique objects in an exhibition, and the 
instrumentalizing of inwardly directed constructions for the purpose of 
education, undermine the independence on which aesthetic value is predicated. 
Adorno observes of Rooms of Art: “Valéry’s argumentation bears the stamp of 
cultural conservatism.”103 This perspective is pushed to the point where it is 
transformed into its opposite, though: 
 
He follows the principle of art for art’s sake to the verge of its negation. 
He makes the pure work of art the object of absolute unwavering 
contemplation, but he scrutinizes it so long and so intensely that he comes 
to see that the object of such pure contemplation must wither and 
degenerate to commercialized decoration, robbed of the dignity in which 
both its raison d’être and Valéry’s consist. The pure work is threatened 
by reification and neutralization. This is the recognition that overwhelms 																																																								
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him in the museum. He discovers that the only pure works, the only 
works that can sustain serious observation, are the impure ones that do 
not exhaust themselves in that observation but point beyond, towards a 
social context.104 
 
According to Adorno, Proust believes that aesthetic value does not inhere in the 
immanent meaning of the artwork, but rather in its impression on the 
consciousness of the spectator, and for that reason he is less critical of museums. 
His focus on the impact of the object on the observer can at times become 
reductive, making of the artwork no more than a set of psychological stimuli: 
“Proust’s work contains passages on art which approach in unbridled 
subjectivism the philistine [banausischen] attitude that turns the work into a 
battery of projective tests.”105 This weakness is also a strength, however: “Proust, 
in his unfettered subjectivism, is untrue to objectifications of the spirit, but it is 
only this subjectivism that enables him to break through the immanence of 
culture.”106 
In “Valéry Proust Museum”, Valéry and Proust are construed as holding 
antithetical positions, each of which is internally dynamic, with limitations that 
give rise to its moment of truth vis-à-vis the other. In summary, Valéry does not 
interrogate the category of the artwork as such, but he is more sensitive to the 
qualities of individual artworks. Proust is frequently superficial in his treatment 
of individual artworks, but he is better placed to historicize the category of the 
artwork as such. The impasse between them cannot be circumvented, because it 
arises from a contradiction within the matter itself. Nevertheless, Adorno 
identifies a point of convergence in their privileging of aesthetic pleasure: 
 
[T]hey share the presupposition that works of art should be enjoyed. 
Valéry speaks of “délices”, Proust of “joie enivrante”, exhilarating joy. 
Nothing is more characteristic than that presupposition of the distance not 
merely between the present generation and the previous one but also 
between the German and the French attitudes towards art. As early as the 																																																								
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writing of A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs [Within a Budding Grove], 
the expression Kunstgenuss [aesthetic pleasure] must have sounded as 
touchingly philistine [philiströs] in German as a Wilhelm Busch rhyme. 
This aesthetic pleasure, furthermore, in which Valéry and Proust have as 
much faith as in a revered mother, has always been a questionable 
matter.107 
 
“In Memory of Eichendorff” [1957] instead distinguishes German and French 
literature on the basis of the “prudishness” and “idealistic philistinism 
[Philistertum]” of the former.108 The claims of conservatism and philistinism 
made about Valéry and Proust are also complicated by references to them 
elsewhere in his oeuvre. In “Valéry’s Deviations” [1960], Rooms of Art is cited 
approvingly for its “denunciation of the forest-and-meadow aesthetics of the 
simple things”, described as a “notion the philistine [Philister] cherishes”.109 
“Punctuation Marks” [1956] attributes to parentheses the quality of “pedantic 
philistinism [Banausie]”, before acknowledging that “Proust, whom no one can 
lightly call a philistine [Banausen] and whose pedantry is nothing but one aspect 
of his wonderful micrological power, did not hesitate to use brackets”.110 Across 
his body of work, Adorno often identifies the same individuals as philistine and 
anti-philistine, among them Plato, Goethe, Kant, Hegel, Wagner and 
Nietzsche.111 
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 Aesthetic Theory also contains this incidental remark disparaging “an 
aesthetic that constantly insists on subjective feeling”, in the context of a critique 
of the “element of pleasure in art”: “Almost without exception its descriptions 
were banausic [banausisch], perhaps because from the beginning the subjective 
approach made it impossible to recognize that something compelling can be 
grasped of aesthetic experience only on the basis of a relation to the aesthetic 
object, not by recurring to the fun of the art lover.”112 The passage continues with 
an account of how aesthetic pleasure weakens the resistance to the given order 
which the formally autonomous artwork represents: 
 
The concept of artistic enjoyment was a bad compromise between the 
social and the socially critical essence of the artwork. If art is useless for 
the business of self-preservation – bourgeois society never quite forgives 
that – it should at least demonstrate a sort of use-value modelled on 
sensual pleasure. This distorts art as well as the physical fulfillment that 
art’s aesthetic representatives do not dispense. That a person who is 
incapable of sensual differentiation – who cannot distinguish a beautiful 
from a flat sound, a brilliant from a dull color – is hardly capable of 
aesthetic experience, is hypostatized.113 
 
The last line conjures up the figure of the philistine. In a footnote to 
“Commitment”, Adorno quotes Jean-Paul Sartre’s What is Literature? [1948], 
associating the “aesthetic purism” of l’art pour l’art with “bourgeois […] 
philistines [Philister]”.114 He turns this around with a description of “some 
Philistine [philiströs]”, who “rants against the ideal of l’art pour l’art”, accusing 
it of “decadence and degeneration and other nefarious things”, in his early essay 
“Why is the New Art So Hard to Understand?” [1931].115 These somewhat 
obscure references to philistinism further demonstrate the flexibility of the term, 
as it is mobilized on behalf of and in opposition to l’art pour l’art, much as we 
saw it deployed for and against both Valéry and Proust.  																																																								
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Adorno counterposes the formally autonomous artwork to the 
philistinism of art with a cause, arguing that its critical force rests on its distance 
from empirical reality, negatively articulating utopian potential by resisting 
universal fungibility. He also sets it against the philistinism of art for enjoyment, 
which arises from the similarity of aesthetic autonomy to the fetish-character of 
the commodity form, and is realized in a social situation in which the relation to 
culture is modelled on the relation to consumer goods. He connects this version 
of philistinism to the emphasis on aesthetic pleasure, attributing that attitude to 
both public opinion and official taste in Aesthetic Theory: 
 
What popular consciousness and a complaisant aesthetics regard as the 
taking pleasure in art, modelled on real enjoyment, probably does not 
exist. The empirical subject has only a limited and modified part in 
artistic experience tel quel, and this part may well be diminished the 
higher the work’s rank. Whoever concretely enjoys artworks is a 
philistine [Banause]; he is convicted by expressions like “a feast for the 
ears”. Yet if the last traces of pleasure were extirpated, the question of 
what artworks are for would be an embarrassment.116 
 
He deconstructs the experience of aesthetic pleasure, before enacting another of 
his characteristic reversals, acknowledging that his brand of modernism, even in 
its most ascetic manifestations, always contains an irreducible element of 
enjoyment. He maintains that this aspect of aesthetic experience, which is all that 
remains in l’art pour l’art, undermines the drive towards radical self-sufficiency. 
He insists that the formally autonomous artwork, if its ideal of autarchy is made 
absolute, becomes a vehicle for ideology as much as any propaganda. In keeping 
with his dialectical method, Adorno’s model of advanced art does not seek to 
steer a middle course between these extremes, but instead inhabits both poles of 
the antithesis to the utmost, thereby effecting the mediation of the aesthetic and 
the social.  
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THE PHILISTINE AND THE CONNOISSEUR 
 
This analysis of the philistinism of art with a cause and the philistinism of 
art for enjoyment returns us to the alleged incomprehensibility of advanced art, 
and to the explicit affirmation of the critical potential of philistinism quoted by 
Beech and Roberts in “Spectres of the Aesthetic”. The context of the quotation 
which they select as an example is a discussion of the enigmaticalness of art 
from Aesthetic Theory, which begins: “The task of aesthetics is not to 
comprehend artworks as hermeneutical objects; in the contemporary situation, it 
is their incomprehensibility that needs to be comprehended.”117 Adorno goes on 
to reiterate his belief in an integral structuration that is ultimately mimetic, 
identifying this paradox as the spirit of artworks under current conditions: “In 
artworks, spirit has become their principle of construction, although it fulfils its 
telos only when it emerges from what is to be constructed, from the mimetic 
impulses, by shaping itself to them rather than allowing itself to be imposed on 
them by sovereign rule.”118 He says of the formally autonomous artwork that its 
“rationality […] becomes spirit only when it is immersed in its polar opposite”, 
highlighting the concomitant “divergence between the constructive and the 
mimetic”, of which the correlative is the “element of the clownish and the 
ridiculous that even the most significant works bear”.119 The element of the 
clownish and the ridiculous is supposed to be especially pronounced when art 
“assimilates itself to a logical order by virtue of its inner exactitude”, as the 
rigour of its construction then accentuates the “difference between the artwork’s 
logicity and the logicity that governs empirically”, and becomes critical by 
accusing the “rationality of social praxis of having become an end in itself and as 
such the irrational and mad reversal of means into ends”.120 This description 
recalls his model of advanced art, constructed in opposition to the philistinism of 
art with a cause, but there is also an allusion to the philistinism of art for 
enjoyment, when he says that those lacking an aesthetic sensibility misconstrue 
the enigmaticalness of art by taking it as a source of pleasure.121 																																																								
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Adorno accords the art-alien a privileged perspective with regard to 
ridiculousness, which allows them to participate in its criticism of rationality: 
“The ridiculous in art, which philistines [Amusischen] recognize better than do 
those who are naively at home in art, and the folly of a rationality made absolute 
indict one another reciprocally[.]”122 Beech and Roberts emphasize one side of 
this reciprocal negation, focusing on his qualified endorsement of the figure of 
the philistine, independently of the interplay with their counterpart the 
connoisseur, which is evident in the expanded quotation from Aesthetic Theory: 
 
Ridiculousness is the residue of the mimetic in art, the price of its self-
enclosure. In his condemnation of this element, the philistine [Philister] 
always has an ignominious measure of justification. The ridiculous, as a 
barbaric residuum of something alien to form, misfires in art if art fails to 
reflect and shape it. If it remains on the level of the childish and is taken 
for such, it merges with the calculated fun of the culture industry. By its 
very concept, art implies kitsch, just as by the obligation it imposes of 
sublimating the ridiculous it presupposes educational privilege and class 
structure; fun is art’s punishment for this. All the same, the ridiculous 
elements in artworks are most akin to their intentionless levels and 
therefore, in great works, also closest to their secret.123 
 
The philistine is excluded from aesthetic experience, and for that reason they are 
meant to be better able to disclose the enigmaticalness of art than the 
connoisseur, who remains immersed in the internal logic of the formally 
autonomous artwork: “[I]f one is within the artwork, if one participates in its 
immanent completion, this enigmaticalness makes itself invisible; if one steps 
outside the work, breaking the contract with its immanent context, this 
enigmaticalness returns like a spirit.”124 Aesthetic Theory argues that this 
remainder is constitutive of the truth content of art, granting the philistine a key 
role in its crystallization. 
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The connoisseur may master the material, but they cannot resolve its 
enigmaticalness, according to Adorno: “Whoever seeks to understand artworks 
exclusively through the immanence of consciousness within them by this very 
measure fails to understand them and as such understanding grows, so does the 
feeling of its insufficiency caught blindly in the spell of art, to which art’s own 
truth content is opposed.”125 He contends conversely that the philistine is unable 
to encompass the complexity of the formally autonomous artwork, which turns 
into resentment towards it and precludes the possibility of comprehending its 
enigmaticalness: 
 
This gives further reason for the study of those who are alien to art 
[amusischer]: In their proximity the enigmaticalness of art becomes 
outrageous to the point that art is completely negated, unwittingly the 
ultimate criticism of art and, in that it is a defective attitude, a 
confirmation of art’s truth. It is impossible to explain art to those who 
have no feeling for it [Amusischen]; they are not able to bring an 
intellectual understanding of it into their living experience. For them the 
reality principle is such an obsession that it places a taboo on aesthetic 
comportment as a whole; incited by the cultural approbation of art, 
alienness to art [Amusie] often changes into aggression, not the least of 
the causes of the contemporary deaestheticization of art.126 
 
The fundamental incapacity of the philistine is most evident in the field of music 
on account of its aconceptuality, according to Adorno: “[E]nigmaticalness may 
in an elementary fashion confirm the so-called unmusical [Unmusikalische], who 
does not understand the “language of music”, hears nothing but nonsense, and 
wonders what all the noise is about; the difference between what this person 
hears and what the initiated hear defines art’s enigmaticalness.”127 He adds that 
the recognition of ridiculousness, though undoubtedly an advantage over the 
connoisseur and a check on the ideological aspects of advanced art, is also 
insufficient unless it is assimilated into a higher-order analysis. 																																																								
125 Ibid., p.161. 
126 Ibid., p.160 [GS7, p.183]. 
127 Ibid., p.160 [GS7, p.183]. 
 72 
I will now attempt to summarize his argument, which concerns the modes 
of attention appropriate to aesthetic experience as he understands it, a topic taken 
up more fully in the next part of this chapter. Adorno’s model of advanced art, 
adapted to the dialectic of the aesthetic and the social, necessitates a form of 
engagement which combines the stances of the connoisseur and the philistine 
without compromise, bringing each of them to bear negatively on the other. The 
connoisseur is too invested in the rationality of art, and consequently impervious 
to the ridiculousness which accompanies it. The philistine apprehends this 
element of the formally autonomous artwork, but they lack the expertise to 
reflect and shape it, reserved for members of the cultural elite. The connoisseur is 
superior in their knowledge of and sympathy for art, which are required for any 
meaningful encounter with it. The philistine acts as a corrective to the absolutism 
of the formally autonomous artwork, by posing the embarrassing question of 
what it is for, which strikes at its underlying principle. The connoisseur 
circumvents this challenge to the raison d’être of art, by bracketing off the 
aesthetic as an exceptional realm. The philistine touches on what is ideological 
about the formally autonomous artwork, but the naivety with which the issue is 
raised has to be overcome, in order to move beyond uncomprehending rage. The 
connoisseur nevertheless fails to resolve the enigmaticalness of art, which is 
definitively irreducible to conceptual elucidation. The philistine therefore attains 
their true value at a later stage in the interpretation of the formally autonomous 
artwork, when the controversy over its purpose recurs, in the face of the 
continuing contradiction of its rationality and its ridiculousness. Adorno insists 
that these positions must not be falsely reconciled, because the tension between 
them is the substance of advanced art, which demands the perspective of the 
connoisseur as much as that of the philistine.128 My contention is that the 
affirmation of the latter is intelligible only if it is taken together with their 
negation, and similarly his derogatory comments about the critics of advanced 
art, and about the alternative models of art with a cause and art for enjoyment, 
should be given the binding status of truth-claims, and allowed to indict 
reciprocally the critical insight of the philistine. 
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Aesthetics 
 
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
 
In his writings on music, literature and visual art, Adorno attempts to 
articulate philosophically the concrete specificity of aesthetic experience, a 
notion never clearly defined or argued for in his work, and indeed considered to 
be irreducible to conceptual generalization or discursive justification. Aesthetic 
Theory mainly operates at a more abstract level, as an immanent analysis of the 
apparently outmoded categories of philosophical aesthetics, which he believes 
should not simply be abandoned, but rather critically reconfigured from within 
that discourse. In the “Paralipomena”, Kant’s account of the sublime – in which 
the subject apprehends its own insignificance, reaching beyond itself to 
something else – is extended to cover all forms of beauty by Adorno. This 
adaptation of the encounter of the self with what exceeds it rejects the concept of 
infinity, which in the original version is established as the positive side to that 
awareness of nullity, and used to master it intellectually. Instead, Adorno 
recommends immersion in the individual artwork, even submission to its internal 
logic, positioning aesthetic experience in opposition to philistinism: 
 
Pain in the face of beauty is the longing for what the subjective block 
closes off to the subject, of which the subject nevertheless knows that it is 
truer than itself. Experience, which would without violence be free of the 
block, results from the surrender of the subject to the aesthetic law of 
form. The viewer enters into a contract with the artwork so that it will 
speak. Those who brag of having “got” something from an artwork 
transfer in philistine [Banausisch] fashion the relation of possession to 
what is strictly foreign to it; they extend the comportment of unbroken 
self-preservation, subordinating beauty to that interest that beauty, 
according to Kantʼs ever valid insight, transcends.129 
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Following on from his formulation of the sublime, Kant’s principle of the 
disinterested judgement of beauty is taken up here, along with its correlative the 
uselessness of art for the purpose of self-preservation, which is said to run 
counter to the dominant ideology of the bourgeoisie. There are broadly two types 
of interest in the Kantian schema, the interest in the good and the interest in the 
agreeable, with the former equivalent to the moral or political imperative of the 
philistinism of art with a cause, while the latter corresponds to the material or 
sensual gratification of the philistinism of art for enjoyment. Elsewhere in the 
“Paralipomena”, Adorno represents the practice of instrumentalizing the artwork 
with the emblematic phrase, written in English: “What do I get out of it?”130 This 
is an attitude associated with the culture industry, but it applies as well to 
demands for art to fulfil a social function or satisfy the desire for pleasure. It has 
already been identified as characteristic of the cultivated philistine, who in his 
work is the archetype for the bourgeois identity of the philistine.  
In the draft introduction to Aesthetic Theory, Adorno distinguishes pre-
artistic experience from aesthetic experience as follows: “Preartistic experience 
requires projection, yet aesthetic experience – precisely by virtue of the a priori 
primacy of subjectivity in it – is a countermovement to the subject. It demands 
something on the order of the self-denial of the observer, his capacity to address 
or recognize what aesthetic objects themselves enunciate and what they 
conceal.”131 The surrender to the aesthetic law of form required of the spectator 
involves a sacrifice of subjectivity, as they adapt themselves to the rigour of the 
integral structuration of the individual artwork in its qualitative uniqueness. 
Adorno also insists on the importance of aesthetic distance, again recalling the 
disinterested observer advocated by Kant: 
 
Aesthetic experience first of all places the observer at a distance from the 
object. This resonates in the idea of disinterested observation. Philistines 
[Banausen] are those whose relation to artworks is ruled by whether and 
to what degree they can, for example, put themselves in the place of the 
actors as they come forth; this is what all parts of the culture industry are 
based on and they foster it insistently in their customers. The more artistic 																																																								
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experience possesses its objects and the closer it approaches them in a 
certain sense, the farther it is at the same time shifted away from them; 
artistic enthusiasm is art-alien [kunstfremd].132 
 
The possibility of this type of aesthetic experience is progressively undermined 
with the rise of the culture industry, which is said to cancel the aesthetic distance 
on which the disinterested judgement of beauty depends. Adorno holds that this 
lack of interest allows for an intimation of the artwork as a negative prolepsis of 
a liberated humanity in a world free from domination, including the self-
domination of the rational subject: “It is thus that aesthetic experience […] 
breaks through the spell of obstinate self-preservation; it is the model of a stage 
of consciousness in which the I no longer has its happiness in its interests, or, 
ultimately, in its reproduction.”133 This inverted image of utopia is inaccessible 
via the immediate identification encouraged by the culture industry, which serves 
the interests of bourgeois self-preservation. 
 These themes are explored in texts other than Aesthetic Theory. The 
illegitimate transfer of the relation of possession to the aesthetic sphere is 
literalized in the activity of the collector, for whom it is “more important to 
possess books than to read them”, according to Adorno’s “Bibliographical 
Musings” [1959]: “Hence private libraries made up predominantly of editions of 
collected works easily acquire a philistine [Banausisches] aspect.”134 This 
relation of possession, which is of course fundamental to the constitution of the 
bourgeoisie as the ruling class, is anathema to aesthetic experience as he 
understands it. A sense of what that actually involves emerges incrementally as 
he distinguishes it from philistinism, drawing on Hegel as well as Kant. Hegel’s 
turn to the object, which as we have seen is branded philistine for its undue 
emphasis on content, is opposed to the perspective of the philistine in Aesthetic 
Theory: 
 
Prior to total administration, the subject who viewed, heard, or read a 
work was to lose himself, forget himself, extinguish himself in the 																																																								
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artwork. The identification carried out by the subject was ideally not that 
of making the artwork like himself, but rather that of making himself like 
the artwork. This identification constituted aesthetic sublimation: Hegel 
named this comportment freedom to the object. He thus paid homage to 
the subject that becomes subject in spiritual experience through self-
relinquishment, the opposite of the philistine [speißbürgerlichen] demand 
that the artwork give him something.135 
 
The expectation that the artwork will give the spectator something, alternatively 
formulated as their preoccupation with what they can get out of it, is elsewhere 
explicitly connected to the relation of possession by Adorno. It recurs throughout 
his oeuvre, for example in “On Wilhelm Lehmann’s “Bemerkungen zur Kunst 
des Gedichts [Remarks on the Art of the Poem]”” [1974]: “[T]he philistine 
[Banausenidee] notion of art […] requires art to be continually giving and 
affirming something.”136 The act of identification described in the passage above 
differs radically from the more immediate variant promoted by the culture 
industry, which is false because it is based on subjective projection. Hegel’s 
insight that full subjecthood instead results from granting primacy to the object, 
risking the self in a transformative encounter with what is other to it, suggests an 
alternative model for aesthetic experience. 
Back in the “Paralipomena” to Aesthetic Theory, Adorno extends his 
prohibition on identification with the characters in an artwork to identification 
with the artist, both modes of attention common to the culture industry: “Just as 
the exemplary instance of the philistine [Banausie] is a reader who judges his 
relation to artworks on the basis of whether he can identify with the protagonists, 
so false identification with the immediately empirical person is the index of 
complete obtuseness towards art.”137 He confirms the philistinism of the second 
stance elsewhere in his body of work.138 Aesthetic Theory goes on to reaffirm the 
importance of a relationship to the artwork based on a different type of 
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identification, again discussed in terms of the self-relinquishment of the subject 
to the object in Hegel: 
 
[T]he medium of this relationship is what Hegel called freedom toward 
the object: The spectator must not project what transpires in himself on to 
the artwork in order to find himself confirmed, uplifted, and satisfied in 
it, but must, on the contrary, relinquish himself to the artwork, assimilate 
himself to it, and fulfil the work in its own terms. In other words, he must 
submit to the discipline of the work rather than demand that the artwork 
give him something. The aesthetic comportment, however, that avoids 
this, thereby remaining blind to what in the artwork is more than factually 
the case, is unitary with the projective attitude, that of terre á terre, which 
characterizes the contemporary epoch and deastheticizes artworks.139 
 
The viability of aesthetic experience like this is threatened in the contemporary 
epoch, as the regressive tendencies of enlightenment are realized in a fully 
administered society. The projective attitude, where the spectator – or, for that 
matter, the artist – imposes a subjectively posited meaning on the artwork, is 
repeatedly labelled philistine in Aesthetic Theory. Adorno acknowledges a 
moment of truth in this philistinism, that is, its reflection of the underlying reality 
of advanced capitalism: “[T]he thesis of the projective character of art […] is 
important as the expression of a historical tendency. What in philistine 
[banausisch] fashion it inflicts on artworks corresponds to the positivistic 
caricature of enlightenment, of unfettered subjective reason.”140 His version of 
aesthetic experience resists that historical tendency, embracing a 
countermovement to the subject. 
He is influenced in this regard by the aesthetics of Kant and Hegel. The 
disinterested judgement of beauty and the self-relinquishment of the subject to 
the object, which he combines in an idiosyncratic synthesis, are respectively 
differentiated from the philistinism of getting something out of the artwork, and 
the philistinism of subjective projection. These attitudes are associated with the 
culture industry, which inculcates in its consumers the relation of possession and 																																																								
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a disposition to immediate identification. Adorno maintains that the other 
extreme to the projective attitude, where the subject is shaped by the object 
without impacting on it reciprocally, is equally unacceptable as a model of 
aesthetic experience. What is required is a dialectical approach, as he argues in 
Aesthetic Theory: 
 
Even in its fallibility and weakness, the subject who contemplates art is 
not expected simply to retreat from the claim to objectivity. Otherwise it 
would hold that those alien to art [Kunstfremde] – the philistines 
[Banause] devoid of any relation to art, who let it affect them as if they 
were a tabula rasa – would be the most qualified to understand and judge 
it, and the unmusical [Unmusikalische] would be the best music critics. 
Like art itself, knowledge of it is consummated dialectically. The more 
the observer adds to the process, the greater the energy with which he 
penetrates the artwork, the more he then becomes aware of objectivity 
from within. He takes part in objectivity when his energy, even that of his 
misguided subjective “projection”, extinguishes itself in the artwork.141 
 
Adorno is clear that any philosophical articulation of aesthetic experience cannot 
hope to encapsulate its richness, but he considers that the aconceptual knowledge 
represented by artworks nevertheless demands to be completed discursively. His 
remarks on the topic in relation to philistinism reveal a consistent set of 
interconnected themes, which provide points of orientation for an account of his 
aesthetics. The key features which emerge – historically situated and subject to 
change – include aesthetic distance and disinterested contemplation, freedom 
towards the object and a countermovement to the subject. He holds that art itself 
is dialectical, and that knowledge of it must therefore be consummated 
dialectically. In what follows, I expand on this claim by exploring his theory of 
the artwork and his technique of immanent analysis, both of which are saturated 
by aesthetic experience, before again touching on the topic of beauty, in relation 
to the blindness of the philistine. 
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FORM AND CONTENT 
 
In this chapter, I have already highlighted some of the recurring traits of 
Adorno’s philistine, and there are a number of other qualities consistently 
associated with this figure, such as narrowness, prosaism and provincialism, all 
of which are mentioned in the Introduction.142 These constitute a more or less 
stable set of features, attached to what is nevertheless a highly mobile term, 
applied to a wide variety of targets across his oeuvre and within the same text, 
for example both the rentier and the believer in his early monograph on Søren 
Kierkegaard.143 This combination of consistency and mobility has the effect of 
critically conflating apparently distinct or even opposed positions, among them 
fascism and socialism, idealism and materialism, and positivism and 
psychoanalysis.144 In an expanded version of a quotation cited above in relation 
to Lukács, Aesthetic Theory identifies insensitivity to form as another key 
characteristic of the philistine: 
 
The participation of form in the crisis of art becomes evident in 
statements like those of Lukács, who said that in modern art the 
importance of form has been greatly overestimated. Evident in this 
philistine [banausischen] call to arms is a discontent with art of which 
Lukács the cultural conservative is unconscious, as well as a concept of 
form that is inadequate to art. To hit upon the idea that form has been 
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“The Essay as Form”, p.5 [GS11, p.11]; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.274 [GS6, p.270]; 
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overestimated in art, one must have failed to recognize that form is 
essential to art, that it mediates content [Inhalt].145 
 
Adorno’s claim that form mediates content can be clarified by distinguishing 
form from technique and content from material in his nomenclature, with the 
proviso that these should not be treated as invariant categories. The material is 
everything the artist works on, like colours, words and sounds, but also the forms 
and techniques available at a particular stage of historical development. The 
technique, at a general level, is the means by which these elements are organized 
purposefully, and through that process set against what currently exists. The 
dynamic relations of the parts to each other and of the parts to the whole together 
comprise the form, which in its integral structuration posits the negation of the 
world as it is. The content then is both what happens within the artwork, and its 
additional significance beyond what is empirically there, the intertwined senses 
of subject matter (“Inhalt”) and import (“Gehalt”). 
Elsewhere in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno confirms the philistinism of 
insensitivity to form, as well as the preeminent status of the latter as the central 
element of art.146 However, “Television as Ideology” [1953] calls for the formal 
analysis of television to be “supplemented by closer consideration of the specific 
contents [Inhalt] of programmes”, while noting that in this medium the “contents 
[Inhalt] and the form of presentation are so complicitous with one another that 
each may vouch for the other”: “Abstracting from the form would be philistine 
[banausisch] vis-á-vis any work of art; it would amount to measuring by its own 
standard a sphere that ignores aesthetic autonomy and replaces form with 
function and packaging.”147 His insistence that content should not be 
subordinated wholly to form applies to artistic productions from beyond the 
realm of the culture industry, as we can see in another expanded quotation 
familiar to us from Aesthetic Theory, dealing with Hegel’s anti-formalism: 
 
What even his [Hegel’s] sworn enemy Kierkegaard so admired him for, 
the accent he put on content [Inhalt] vis-á-vis form, did not merely 																																																								
145 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.187 [GS7, p.213]. 
146 Ibid., p.110 [GS7, p.129]. 
147 Theodor Adorno, “Television as Ideology” [1953], in Critical Models, p.59 [GS10.2, p.518]. 
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announce opposition to empty and indifferent play, that is, the relation of 
art to truth, which was his preeminent concern. Rather, at the same time it 
revealed an overestimation of the thematic content [Stoffgehalt] of 
artworks regardless of their dialectic of form. As a result, an art-alien 
[Kunstfremdes] and philistine [Banausisches] element entered Hegel’s 
aesthetics, which manifests its fatal character in the aesthetics of 
dialectical materialism, which in this regard had no more misgivings 
about Hegel than did Marx.148 
 
The accusation of philistinism is still directed at the overestimation of content 
rather than form, but it is accompanied by an awareness of the countervailing 
risk of the empty play of formalism. Adorno maintains that the content mediates 
the form, just as the form mediates the content, in this passage from Aesthetic 
Theory: “Even in so-called formal elements there is by virtue of their relation to 
the unreconcilable a return of content [Inhalt] that is refracted by their law. This 
dialectic in the form constitutes its depth; without it form would be what 
philistines [Banausen] take it to be: empty play.”149 He holds that it is the task of 
aesthetic reflection to crystallize the artwork’s truth content (“Wahrheitsgehalt”), 
which emerges out of the dialectic of form and content (“Inhalt”). 
Characteristically, Aesthetic Theory articulates this dialectic by way of a 
double-sided negation, in a formulation to which we will return in the next 
section: “Against the philistine [banausische] division of art into form and 
content [Inhalt] it is necessary to insist on their unity; against the sentimental 
view of their indifference in the artwork it is necessary to insist that their 
difference endures even in their mediation.”150 The tendency to 
compartmentalize is another feature of the philistine established in the 
Introduction, which along with narrowness is taken up by Adorno in Hegel: 
Three Studies [1963]: “The experience of post-Kantian German Idealism reacts 
against philistine [spießbürgerliche] narrowness and contentment with the 
compartmentalization of life and organized knowledge in accordance with the 
																																																								
148 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.449 [GS7, p.526]. 
149 Ibid., p.249 [GS7, p.283]. 
150 Ibid., p.194 [GS7, p.221]. 
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division of labour.”151 There are further examples of this philistine mindset, for 
example the division of the artwork into an appearance appreciated intuitably and 
a meaning requiring conceptual elucidation, which is imputed to traditional 
aesthetics in Aesthetic Theory.152 Analogous to the treatment of form and 
content, Sound Figures warns against both the compartmentalization and the 
conflation of the categories of technique and meaning, in a discussion about the 
correct approach to aesthetics: 
 
It would not be legitimate to devise an aesthetics from above with quasi-
ontological status, one that was unconcerned with the laws governing 
musical language and the concrete musical structures in which alone 
those laws are crystallized. Nor would it be sufficient to give a positivist 
description of the technical facts and then to tack on to it retrospectively a 
theory that would lose all sense of its own meaning once it had ceased to 
grasp its truth or falsity. Only the philistine [Banause] keeps questions of 
musical technique and aesthetic meaning in separate compartments; only 
the unrepentant technofreak or resolute idealist confuses the two. But 
neither will the solution be found in a middle course between speculative 
thought remote from musical practice and a diligent craftsmanship. […] 
The work of art is not best served by a compromise between the extremes 
of the internal and external, of spirit and technicality. True mediation can 
result only from preserving the extremes as such.153 
 
Adorno echoes this claim later in Sound Figures: “Only philistines [Philiströs] 
can entertain the notion of a ready-made and self-contained artistic content that is 
then projected into the external world with the aid of a technique conceived of in 
similarly thinglike terms. Inner experience and outer form are created by a 
reciprocal process of interaction.”154 The model of mediation alluded to in these 
passages has already been identified as key to his dialectical method, and it 
informs his aesthetics in the case of the dialectic of form and content. The 
definition of content as what happens within the artwork includes formal 																																																								
151 Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, pp.61-62 [GS5, p.302]. 
152 See: Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.127 [GS7, p.150], p.128 [GS7, p.151]. 
153 Adorno, Sound Figures, p.124 [GS16, p.146]. 
154 Ibid., p.198 [GS16, p.229]. 
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elements in motion, for example the development of a theme in a musical 
composition. The images and ideas that might usually be thought of as the 
content of the artwork in fact mostly fall within the category of material, worked 
on by the artist using technical means, and transformed as they are integrated 
into a formal complex. The content in the sense of the import of the artwork is its 
utopian potential, negatively articulated on the level of form. The form is itself 
sedimented content though, in that it is shaped historically and participates in the 
relation of the artwork to society. There is content too in the implicit criticism of 
the evident disparity between the semblance of reconciliation constituted by the 
artwork and the impossibility of achieving such reconciliation in empirical 
reality. 
 Consistent with his theory of the artwork, Adorno advocates a type of 
aesthetic reflection open and agile enough to negotiate the dialectic of form and 
content, which really is an elaboration in inner-aesthetic terms of the dialectic of 
the aesthetic and the social. His technique of immanent analysis, which he insists 
is not a fixed method to be applied uniformly, is nevertheless distinguished by its 
practice of immersion in the individual artwork, and the associated set of 
aesthetic dispositions adumbrated in the last section. He argues that it must orient 
itself both internally and externally to the object, as described in relation to the 
philistine and the connoisseur at the end of the preceding part of this chapter. The 
approach is sympathetic to the extent that it closely follows the internal logic of 
the formally autonomous artwork, but critical in that it recognizes the social 
character of aesthetic autonomy itself. Stressing the vital role played by 
interpretation in crystallizing truth content in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
maintains that fidelity to the object includes the obligation to negate what is false 
in it, to assist in drawing out its social import:  
 
The immanence of society in the artwork is the essential social relation of 
art, not the immanence of art in society. Because the social content of art 
is not related externally to its principium individuationis but rather 
inheres in individuation, which is itself a social reality, art’s social 
character is concealed and can only be grasped by its interpretation. Yet 
even in artworks that are to their very core ideological, truth content can 
assert itself. Ideology, socially necessary semblance, is by this same 
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necessity also the distorted image of the true. A threshold that divides the 
social consciousness of aesthetics from the philistine [Banausie] is that 
aesthetics reflects the social critique of the ideological in artworks, rather 
than mechanically reiterating it.155 
 
If ideology is defined as socially necessary semblance, then its determinate 
negation may disclose something about contemporary society, in this way 
forming part of the truth content of the artwork, according to Adorno. There 
might be straightforwardly ideological elements to it, incorporated from the 
surrounding culture, or a particular social function it is designed to fulfil, as with 
religious art. He argues that the formally autonomous artwork has a higher-order 
ideological character, which consists in its resemblance to the commodity form, 
that is, its objectivation of a process as a thing, and its pretensions to radically 
self-sufficient status: “Only a philistine [philiströs] and stubborn faith in artists 
could overlook the complicity of the artwork’s thing-character with social 
reification and thus with its untruth: the fetishization of what is in itself a process 
as a relation between elements.”156 That the rigour of its construction 
paradoxically produces a model of freedom, but that it fails to make good on this 
utopian promise, is another reason art is said to require critique as well as 
interpretation. Adorno’s version of immanent analysis critically reconfigures the 
elements of the artwork, arranging them in a new constellation, in order to cast 
light on its truth and falsity. 
This technique situates itself within the inner-aesthetic nexus of the 
artwork, but ultimately registers a significance extending beyond that formal 
complex. Adorno comments on the question of his own form, specifically the 
open and unsystematic structure of the essay, in the self-reflexive text “The 
Essay as Form”: “[T]he essay has something like an aesthetic autonomy that is 
easily accused of being simply derived from art, although it is distinguished from 
art by its medium, concepts, and by its claim to a truth devoid of aesthetic 
semblance.”157 He believes that immanent analysis is well suited to the task of 
translating aconceptual knowledge into discursive terms, but there is nevertheless 																																																								
155 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.304 [GS7, p.346]. 
156 Ibid., p.130 [GS7, p.154]. 
157 Adorno, “The Essay as Form”, p.5. 
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an aesthetic aspect to its imaginative reconstruction of its object, by contrast with 
the methodological division of form and content in positivism: 
 
Lukács failed to recognize this [what distinguishes the essay from art] 
when he called the essay an art form in the letter to Leo Popper that 
introduces Soul and Form. But the positivist maxim according to which 
what is written about art may in no way lay claim to artistic presentation, 
that is, autonomy of form, is no better. Here as elsewhere, the general 
positivist tendency to set every possible object, as an object of research, 
in stark opposition to the subject, does not go beyond the mere separation 
of form and content – for one can hardly speak of aesthetic matters 
unaesthetically, devoid of resemblance to the subject matter, without 
falling into philistinism [Banausie] and losing touch with the object a 
priori.158 
 
Adorno’s claim about aesthetics here is broadened to cover all philosophy in 
“Notes on Philosophical Thinking” [1965]: “Philosophical thoughts that can be 
reduced to their skeleton or their net profit are of no worth. That countless 
philosophical treatises are philistine [Banausische] and could not care less about 
being so is more than just an aesthetic shortcoming: it is the index of their own 
falsity.”159 There are of course important differences, which he acknowledges, 
between the interpretation of artworks and theoretical texts, not least that the 
latter are already discursive and conceptual. These two types of immanent 
analysis nevertheless share many features, including the aesthetic component of 
truth, that is, the moment of mimesis in which thought makes itself like its 
object, rather than merely classifying or describing it. The practice of 
constellational thinking is also common to his essays on art and his readings of 
philosophers, where he eschews a closed deductive organization or total system 
in favour of a force field of elements held in tension by their reciprocal negation. 
In this chapter, I am attempting such an immanent analysis of Adorno’s model of 
culture, art and aesthetics, structured around the figure of the philistine. 																																																								
158 Ibid., p.5 [GS11, p.11]. 
159 Theodor Adorno, “Notes on Philosophical Thinking” [1965], in Critical Models, pp.131-132 
[GS10.2, p.604]. 
 86 
BLINDNESS 
 
In the course of my survey of his work, I have touched on some of the 
ways in which philistinism is creatively incorporated into unorthodox structures 
of argumentation by Adorno. He often applies this label to each pole of an 
antithesis, so that the philistine becomes a rhetorical container for contradiction, 
embodying irreconcilable aspects of a truth that can only be expressed 
negatively. The term functions as the point of mediation in a dialectical reversal 
on a number of occasions. There are many examples of entities being identified 
as both philistine and anti-philistine, either in different contexts or within the 
same passage, and this construct is considered in combination with a wide range 
of ideas. Aesthetic Theory, in which the realization of the double-sided concept 
of philistinism is at its most sophisticated, frequently deploys it in close 
proximity to the trope of blindness, beginning with this extract from the chapter 
on “Natural Beauty”: 
 
Art does not imitate nature, not even individual instances of natural 
beauty, but natural beauty as such. This denominates not only the aporia 
of natural beauty but the aporia of aesthetics as a whole. Its object is 
determined negatively, as indeterminable. It is for this reason that art 
requires philosophy, which interprets it in order to say what it is unable to 
say, whereas art is only able to say it by not saying it. The paradoxes of 
aesthetics are dictated to it by its object: “Beauty demands, perhaps, the 
slavish imitation of what is indeterminable in things.” If it is barbaric to 
say of something in nature that it is more beautiful than something else, 
the concept of beauty in nature as the concept of something that can be 
distinguished as such nevertheless bears that barbarism teleologically in 
itself, whereas the figure of the philistine [Banausen] remains 
prototypically that of a person who is blind to beauty. The origin of this 
paradox is the enigmatic character of nature’s language.160 
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Adorno again constructs an opposition where each side of the formulation is 
negative, without resolving the tension between them. The philistine is 
prototypically blind to beauty, because they are incapable of producing 
comparative judgements about aesthetic value in the natural world. The act of 
discrimination which makes it possible to recognize beauty is barbaric, being a 
prototypical form of the domination of nature by instrumental rationality. The 
co-occurrence of philistinism and barbarism, which is not uncommon in his work 
either, here serves to illustrate a paradox it is claimed is inherent to the 
apprehension of beauty in nature.161 Aesthetic Theory explains how the 
simultaneous need for and resistance to definition is transferred from natural 
beauty to art beauty, in turn circumscribing the practice of aesthetics, which must 
reflect the aporias of its object. 
Adorno reprises the trope of blindness in the chapter on “Art Beauty”, in 
which he rebuts the critique of art found in Plato: “Plato’s ontology, more 
congenial to positivism than dialectic is, took offence at art’s semblance 
character, as if the promise made by art awakened doubt in the positive 
omnipresence of being and idea, for which Plato hoped to find surety in the 
concept.”162 For Adorno, Plato’s rejection of aesthetic semblance as mendacious 
is misconceived, because the artwork does not seek to copy reality or 
approximate the universal ideas behind it, but instead gestures towards an 
alternative to the given order on the level of form. Its mimesis is not mimesis of 
the world as currently constituted, except by way of negation, rather it imitates 
natural beauty as such, specifically its opposition to instrumental rationality. The 
blindness referred to here is an insensitivity to form, which we have already 
encountered as a philistine trait in relation to Lukács: 
 
If the Platonic ideas were existence-in-itself, art would not be needed; the 
ontologists of antiquity mistrusted art and sought pragmatic control over 
it because in their innermost being they knew that the hypostatized 
universal concept is not what beauty promises. Plato’s critique of art is 																																																								
161 See: Adorno, “The Sociology of Knowledge and its Consciousness”, p.39 [GS10.1, p.34]; 
Adorno, “What National Socialism Has Done to the Arts”, p.385; Adorno, Philosophy of New 
Music, p.112 [GS12, p.136]; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.205 [GS6, p.204]; Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, p.158 [GS7, p.181]. Adorno even substitutes the word “philistine” for the 
word “barbaric” in a revision to his essay “Television as Ideology”, p.59 [GS10.2, p.518]. 
162 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.110. 
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indeed not compelling, because art negates the literal reality of its 
thematic content [Stoffgehalte], which Plato had indicted as a lie. The 
exaltation of the concept as idea is allied with the philistine 
[banausischer] blindness for the central element of art, its form.163 
 
At another point in the book, Adorno asserts that to “lambast art as human 
deception” is to “stand[…] in sympathetic accord with philistinism 
[Banausie]”.164 He holds that the promise of art is its utopian potential, which 
consists in the integral development of its own organizational principle. It 
thereby posits a radically transformed existence, rather than affirming things as 
they are, but it is worth noting the reversal immediately following the extract 
above: “In spite of all this, however, the blemish of mendacity obviously cannot 
be rubbed off art; nothing guarantees that it will keep its objective promise. […] 
Even radical art is a lie insofar as it fails to create the possible to which it gives 
rise as semblance.”165 The fact that art is unable to bring about the alternative to 
the given order it gestures towards, because that utopian potential cannot be 
fulfilled within the aesthetic sphere, means that any theory of art has to be a 
critique of art as well, it is suggested in Aesthetic Theory. 
 Adorno’s assertion of the centrality of form to art does not fully reflect 
his sophisticated understanding of how it relates to other elements of the artwork, 
as we have seen. He condemns as philistine the compartmentalization of form 
and content, maintaining that these categories are inextricably intertwined, and 
that thinking of them in isolation would rob them of much of their substance. He 
also repudiates the identity of form and content, which overrides their irreducible 
difference, and in practice means one component of the equation wholly 
subsuming the other. In the chapter on “Coherence and Meaning”, Kant’s 
formulation that thoughts without content are empty, while intuitions without 
concepts are blind, is applied to the aesthetic sphere to make this point, in an 
expanded version of a quotation cited in the last section: 
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Against the philistine [banausische] division of art into form and content 
[Inhalt] it is necessary to insist on their unity; against the sentimental 
view of their indifference in the artwork it is necessary to insist that their 
difference endures even in their mediation. Not only is the perfect 
identity of the two chimerical, it would not redound to the success of the 
works: By analogy to Kantʼs maxim, they would become empty or blind, 
self-sufficient play or raw empiria.166 
 
In keeping with his dialectical method, Adorno negates both of these 
unacceptable alternatives, mediating them in their extremity. The empty play of 
formalism is attacked elsewhere, as the error which the Hegelian turn to the 
object attempts to redress. It is the artwork rather than the philistine that is now 
called blind, to convey how too narrow a focus on content fails to capture what is 
specifically aesthetic. These are the problems that result from subordinating 
content to form or vice versa, which is what happens when they are conflated. 
Seeking instead to maintain the tension between them, Adorno recommends a 
version of immanent analysis that pays close attention to form, while recognizing 
it as internally related to the social situation, with the ultimate aim of 
crystallizing truth content, which cannot be conceived independently of its 
aesthetic articulation. 
He further complicates the trope of blindness, again insisting on the 
social import of inwardly directed constructions, in the chapter headed “Toward 
a Theory of the Artwork”: “Artworks are closed to one another, blind, and yet in 
their hermeticism they represent what is external.”167 The type of aesthetic 
reflection that can apprehend this relation to the external, which paradoxically 
consists in an inner-aesthetic orientation, must also negate what is false in its 
object, working through the internal contradictions of the formally autonomous 
artwork to deconstruct the myth of radical self-sufficiency from within. He 
acknowledges that immanent analysis, which is supposed to resist ideology, may 
itself serve ideological ends, if its internal perspective is absolutized, echoing his 
argument about l’art pour l’art: 
  																																																								
166 Ibid., p.194 [GS7, p.221]. 
167 Ibid., p.237. 
 90 
If it is made absolute, immanent analysis falls prey to ideology, against 
which it struggled when it wanted to devote itself to the artworks 
internally rather than deducing their worldviews. Today it is already 
evident that immanent analysis, which was once a weapon of artistic 
experience against philistinism [Banausie], is being misused as a slogan 
to hold social reflection at a distance from an absolutized art. With social 
reflection, however, the artwork is not to be understood in relation to that 
of which it constitutes one element, nor is it to be deciphered in terms of 
its own content [Gehalt]. The blindness of the artwork is not only a 
corrective of the nature-dominating universal, it is also its correlative; as 
always the blind and the empty belong together in their abstractness.168 
 
The artwork should not be understood reductively as an inert reflection of its 
social situation, nor conceived of in total isolation from the extra-aesthetic 
sphere. Its blindness is once again double-sided, with regard to the domination of 
nature by instrumental rationality. There is an insistence on a dialectical 
approach, in response to the interplay of the universal and the particular: “The 
reciprocal relation of the universal and the particular, which takes place 
unconsciously in artworks and which aesthetics must bring to consciousness, is 
what truly necessitates a dialectical approach.”169 This substantially completes 
the complex of arguments constructed around philistinism and blindness in 
Aesthetic Theory. 
There are additional instances of these concepts co-occurring throughout 
the book, and part of the reason for the selection presented here is to recapitulate 
and reinforce my reading of Adorno’s aesthetics. The recurrence of blindness 
adds a specifically ocular dimension to the insensateness to aesthetic experience 
that is the defining characteristic of the philistine. The implication is that visual 
art is the preeminent domain of aesthetic experience, when greater attention is 
typically given to the fields of literature and music in his oeuvre. In relation to 
the latter, Aesthetic Theory contains far fewer examples of the trope of deafness 
than of blindness, with the most significant of these not integrated into the main 
body of the text, but included in the “Paralipomena”:  																																																								
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The philosophical construction of the unequivocal primacy of the whole 
over the part is as alien to art [Kunst so fremd] as it is epistemologically 
untenable. In important works, details never merge tracelessly into the 
totality. Certainly the autonomization of the details, when they become 
indifferent to the nexus of the work and reduce it to a subordinating 
schema, is accompanied by the regression of the work to the preartistic. 
Yet artworks distinguish themselves productively from the merely 
schematic exclusively by the element of the autonomy of their details; 
every authentic work is the result of centripetal and centrifugal forces. 
Anyone who listens to music seeking out the beautiful passages is a 
dilettante [Dilettant]; but whoever is unable to perceive beautiful 
passages, the varying density of invention and texture in a work, is 
deaf.170 
 
Adorno here invokes the dilettante, another typological figure, mentioned 
alongside the philistine and the art-alien elsewhere in his body of work.171 The 
usual practice of traditional aesthetics is to subordinate the parts to the whole, 
seeing beauty in surface coherence and the appearance of harmony. The 
dilettante, on the other hand, isolates the part from the whole, calling individual 
elements beautiful, when that effect depends on their place within the totality. 
The philistine does not participate in either of these degraded forms of aesthetic 
experience, because they are constitutively insensate to beauty, whether the 
deficiency is imagined as blindness or deafness. In my immanent analysis of 
Adorno’s model of culture, art and aesthetics, I have deployed their constitutive 
counterconcept and immanent negation the figure of the philistine, to bind 
together the elements of this constellation. 
 
Adorno’s Blindnesses 
 
Adorno’s philistine is developed dialectically to a far greater extent than 
admitted by either Beech and Roberts in “Spectres of the Aesthetic” or Bull in 																																																								
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“The Ecstasy of Philistinism”. His treatment of the concept is double-sided, in 
that he first deploys it polemically against opponents, in the process negatively 
delineating his own position. He then makes a theoretical countermove, 
affirming the perspective of the philistine, in order to disclose the corresponding 
moment of falsity in his aesthetic theory. The sequence of these elements of the 
argument varies, as does their proximity within a text or indeed across his 
oeuvre, but in my opinion they need to be considered together. Adorno insists on 
the truth content of the accusation of philistinism, while recognizing that this 
vocabulary is invested in educational privilege and class structure, seeking to 
register that tension with a self-critical turn. There is an inbuilt flexibility to the 
term, which he exploits rhetorically. He combines it with its antitheses in 
compound words and paradoxical formulations, and plays on its ambivalent 
temporality. He uses it to construct oppositions where both components are 
negated, and makes it the fulcrum on which dialectical reversals pivot. He 
mobilizes it to defend and undermine the same entities, and as a means of 
equating seemingly disparate ideas. This diversity of applications does not add 
up to conceptual incoherence however, and the figure of the philistine is given 
greater precision through their differentiation from the vulgarian, the connoisseur 
and the dilettante. Adorno suggests that they fulfil a specified role among this 
cast of characters, as the absolute negation of art and aesthetics, which remains 
immanent to that discourse. They therefore represent, at least on a theoretical 
level, the immanent negation of art and aesthetics, sublating the partial positions 
of an immanent non-negation and a non-immanent negation, earlier attributed 
respectively to Beech and Roberts and Bull. He does not fully realize that critical 
potential though, and in my view his aesthetic theory ought to be subjected to 
greater counterpressure from the philistine. His approach has its own 
blindnesses, aporias and exclusions, which this investigation allows us to broach. 
In the concluding section, I recapitulate his model of culture, art and aesthetics, 
and advance a preliminary critique of it guided by his dialectical conception of 
the philistine, before turning in the next chapter to the topic of Dada.  
In terms of the field of culture, Adorno situates the dialectic of art and its 
other on one side of the division of pure culture and popular culture, imagining 
the interplay of the aesthetic and the philistine as internal to the higher domain, 
and accordingly as predominantly intra-bourgeois. He holds that advanced art is 
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the only type of cultural production with any critical potential, but that ultimately 
its promise of an alternative to the given order cannot be concretized by aesthetic 
means. He denies that oppositional capacity to popular and commercial art, 
which he says merely affirm the status quo while gratifying the masses, and 
though he acknowledges some lower forms may once have contained the 
potential for resistance he believes that it has been eliminated with their 
assimilation by the culture industry. The rise of this phenomenon reflects the 
development of a fully administered society, in which differences in the modes 
of consciousness of the classes are said to break down, along with the distinction 
between pure culture and popular culture. The consumers of the mass-produced 
entertainment of the culture industry are depicted unevenly as working-class 
vulgarians, on whom middle-class philistinism is imposed, but for the most part 
they are excluded from the struggle over the continued possibility of aesthetic 
truth. It is the cultivated philistine, representing the deterioration of the sphere of 
pure culture, who is charged with effecting the negation of advanced art. Their 
strategies of disinvestment, albeit partially derived from modes of attention 
associated with the culture industry, successfully neutralize the radical content of 
the artwork. However, Adorno’s focus on this confrontation, confining the 
dialectic of art and its other to a particular zone of the field of culture, is open to 
question. 
His controversial construct of the culture industry, and his disputed model 
of the fully administered society, need to be addressed in the first instance. He 
has been criticized for his alleged elitism and denial of agency to the masses, and 
as the author of a totalizing account ultimately tied to an economic paradigm of 
monopoly capitalism and the bureaucratic state which has now been historically 
superseded. His insights into mass culture, and its industrial apparatuses of 
production and distribution, have been taken up despite the suspicion of 
snobbery, and applied to new media technologies, typically accompanied by the 
caveat that his overall assessment is too pessimistic. This tendency to temper his 
supposed extremism, to introduce qualifications or balancing statements, 
fundamentally fails to reckon with the form of his argument, which is deemed 
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unimportant in positivistic fashion.172 His writings on culture often operate in the 
polemic mode, in which absolute formulations and strategic hyperbole are to be 
expected. The purpose of these devices is not merely rhetorical, meant to convey 
his point with greater emphasis or graphicness, rather this unorthodox approach 
reflects his conviction that language cannot function as a neutral medium through 
which truth is communicated indifferently, as well as the foundational principle 
of a critical theory that understands itself as actively intervening in the society it 
describes.173 His dialectical method could be said to require a mode of 
presentation which overshoots literal reality, and he confirms the legitimacy of 
techniques like exaggeration more than once.174 It would be a mistake to 
recognize this but then attempt to translate his transcendent critique into a 
normative framework, as if his work concealed what he really thinks, which 
might be extracted from it, as soon as stylistic peculiarities are stripped away and 
overstatements rowed back.175 This would miss how he proceeds by pushing 
interdependent opposites to an extreme, so that the moment of falsity in each is 
exposed by the other. We must avoid isolating elements of his dialectical 
constructions, treating them as independent claims to be endorsed or denied, or 
trying to find a compromise by charting a middle path. The way out of this 
interpretive double-bind, in which his claims cannot be accepted at face value, 
nor recast in a realistic register, is to criticize his analysis of the field of culture in 
its own terms. 
 We might ask whether he gives sufficient weight to the critical potential 
of popular culture, neglecting opportunities to exploit its status as the antithesis 
of pure culture, notwithstanding the increasing permeability of the boundary 
between these spheres. He recognizes that advanced art contains ideological 																																																								
172 For a sketch of this institutionalized straw-manning of Adorno, see: Militant Esthetix, 
“Adornism: A Manifesto”, http://www.militantesthetix.co.uk/adorno/twamani.htm [accessed 24 
January 2019]. 
173 For a brief discussion of this aspect of Adorno’s implicit philosophy of language, in the 
context of a consideration of the similarity between language and music, see: Mark Abel, “Is 
Music a Language? Adorno, Voloshinov and the Language Character of Music”, Historical 
Materialism 26.4 (2018): pp.65-66, pp.73-76. For the programmatic statement of critical theory, 
see: Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” [1937], trans. by Matthew J 
O’Connell, in Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York, New York: Continuum, 2002), 
pp.188-243. 
174 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.49, pp.126-127. 
175 For a sophisticated example of this approach applied in a reading of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, see: Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory 
[2000], trans. by John Farrell and Siobhan Kattago (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp.49-61. 
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elements as well as an inverted utopianism, and calls for an interpretation that 
negates what is false in its object, as part of the process of crystallizing its truth 
content. His assessment of the productions of the culture industry is much less 
nuanced, and they are dismissed as wholly ideological, denied even the minimal 
oppositional capacity that is allowed for certain forms of popular culture prior to 
their integration. There is reason to challenge this position, if only because it 
appears incompatible with his claim that ideology, understood as socially 
necessary semblance, constitutes an indirect route to truth content. I believe that 
a more complex account of the relationship between truth and falsity in the 
productions of the culture industry is required, not in order to champion this 
domain as a source of resistance in its own right, but rather to bring out how its 
focus on function and pleasure exerts counterpressure on his aesthetic theory 
with its Kantian inheritance. That the cultivated philistine is shown successfully 
neutralizing the radical content of advanced art, by applying to it modes of 
attention modelled on the relation to consumer goods, falls short of a critique of 
the aesthetic comportment which he does consider appropriate to the formally 
autonomous artwork. This self-critical turn is what the dialectical approach he 
envisages demands, however in my view he fails to enact it properly, leaving 
advanced art insufficiently negatively mediated by the productions of the culture 
industry. To correct this error need not involve moving outside the bounds of 
pure culture, perhaps just giving greater credence to the critical force of popular 
and commercial material incorporated into that realm by avant-garde 
movements, admittedly a tendency now so entrenched that in contemporary art it 
scarcely seems tenable to separate the spheres analytically. In keeping with the 
model of an immanent negation of art and aesthetics, Adorno may locate the 
dialectic of art and its other within pure culture, but the latter ought to be 
conceived as immanently permeated by popular culture, while his commitment to 
aesthetic autonomy is negated by the appetitive aspect of the philistine, who 
consistent with his actual practice should not be distinguished too strictly from 
the vulgarian. 
 The next part of the chapter addressed the question of art, specifically his 
model of advanced art. The philistinism which he attributes to critics of advanced 
art indirectly discloses some of its distinctive qualities, that is, its alleged 
incomprehensibility and abstractness, recast respectively as a repudiation of 
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conventional surface coherence and the appearance of harmony, and as a 
critically inflected mimetic adaptation to the dominant principle of exchange. He 
further justifies them as a response to the objective demands of the social 
situation, deemed necessary at this stage of the intrinsic and extrinsic 
development of advanced art. He credits it for its successful negotiation of the 
dialectic of the aesthetic and the social, which is articulated negatively with 
reference to the philistinism of art with a cause and the philistinism of art for 
enjoyment. The philistinism of art with a cause is attacked for reducing the 
aesthetic to the social, whereas in his opinion the social import of the artwork 
inheres in its aesthetic autonomy. He argues that advanced art sets itself against 
what currently exists by rigorously pursuing its own internal logic, and that its 
qualitative uniqueness thereby challenges the interchangeability of all things 
under advanced capitalism. The philistinism of art for enjoyment is accused of 
excluding the social from the aesthetic, but he recognizes that aesthetic 
autonomy is itself a social fact, highlighting the complicity of the formally 
autonomous artwork with the fetish-character of the commodity form. His 
aesthetics both underlies and is informed by this conception of advanced art, 
which again necessitates a dialectical approach. There is in his sketch of an 
interpretation adequate to it a back-and-forth movement between a close reading 
which evinces an affinity for art, and moments when its purposelessness is 
questioned from a position of art-alienness, perspectives attributed respectively 
to the connoisseur and the philistine. His version of the latter figure marks out 
what he takes to be the limits to aesthetic truth under the historical conditions of 
the time, and it is on that negative basis that his model of advanced art is 
constructed. 
This account of the dialectic of the aesthetic and the social is compelling, 
but it is not the only way to negotiate it. We might think instead of the 
integration of art and design promoted at the Bauhaus, or of the interventions 
into everyday life undertaken by the Surrealists. It is possible to envisage a 
politically partisan art with a propaganda message, of the sort he disqualifies as 
reductive and instrumentalized, which challenges the given order on a formal 
level as well, as with the satirical photomonatges of John Heartfield, and the 
graphic design of El Lissitzky. His rejection of an art oriented towards pleasure 
can likewise be countered by pointing to the subversive and disruptive force 
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which some of these productions exhibit, including the performative self-
portraits of Claude Cahun, and the pornographic fiction of Georges Bataille. This 
block on a version of advanced art which aims at radical change, and which 
accords a central role to enjoyment, perhaps partly explains his lack of 
appreciation for Bertolt Brecht. These counterexamples are all drawn from the 
modernist milieu with which he was chiefly concerned, yet none of them are 
admitted into his extremely narrow canon of advanced art, which is not just 
almost exclusively Western, but focused to a large extent on a particular phase of 
new music in Vienna. He concentrates for the most part on formally autonomous 
artworks, giving priority to their integral structuration, in keeping with his theory 
of art and aesthetics. It is not simply that his range of references ought to be 
expanded, rather that his model of aesthetic comportment should be brought into 
productive tension with the approaches he excludes from his definition of 
advanced art. In this thesis, I attempt such a critical encounter between Adorno 
and Dada. 
Adorno attributes to the philistine an essential function in the 
apprehension of the enigmaticalness of art, but they nevertheless operate in a 
secondary capacity, acting as a check on the connoisseur, whose knowledgeable 
and sympathetic attitude towards the object is closer to his default position. I am 
not proposing that the components of a dialectical mediation must be equally 
weighted, simply noting that the philistine is clearly delimited and allotted a 
fixed place within his aesthetics. They are also left largely abstract, lacking 
concrete content. The philistine, in his account of their interplay with the 
connoisseur, is barely defined beyond the fact of their art-alienness, which is 
understood broadly as a demand for art to have a purpose, in opposition to the 
principle of aesthetic autonomy. There are hints as to what that purpose might be 
in the philistinism of art with a cause and the philistinism of art for enjoyment, 
with the former implying partisanship and the latter pleasure, corresponding to 
the two types of interest repudiated by Kant. I would argue that these aspects of 
the philistine need to be pushed further, overcoming the definite limits placed on 
this figure by actually admitting the counterclaims of the partisan and the 
voluptuous into Adorno’s aesthetics. My point is not that he ought to affirm these 
alternatives as valid in themselves, only that more could be made of their 
oppositional capacity vis-à-vis advanced art. His version of the dialectic of art 
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and its other suggests a self-critical approach to aesthetics, cognizant of the fact 
that it is implicated in untruth, readily incorporating its own negation in the 
shape of the philistine. Their insensitivity to the aesthetic, the moment of art-
alienness which he incorporates into his preferred form of interpretation, must be 
allowed to permeate it more thoroughly if he is to fully realize the critical 
potential of the philistine as the immanent negation of art and aesthetics. I want 
to suggest that he remains too invested in aesthetic autonomy, and can as a result 
appear insensitive to attempts to challenge this principle from within aesthetic 
discourse, for example the critique of the institutionality of art which is 
characteristic of the early twentieth-century avant-garde movements, according 
to Peter Bürger.176 Adorno’s philistine should be brought to bear negatively on 
his aesthetic theory, allowing greater scope to the countervailing force of the 
excluded modes in their specificity. 
For my investigation into his aesthetics, I began with Adorno’s notion of 
aesthetic experience, for him the core of the enigma with which the discipline 
must come to grips, noting that it is inherently resistant to discursive articulation 
of its aconceptual knowledge. This is not to say that it lacks any philosophical 
content, and he draws on Kant and Hegel in sketching its principal features, 
notwithstanding the acknowledged danger of generalization. From Kant, Adorno 
takes the stances of aesthetic distance and disinterested contemplation, which are 
at odds with an appetitive philistinism. From Hegel, Adorno adapts the positions 
of freedom towards the object and a countermovement to the subject, advocating 
surrender to the aesthetic law of form. These Kantian and Hegelian influences, 
combined despite the apparent opposition of detached contemplation and 
immersive engagement, correspond to the modes of attention deemed appropriate 
to advanced art, which are the inverse of the philistine practices of demanding 
something out of the artwork and subjective projection onto it. Adorno’s version 
of aesthetic experience informs his theory of the artwork. He accords central 
importance to form, while stressing its dynamic relations with other elements of 
the artwork. This emphasis reflects his commitment to aesthetic autonomy, as 
exemplified by the formally autonomous artwork. His understanding of aesthetic 
experience also shapes his technique of immanent analysis. He argues that the 																																																								
176 Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde [1974], trans. by Michael Shaw (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), pp.22-23. 
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critic must orient themselves both internally and externally to the object, moving 
within its inner-aesthetic nexus, while remaining alert to its extra-aesthetic 
significance. They have to mix sympathetic and critical approaches, faithfully 
adhering to the immanent logic of the artwork, yet negating its moment of falsity. 
The philistine represents the external and critical aspects of this model of 
interpretation, with their art-alienness puncturing the closed circle of an 
immanent analysis which becomes ideological when it is made absolute, 
according to Adorno. The dialectic of form and content and the dialectic of 
internal and external are localized variants of the dialectic of the aesthetic and the 
social, which is key to my reconstruction of his aesthetic theory. He incorporates 
them all into the dialectic of art and its other, setting up the philistine as the 
immanent negation of art and aesthetics, though it is questionable how far he 
follows through on this insight. 
Before concluding on that point, I want to address some immediate 
objections to his aesthetics which might be raised in response to the summary 
presented here. He never seeks to justify his notion of aesthetic experience, it is 
simply assumed as fundamental to art and aesthetics, an indefinable given which 
the reader either recognizes or not. This might be seen as an aporia in his 
argument, but really it falls out of his framing of the task of aesthetics, 
identifying the enigma of aesthetic experience as the ultimate object of study for 
the discipline, a theoretical move which it is necessary to accept in order to enter 
into meaningful dialogue with him on the topic. However, I do not believe that 
this precludes a critique of aesthetic experience insofar as he does define it, in 
descriptions formulated with recourse to Kantian and Hegelian categories. 
Adorno’s theory of the artwork also exposes him to the accusation of formalism, 
though my reading has given reason to dispel that suspicion. He is certainly alive 
to the risk of the focus on form deteriorating into empty play, and his contention 
that content mediates form as well as the reverse goes some way towards 
mitigating this perceived bias. It is nevertheless the case that form is given 
special status in his aesthetics, as the element of the artwork in which all the 
others inhere, and through which aesthetic meaning is articulated. Finally, I 
return to the issue of his alleged elitism, observing that his technique of 
immanent analysis relies on a certain capacity for sympathy with the artwork, 
and a special competence for following its internal logic, which align it more 
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closely with the connoisseur than with the philistine. The latter figure is said to 
be constitutively insensate to aesthetic experience, from which we might infer 
the existence of the opposite, an elite imbued with a particular receptivity to it. 
He acknowledges the unjust social basis of this aesthetic disposition, the so-
called “pure gaze” ascribed to the bourgeoisie by Pierre Bourdieu, checking that 
elitism by incorporating a moment of art-alienness into his model of 
interpretation.177 Based on my reading of his work, I am unconvinced that his 
self-critical turn goes far enough in problematizing the modes of attention on 
which he instinctively falls back. 
 Adorno’s blindness in this regard is evident in his notion of aesthetic 
experience, his theory of the artwork, and his technique of immanent analysis. 
These all lean most heavily on the first side of the dialectic of the aesthetic and 
the social, whether expressed as an emphasis on form or an internal orientation, 
with the perspective of the philistine only admitted intermittently, and always 
limited in scope. This imbalance is not an error in itself, as there is no 
requirement for quantitative equivalence in order to effect a truly reciprocal 
negation, but it is still my assessment that he fails to fully mediate the poles of 
the antithesis. Contrary to the criticism of it as an aporia, Adorno’s refusal to 
circumscribe aesthetic experience by defining it in advance is actually a strength 
of his argument. If anything, I consider his descriptions of aesthetic experience 
too prescriptive and restrictive, tending to exclude encounters with art which do 
not conform to his understanding of it. The category should be opened up even 
further, so that it can encompass a wider spectrum of aesthetic experience, 
responding to each instance in its specificity without predetermined criteria. 
Similarly, Adorno does not so much overestimate the importance of form, 
incidentally an accusation which he labels philistine, as define it too narrowly, 
itself a philistine trait. His conception of the formal complex in which meaning 
consists ought to be expanded, going beyond the integral structuration of the 
artwork to incorporate the institutional structures enframing it, treating these as 
part of the set of dynamic relations which constitutes its inner-aesthetic nexus. 
This is justified where avant-garde movements resist the principle of aesthetic 
autonomy on the level of form, critically reflecting on their own institutionality, 																																																								
177 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste [1979], trans. by 
Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 2010), p.3. 
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as then that dimension is demonstrably implicated in the multi-directional play of 
elements which he takes to be the legitimate purview of aesthetics. However, 
Adorno’s variant of immanent analysis also needs to be amended, not just to 
accommodate the broader definitions of aesthetic experience and aesthetic form 
proposed here, but to ensure that the modes of attention of which it is in part a 
technical expression are critically interrogated. These modes of attention, which 
have already been presented couched in philosophical terms, are those of a 
connoisseur at home in the artistic milieu and practised in aesthetic reflection, 
not that far removed from the aesthetic comportment officially endorsed as 
appropriate to the realm of pure culture. What is required is their determinate 
negation, which can be enacted by a less abstract version of the philistine, 
unleashing the proscribed modes of attention of the partisan and the voluptuous, 
emblematically iconoclastic destruction and eating the artwork. Adorno’s 
aesthetics, transformed in this way, would be a better realization of his model of 
the dialectic of art and its other. 
In my immanent analysis of Adorno’s model of culture, art and 
aesthetics, I have employed the figure of the philistine as an organizing principle, 
an apophatic route to knowledge, and ultimately a means of teasing out the 
blindnesses, aporias and exclusions of his aesthetic theory. Beginning from a 
position of sympathy with his philosophy, I have accepted most of its central 
tenets, limiting myself to a critique rooted in its internal tensions. With the aid of 
his dialectical conception of the philistine, I have sought to reconfigure his 
aesthetic theory from within, thereby crystallizing its insight and negating its 
moment of falsity. This approach is broadly consistent with his own method, and 
basically means revising his model of culture, art and aesthetics in the light of his 
version of the dialectic of art and its other, once the latter has been completed 
theoretically and its implications worked through in practice. Adorno should 
allow the critical force of the philistine, who he himself construes as the 
immanent negation of art and aesthetics, to be brought to bear more fully on his 
preferred form of aesthetic comportment, giving this figure concrete realization 
in the modes of attention of the partisan and the voluptuous. Beech and Roberts’ 
emphasis on these perspectives appears to be confirmed by a close reading of his 
aesthetic theory, which invokes them in its depiction of the consumers of the 
culture industry as instrumentalizing and appetitive, in its opposition between the 
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philistinism of art with a cause and the philistinism of art for enjoyment, and in 
its adherence to the Kantian prohibitions on the interest in the good and the 
interest in the agreeable. However, I would caution that the critical potential of 
the philistine is not exhausted by cultural contestation and bodily pleasure, and 
other non-sanctioned forms of engagement with art are also relevant to the task 
of correcting the blindnesses of his aesthetic theory, as will become clear in the 
following chapters. This is only a preliminary critique of Adorno’s model of 
culture, art and aesthetics, which remains to be tested and further developed 
through a sustained encounter with an actual body of creative practice, that of 
Dada. 
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Adorno and Dada 
 
 
In the last chapter, Adorno’s model of culture, art and aesthetics was 
critically reconfigured, through an immanent analysis organized around its 
definitional other or constitutive counterconcept, the figure of the philistine. In 
this chapter, I introduce a different form of symbolic negation, which like 
philistinism is opposed to art as such, while remaining internal to aesthetic 
discourse, namely the anti-art of Dada. Adorno does not dedicate much attention 
to this avant-garde movement, writing at a time of widespread indifference 
towards it after its dissolution in the 1920s, which continued until the neo-avant-
garde revival of it on which he reflected in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 
intervening period , Dada was largely eclipsed by its successor Surrealism, and 
he engages more extensively with the latter in his essay “Looking Back on 
Surrealism” [1956], in which he does not mention Dada.178 There are relatively 
few passages addressing the earlier movement, either directly or indirectly, 
anywhere in his body of work. This is the case compared to his contemporaries, 
some of whom broke with the consensus to recognize its significance, for 
example Walter Benjamin.179 The references to Dada which do exist in Adorno’s 
oeuvre are usually brief, often allusive or incidental, and distributed across a 
number of texts. It is therefore necessary to undertake a labour of reconstruction, 
in which disparate statements are brought into combination with one another, and 
implicit attitudes are drawn out more clearly. His overall assessment of the 
movement, insofar as it can be pieced together in this way, appears 
underdeveloped and occasionally mistaken in its assumptions. In what follows, I 
aim to correct his reading where it is flawed, and to amplify his moments of 
insight, arriving by this roundabout route at a better understanding of Dada. To 
supplement and dispute the assertions made by Adorno, I cite concrete instances 
of its activity, drawing on the full range of its creative practice, though with a 
																																																								
178 Theodor Adorno, “Looking Back on Surrealism” [1956], in Notes to Literature, Volume 1, 
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179 See: Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” [1936], in 
Illuminations [1968], ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), 
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particular focus on the field of music, reflecting his interests as a critic.180 In 
advance of making this argument, I should engage with Dada’s current scholarly 
reception, clarifying the context in which my own interpretation intervenes, and 
taking up preliminary positions on key issues. 
 
Perspectives on Dada 
 
Mark Hutchinson was active on the fringes of the philistine controversy, 
for example writing the catalogue essay “Just Give Me The Truth: A Philistine’s 
Guide to Public Art” [2007], for an exhibition by the Freee Art Collective, the 
membership of which included Beech.181 With his article “Dada Contra Art 
History” [2015], which incidentally quotes Beech and Roberts’ “The Philistine 
and the Logic of Negation”, Hutchinson makes a sharply critical intervention in 
the revisionist art history which according to him has in recent years successfully 
reoriented the academic study of Dada. He outlines how leading figures in the 
field have sought to broaden the understanding of this movement, in order to 
correct the previously hegemonic account of it, which they see as reductive in 
two main respects. First, Dada has been uniformly represented as an expression 
of nihilistic despair emerging in response to war and social crisis. Second, Dada 
has been retroactively limited to the status of a juvenile precursor to Surrealism. 
Hutchinson does not defend this imputed traditional position, any more than he 
does the new orthodoxy which is supposed to have supplanted it. He does though 
consider it too narrow a characterization of past scholarship on the subject, which 
neglects an important strand of interpretation focused on the institutionality of 
art, originating with Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde [1974]. The revisionist 
art historians are said to redescribe the negativity of anti-art in positive terms, 
highlighting features such as innovation, interdisciplinarity and the multiplicity 
of artistic practices. This entails dismissing or minimizing the anti-artistic 
rhetoric which runs counter to these sentiments, so as to reassert a conventional 
emphasis on the centrality of art-making, which is in addition more compatible 																																																								
180 In this chapter, I introduce a number of examples of Dadaist music discussed at greater length 
in my article: Paul Ingram, “Songs, Anti-Symphonies and Sodomist Music: Dadaist Music in 
Zurich, Berlin and Paris”, Dada/Surrealism 21 (2017): 
https://ir.uiowa.edu/dadasur/vol21/iss1/10/ [accessed 28 January 2019]. 
181 Hutchinson, “Just Give Me the Truth”.  
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with contemporary preoccupations. By contrast, Hutchinson sees Dada neither as 
reactive and inchoate, nor as creative and diverse, but instead as engaged in a 
systematic negation of the aesthetic.182 
Let us start with a brief summary of the traditional art-historical account 
of Dada, in part based on the one provided by Hutchinson. The dominant critical 
consensus prior to the revisionist turn invariably situates the movement within its 
immediate historical context, in relation to the mass slaughter and revolutionary 
upheavals inaugurated by WW1. The Dadaists’ rejection of the status quo is 
allegedly prompted by these extreme circumstances, which disclose to them the 
insufficiency of civilization and especially of high culture. They are said to 
embrace irrationality, as a protest against the barbarism which appears to them to 
be the culmination of the Enlightenment. Shock, and the violation of established 
taste, are taken to be key components of this project. The destructive capacity of 
the movement is acknowledged, but it is usually represented, somewhat 
dismissively, as instinctive and anarchic. Bürger diverges markedly from this 
consensus with an analysis of Dada as the most radical section of the historical 
avant-garde, enacting the self-criticism of art as an institution, opposing aesthetic 
autonomy to overcome the separation of this sphere from that of everyday life.183 
This strand of interpretation may be set apart from the bulk of the criticism under 
consideration, in that it suggests a conscious strategy, rooted in a longer view of 
the development of art, with implications extending beyond the politics of 
personal rebellion. What both of these versions of the movement have in 
common is their foregrounding of negativity, whether that is imagined as random 
contrariness or targeted antagonism. This is borne out by the many Dadaist 
manifestos and other polemics attacking all existing artistic production, and 
indeed repudiating art as such. Hutchinson maintains that recent art historians, 
abandoning these themes and ignoring the art-institutional dimension, have lost 
sight of the fundamentally negative orientation of the movement, which he 
construes according to a model of thoroughgoing negation rather than glib 
nihilism.184 																																																								
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 “Dada Contra Art History” cites a number of examples of the revisionist 
approach, dealing at length with a programmatic statement of this tendency 
contained in The Dada Seminars [2005], a collection of essays based on a 
seminar series held in association with the major retrospective exhibition “Dada: 
Zurich, Berlin, Hannover, Paris, New York”. In her introduction to the volume, 
Leah Dickerman lists six imperatives that she says are broadly shared by the 
contributors, which depart from the traditional reception of Dada. First, Dada is 
to be understood primarily as an artistic endeavour, for which the creation of 
artworks is the central concern, rather than a preoccupation with the rhetoric of 
anti-art. Second, the Dadaists’ interest in and engagement with the artistic 
tradition preceding them should not be obscured by an overemphasis on their 
iconoclasm, according to Dickerman. Third, Dada needs to be decoupled from 
Surrealism, against the conventional practice of bracketing them together which 
is thought too linear and Francocentric. Fourth, Dickerman calls for an end to the 
reliance on monographs and biographies about the same few Dadaists, with the 
consequence that previously marginalized figures are brought to prominence, and 
extra attention is paid to group dynamics. Fifth, Dada’s different centres are to be 
considered in terms of their relations to one another, as well as to the distinct 
political situation obtaining in each of them. Sixth, Dickerman presents the 
movement as anticipating the development of modernity, into which it is said to 
have a privileged insight.185 In his article, Hutchinson takes issue with all six of 
these imperatives, though his opposition to them is largely concentrated on the 
first, which he believes underpins the rest.186 His critical stance is generally 
welcome, but he might be accused of subordinating everything else to the 
problematic of art and anti-art, risking jettisoning much that is potentially useful 
in the revisionist approach, evident even in the schematic form it is given here. 
Beginning with the first imperative, Hutchinson rightly resists the 
centrality of art-making insisted on in the introduction to The Dada Seminars. 
Dickerman’s claim that the movement is fundamentally about continuing to 
create art under different historical conditions is a misrepresentation, ignoring 
precisely what distinguishes it from other sections of the historical avant-																																																								
185 Leah Dickerman, “Introduction”, in The Dada Seminars, ed. by Leah Dickerman (Washington 
DC: National Gallery of Art, 2005), pp.3-5. 
186 Hutchinson, “Dada Contra Art History”, p.7. 
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garde.187 This is its denunciation of art as such, going beyond the attacks on 
artistic tradition by immediate precursors like the Futurists. The Dadaists are not 
seeking to adapt or to extend art but to destroy it, effecting the annihilation of 
creativity rather than liberating it from the constraints of aesthetic convention. 
Hutchinson criticizes the tendency to promote the artworks actually produced by 
members of the movement, when this is done at the expense of the commitment 
to anti-art expressed in their manifestos, in addition seeking to correct the 
revisionist bias in favour of individual activity over collective action. Certainly, 
Dada’s critical force consists in part in its displacement of the category of the 
artwork, by means of its public pronouncements, manipulation of the press, self-
promotional stunts, and various other manifestations. He perhaps oversteps when 
he suggests that the movement is in essence its slogans, thereby participating in a 
conflict between its words and its objects, despite warning against setting up 
such a false dichotomy in “Dada Contra Art History”.188 Dickerman’s call for 
greater attention to be paid to productions that can be readily recognized as 
artworks would not necessarily be problematic, provided they were still read in 
conjunction with less conventional interventions, and considered in relation to 
the anti-artistic orientation which serves as a unifying principle for Dada. The 
literature, visual art and other traditional media that she has in mind should be 
included alongside the full range of artistic and non-artistic practices employed 
by the movement, and neither entirely reduced to the cause of anti-art, nor 
detached from that context and analysed in isolation. 
Turning to the second and sixth imperatives, Dada is here incorporated 
into a narrative of art history, rooted in what went before, and anticipating what 
came afterwards. This is contrary to how it often presents itself, which is as an 
absolute end point, the termination of the foregoing artistic tradition, and the 
forestalling of future artistic development. Dickerman stresses the Dadaists’ deep 
knowledge of and investment in their artistic heritage, in order to counteract the 
impression of an immediate and superficial iconoclasm.189 Hutchinson does not 
dispute their level of expertise and interest, leaving open the possibility that a 
close engagement with art history informs the attack on the status quo. They both 																																																								
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maintain that Dada should be credited with a more sophisticated understanding 
of its art-historical position, but only he retains the negativity which 
characterizes its relationship to artistic tradition. Dickerman also projects 
forwards, connecting the movement to the subsequent evolution of modern and 
contemporary culture, of which it is said to be a far-sighted pioneer.190 
Hutchinson identifies this manoeuvre as another way to shore up the centrality of 
art-making, by fixing Dada in its place within art history, and redescribing it as 
generative of new artistic practices.191 They actually share a narrow art-historical 
perspective, neglecting the insights of media studies, visual culture and critical 
and theoretical practice into a movement which purposely transgresses 
disciplinary boundaries. Dada’s self-mythologization as a wholly singular event 
in art history ought to be rejected, but it is important in doing so not to transform 
it illegitimately into a positive force which affirms the continuity of the canon. 
Instead, Bürger’s reading of the movement might suggest that its members are 
cognizant of this broader context, through their recognition of and resistance to 
the institutionality of art, and in that light the continuing prevalence of their 
themes and techniques can perhaps be better understood in terms of recuperation 
rather than influence.  
The fourth and fifth imperatives may also be considered together, as they 
bear on the same question of whether to conceptualize the movement as a 
closely-knit group with a shared identity, or as a loose network of independent 
artists. Hutchinson favours maintaining a strong sense of what unites them under 
the banner of Dada, while Dickerman prefers to emphasize the wide variations in 
beliefs and practices that existed between and indeed within individuals. She 
contends that expanding the limited range of sources about the movement 
beyond the usual monographs and biographies is beneficial because it promotes 
participants who have been neglected in previous scholarship, and also helps to 
map the boundaries and interrelations of zones of activity. Her proposal is for a 
synchronic account which, instead of being organized diachronically around the 
careers of key Dadaists, would explore the web of connections between artworks, 
taking into account the political conditions in different locations.192 Hutchinson 																																																								
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sees in these imperatives a surreptitious attempt to undermine the anti-artistic 
project, by confirming that the principal business of the movement was the 
production of art objects.193 There is though no compelling reason why greater 
visibility for marginalized figures, as well as detailed knowledge of group 
dynamics, should be incompatible with an interpretation giving sufficient weight 
to anti-art. The expansion of the field is undoubtedly valuable, insofar as it 
deepens and diversifies our understanding of Dada, on the condition that the 
commonalities which make for a coherent object of study are kept in mind. 
Finally, Dada and Surrealism, and the need to treat them separately, are 
the subject of the third imperative proposed by Dickerman, linked to the second 
and sixth imperatives by Hutchinson. On the face of it, Dickerman’s demand for 
a clear dividing line between Dada and Surrealism, intended to sharpen our sense 
of the former, remains pertinent given how often it is still coupled with the latter, 
as for example with the title of the journal Dada/Surrealism, which published 
Hutchinson’s “Dada Contra Art History”. He acknowledges that the ostensible 
purpose of such a divorce is to allow space to consider Dada’s connections with 
other avant-garde tendencies, but he argues that the actual effect of this 
manoeuvre is to leap over closer comparisons to highlight affinities with later 
manifestations of modernity and postmodernity, to which he objects on the 
grounds that it is illegitimate to assimilate anti-art to a narrative of art history that 
is basically positive in its orientation. He claims that Dickerman ignores all 
examples of criticism where Dada is not treated as an immature version of 
Surrealism, again alluding to the body of scholarship descended from Bürger.194 
He also advances an alternative model of the relationship between the two 
movements, drawing on an essay on revolution by Slavoj Žižek. Žižek describes 
social revolution as comprising two phases, the first of which is the negative 
destruction of existing power structures, and the second of which is the positive 
transformation of the forms of everyday life. Hutchinson applies this schema to 
aesthetic revolution, taking as an analogue for the first phase the attack on art 
perpetrated by the Dadaists, and as the equivalent of the second phase the radical 
reconstruction of art on a new basis pursued by the Surrealists.195 He thereby 																																																								
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posits a linear progression from one movement to the other, and despite his 
protestations to the contrary repeats the critical commonplace of presenting Dada 
as negative and Surrealism as positive. 
In her introduction to The Dada Seminars, Dickerman puts forward a 
critique of traditional art history and its characterization of Dada which is 
basically correct. She identifies how the movement has been misrepresented as a 
spontaneous howl of rage, supposedly protesting against the status quo through 
recourse to nonsense and shock tactics. This description certainly applies to a lot 
of the earlier literature about Dada, though it is fair to say that it largely 
overlooks Bürger’s reflections with regard to the institutionality of art. Some of 
the prescriptions she makes for the study of the movement are valid as well, so 
long as they are not pressed into service on behalf of a project of minimizing the 
importance of anti-art. There is no inherent contradiction between maintaining 
the focus on this aspect of Dada and her stated aims of better contextualizing it 
within art history, promoting marginalized figures, giving greater consideration 
to group dynamics, mapping the relationships between zones of activity, and 
unharnessing the movement from Surrealism. However, Dickerman’s insistence 
on the centrality of art-making does bleed into the other imperatives to a certain 
extent, as she abandons the deep-seated and thoroughgoing negativity that is 
central to the movement, in order to counteract false perceptions of it as 
subjectively motivated and undirected in its nihilism. 
By contrast, “Dada Contra Art History” retains that negativity, while still 
repudiating the main problems with the traditional art-historical account of Dada. 
Hutchinson agrees with Dickerman about many of the failings of this body of 
scholarship, but unlike her he acknowledges the alternative associated with 
Bürger. He refutes the revisionists primarily for their turn away from anti-art, 
and for their characterization of the movement as above all else an artistic 
phenomenon. As he points out, Dada is in fact motivated by a critical 
consciousness of the institutionality of art, to which it responds by adopting an 
anti-artistic approach, extending even to its own productions. Its efforts to 
destroy art, far from being instinctive and anarchic, are actually relatively 
systematic, according to Hutchinson. He implicitly accepts Dickerman’s 
recommendation that the movement be understood in terms of its place within art 
history, on the condition that its iconoclastic attitude is not obscured in the 
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process. He is right to give this emphasis to anti-art, and to recognize how the 
Dadaists’ artistic expertise feeds into their attempted destruction of art. He is less 
reliable on the issue of whether it would be preferable to have a synchronic 
analysis of group dynamics and individual artworks, as opposed to a diachronic 
analysis based on the careers of core participants. His article does not adequately 
demonstrate why the promotion of marginalized figures, which responds to real 
errors and omissions in the existing scholarship, necessarily advances an agenda 
of aestheticizing Dada. As set out above, I do not accept his proposed 
conceptualization of the relationship between Dada and Surrealism either. 
Nevertheless, “Dada Contra Art History” is valuable for refocusing attention on 
the problematic of art and anti-art. 
My analysis of Dada builds on this assessment of the relative merits of 
the respective stances of Dickerman and Hutchinson. Like the former, I connect 
my approach to the strand of interpretation focused on the institutionality of art. 
With regard to the first imperative, I consider the anti-artistic orientation to be a 
defining feature of the movement, and believe that sidelining it as many recent 
writers have done has a depoliticizing effect. However, I recognize that the level 
of commitment to anti-art within the movement is variable, and furthermore that 
it is expressed in myriad ways. It would obviously be illegitimate to exclude less 
explicitly anti-artistic tendencies, falsifying the object of study for the sake of 
conceptual clarity. There is scope to broaden our perspective to accommodate 
such countercurrents, without sacrificing the critical force of anti-art. This does 
not necessitate resolving the apparent conflict between anti-artistic rhetoric and 
continued artistic production by choosing one side over the other, because the 
movement actively embraces the paradox of the destruction of art by artistic 
means. In relation to the second and sixth imperatives, I am in favour of reading 
Dada as maintaining its negativity while consciously taking up a position within 
art history, imagining its iconoclasm as informed by a deep engagement with 
artistic tradition. As for the fourth and fifth imperatives, I adopt a broad and 
inclusive approach regarding who and what qualifies as Dadaist, and try to be 
attentive to differences in group dynamics and political context across a range of 
locations. In addition, I think that the third imperative is still valid, and that in a 
wide-ranging and properly international account of the movement much less 
prominence would be given to Surrealism. Finally, I intend to go beyond the 
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narrow confines of art history, drawing on the insights of other disciplines, for 
example literary criticism and musicology. These preliminary positions on key 
issues within the field guide my analysis of Dada, which will now be elaborated 
in dialogue with Adorno. 
 
Alienating Infantilism 
 
SERIOUS MUSIC 
 
In his early essay “On the Social Situation of Music” [1932], Adorno 
presents a rough typology of contemporary music, focusing on those sections of 
it which in his estimation qualify as advanced art, according to the following 
criterion: “Musical production which in the narrower sense does not subordinate 
itself unconditionally to the law of the market – that is, “serious” music with the 
exception of the obviously quantitatively dominant music, which likewise serves 
the market in disguise – is that music that expresses alienation.”196 The first type 
of music, which is not named here but may for convenience be called new music, 
is identified with Schoenberg. His works and those of his school are described as 
being ignorant of or else indifferent to their social situation, but this does not 
mean that they lack social import. The negotiation of a problematic immanent to 
the musical material, which nevertheless has been formed historically and exists 
in relation to society, necessarily bears on the extra-aesthetic sphere. Adorno 
endorses new music in terms of shock: “[T]he only music which offers a serious 
shock to the listener[.]”197 The second type of music, which he labels objectivist 
music, is personified by Igor Stravinsky. These composers are said to be 
responding to a shared social situation, though each of them adopts a different 
approach to it. The objectivist work starts from an awareness of its own 
alienation, which it attempts to master by inhabiting past forms believed to be 
immune to that state, as with the use of folklore, and the programme of 
neoclassicism. Adorno is unambiguous that this strategy is mistaken: “[S]uch 
forms cannot be reconstituted within a completely changed society and through 																																																								
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completely changed musical material.”198 In his view, Schoenberg and 
Stravinsky embody the two major tendencies in serious music at that time, and 
the opposition between them also structures his later book Philosophy of New 
Music. 
The third type of music is dubbed surrealistic music, by analogy with the 
predominantly literary and artistic movement Surrealism: “Extensive objective 
correspondences between this third type and French surrealism justify speaking 
in this case of surrealistic music.”199 The preeminent practitioner of this type of 
music is not usually considered a Surrealist: Kurt Weill, specifically for his 
collaborations with Brecht The Threepenny Opera [1928] and Rise and Fall of 
the City of Mahagonny [1930]. Adorno argues that the surrealistic work begins 
from the same consciousness of alienation as objectivist music, and indeed that it 
was originally developed out of compositions such as Stravinsky’s The Soldier’s 
Tale [1918].200 These three compositions all incorporate elements of popular 
music, including ragtime, tango and jazz. “On the Social Situation of Music” 
pinpoints the moment at which surrealistic music diverges from objectivist 
music: 
 
Hand in hand with objectivism, this composer proceeds from the 
cognition of alienation. At the same time, he is socially more alert than 
the objectivist and recognizes the solutions offered by his colleague as 
illusion. He denies himself the positive solution and contents himself with 
permitting social flaws to manifest themselves by means of a flawed 
invoice which defines itself as illusory with no attempt at camouflage 
through attempts at an aesthetic totality. In his effort, he employs the 
formal language belonging in part to the bourgeois musical culture of the 
nineteenth century, in part to present-day consumer music. These means 
are used to reveal the flaws which he detects.201  
 
Adorno would later adopt a less favourable view of Weill, but he praises him in 
“On the Social Situation of Music”: “Weill’s music is today the only music of 																																																								
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genuine social-polemic impact, which it will remain so long as it resides at the 
height of its negativity[.]”202 This critical force is channelled through the 
appropriation of the pre-formed structures of the classical tradition and mass-
produced entertainment, which are broken up and recombined according to the 
organizational principle of montage, also associated with The Soldier’s Tale. The 
implication is that surrealistic music is generally superior to objectivist music in 
its thoroughgoing negativity, while falling short of the serious shock offered to 
the listener by new music. In this way, Brecht and Weill are interposed between 
Schoenberg and Stravinsky. 
Adorno also lists a fourth type of music, which comprises use music and 
communal music, associated respectively with Paul Hindemith and Hans Eisler, 
both of whom also collaborated with Brecht. What unites these composers is that 
they seek to resolve the problem of the alienation of art non-artistically, rather 
than on the level of aesthetic form: “The fourth type involves music which 
attempts to break through alienation from within itself, even at the expense of its 
immanent form.”203 This involves giving art a positive social function, such as 
pedagogical instruction for amateur musicians, or the forging of solidarity in 
workers’ choirs. There is a resemblance to surrealistic music, to the extent that 
both oppose aesthetic autonomy: “[T]his [surrealistic music…] approaches man 
so directly that he will no longer even consider the possibility of the autonomous 
work of art.”204 However, Adorno quickly dismisses the vast majority of use 
music as being indistinguishable from the productions of the culture industry.205 
He asserts that even in its elevated mode as communal music it remains inferior 
to surrealistic music, speaking approvingly of the latter: “[I]t is the living 
negation of the possibility of a positive communal music, which collapses in the 
laughter of devilish vulgar [Vulgär] music as which true use music is 
exposed.”206 The place of use music/communal music at the bottom of his 
hierarchy of the different types of music is clear, and hardly surprising given the 
importance he attaches to aesthetic form and aesthetic autonomy. Following the 
lead of “On the Social Situation of Music”, I intend largely to pass over it here, 																																																								
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instead taking as my framework the tripartite schema of new music, objectivist 
music and surrealistic music, and their respective representatives Schoenberg, 
Stravinsky and Brecht and Weill, who provide a way in to the discussion of 
Dada. 
 
SCHOENBERG 
 
Another early essay by Adorno, “Mahler Today” [1930] contains a 
parenthetical remark about the Dadaist, in close proximity to a digression on 
Schoenberg: “The musician [Gustav Mahler] who was once ridiculed for using 
car horns and sirens, like an impudent dadaist, is no longer objective enough for 
the most gray-bearded conservatory types, and every better music history 
seminar considers itself to be more modern than he as it recites its concepts of 
play of movement and process music, of pre-classical and neo-classical 
polyphony.”207 Adorno does not himself dismiss the Dadaist as impudent, but 
instead attributes that opinion to conservative critics of Mahler. The main point is 
that the work of this composer, once rejected as extreme, is now considered 
outmoded: “[U]nmodern before it was properly modern[.]”208 This is equivalent 
to the alleged treatment of Schoenberg: “[C]onsigned to the future as a lonely 
prophet until it was concluded that he had been surpassed as a lonely 
artiste[.]”209 Adorno describes this position as “purposely ideological” in the 
case of Mahler, and as a “reactionary trick” in the case of Schoenberg.210 Derived 
from Futurism, the Dadaist’s experiments with bruitism were indeed a prominent 
feature of the first performances staged by the movement, for example Hugo 
Ball’s Nativity Play (Bruitist) [1916] in Zurich, and Jefim Golyscheff’s Anti-
Symphony: Musical Circular Guillotine [1919] in Berlin.211 The use of noise is 
subject to the opprobrium of official culture, and by virtue of that reaction 
perhaps it might be placed alongside the similarly denigrated innovations of 
Mahler and Schoenberg. However, “Mahler Today” tacitly endorses a dismissive 
																																																								
207 Theodor Adorno, “Mahler Today” [1930], trans. by Susan H Gillespie, in Essays on Music, 
p.603. 
208 Ibid., p.603. 
209 Ibid., p.603. 
210 Ibid., pp.603-604. 
211 Ingram, “Songs, Anti-Symphonies and Sodomist Music”, p.4, pp.10-12. 
 116 
verdict on Dada, which occupies a subordinate position relative to new music in 
the alternative canon proposed by Adorno. 
Adorno’s awareness of Dadaist music appears to have been limited, 
probably not going much beyond the popular conception of purveyors of noise 
that is repeated in “Mahler Today”. This is to be expected, as historically the 
musical dimension of the movement has been neglected, considered of secondary 
importance compared to its poetry and visual art.212 As it happens, Schoenberg’s 
early experiments with free atonality were presented at Dadaist soirées in Zurich 
by Suzanne Perrottet: “Previously, in Germany, I had become acquainted with 
Arnold Schönberg’s music, which, however, was little known in Switzerland. I 
was so enthusiastic about this new dissonant music that I talked the Dadaists into 
performing it.”213 It reportedly met with a muted response, and there appears to 
have been no serious or sustained engagement from the Dadaists in Zurich.214 In 
Dresden and Berlin, Dada briefly had the participation of composers who were 
already, or would become subsequently, identified with new music to a greater or 
lesser extent: Erwin Schulhoff, Hanz Heinz Stuckenschmidt and Stefan Wolpe. 
In Paris, Schoenberg was even less prominent as a reference point for Dada, the 
musical output of which is better represented by the iconoclasm of Francis 
Picabia’s “sodomist music” and Erik Satie’s “furniture music”, as well as their 
post-Dadaist collaboration on the sustained exercise in provocation Relâche: 
Instantaneist Ballet in Two Acts, a Cinematic Intermission, and a Dog’s Tail 
[1924]. Admittedly, Dadaist composers did incorporate dissonant elements, from 
the rhythmic but erratic dances of Hans Heusser in Zurich, to the jarring 
combinations of notes selected by chance by Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes in 
Paris.215 For Adorno, Schoenberg’s dissonance presumably functions in a 
different way, being more deeply rooted in the immanent development of the 
musical material. By contrast, Dadaist music is characterized by improvised 																																																								
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noise and aleatory procedures, which are anathema to the rigorously worked 
through compositional logic of new music, most pronounced during the phase of 
twelve-tone technique. In truth, Schoenberg’s reputation for generating 
controversy was probably the main basis of any attraction he may have had for 
the Dadaists. 
When he refers to car horns and sirens in “Mahler Today”, Adorno is 
most likely thinking of the extra-musical sounds inserted by Jean Cocteau into 
Satie’s score for the ballet Parade [1917], the premiere of which caused a 
scandal within the high-culture milieu of pre-Dadaist Paris.216 In my view, 
Adorno’s implicit judgement of bruitism is that it is a gimmick, the effect of 
which does not come close to the serious shock offered to the listener by new 
music, in terms of how deep-seated or far-reaching it is. Certainly, Dada made 
use of shock effects in its wider practice, whether that was its provocative 
slogans and antagonistic rhetoric, the radical formatting and typography of its 
little magazines, or its perpetuation of stunts, hoaxes and other subversive 
interventions into the public sphere, with extreme examples including the collage 
made of firecrackers on the cover of third issue of MAVO in Tokyo, and the 
“ready to wear” art incorporating items such as a battery-operated tail-light and a 
canary in a cage worn by Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven on the streets of New 
York.217 This tendency is particularly apparent in the spectacular performances, 
which famously climaxed in Paris in 1920. The First Friday of Littérature sought 
to entrap an inappropriate audience by falsely announcing a lecture on the 
exchange rate crisis, then further provoked them with the presentation of a crude 
drawing in chalk on a blackboard which was immediately rubbed out, and a 
reading of a recent speech by a far-right parliamentarian accompanied by the 
ringing of bells.218 The Dada Manifestation went further than its predecessor in 
spreading misinformation in the press that Charlie Chaplin would be in 																																																								
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attendance, resulting in a large crowd which was baited with antagonistic 
manifestos until the proceedings descended into open confrontation.219 The Dada 
Festival was likewise promoted with the empty promise that the participants 
would have their heads shaved on stage, and by various means such a febrile 
atmosphere was created that the entire event was disrupted by booing, heckling 
and the hurling of projectiles.220 There is a suggestion that audience members 
must have come prepared with rotten food to throw, and undoubtedly the 
expectation of a ruckus had quickly become part of Dada’s appeal. This does not 
necessarily indicate how easily such tactics are exhausted, confirming their 
alleged superficiality. It might even be understood conversely, as the success of 
their challenge to the conventional separation between performers and spectators. 
That dynamic is in any case a central part of their project, and the role played by 
shock is undoubtedly more complex than allowed for by the ventriloquized 
characterization of it as mere impudence. 
 
STRAVINSKY 
 
There is another tangential reference to the Dadaist in Philosophy of New 
Music, where this figure is connected to Stravinsky: “Musical infantilism 
[Infantilismus] belongs to a movement that everywhere devised schizophrenic 
models as mimetic defence against combat psychosis: Around 1918, Stravinsky 
was attacked as a dadaist, and The Soldier’s Tale as well as Renard shattered all 
unity of the person in order to épater les bourgeois [shock the bourgeoisie].”221 
As in “Mahler Today”, the Dadaist functions as a negative exemplar of advanced 
art, now from the perspective of conservative critics of Stravinsky. Like The 
Soldier’s Tale, Renard the Fox [1916] is contemporaneous with Dada, and it also 
engages with popular culture, mining Russian folk themes and mimicking the 
circus form. The movement, it is suggested, shares the objective imputed to these 
works of shocking the bourgeoisie, by enacting the destruction of the unified 
subject. This involves a critical mimesis of the psychological condition of shell 
shock, the structure of which is imitated on a formal level, in an adaptation to it 																																																								
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which is supposed to defend against it. In a footnote to this passage, Adorno 
highlights the potential for an approach reliant on shock effects to become 
conformist: “[T]he composer who sets out to épater les bourgeois is always 
preoccupied with considerations of effect, even the effect of alienation[.] […] 
This is why collusion between the intention to épater and the status quo is 
ultimately so much easier.”222 The theme of recuperation figures in many of his 
discussions of Dada, but here it is applied primarily to Stravinsky. In Philosophy 
of New Music, The Soldier’s Tale and Renard the Fox are identified as key works 
of musical infantilism, following on from the use of folklore in his previous 
productions, and preceding the turn to neoclassicism.223 Dada’s supposed affinity 
with the alienating infantilism of this phase of objectivist music is not explored 
further by Adorno. 
The Dadaists made numerous attempts to associate themselves with this 
famous composer, no doubt in part motivated by a desire to share in the artistic 
legitimacy accorded to him, as a leading avant-garde figure of the time.224 As 
with Schoenberg, Stravinsky was most likely attractive to members of the 
movement because of his reputation for scandal, arising principally from the 
legendary riot at the Paris premiere of The Rite of Spring [1913]. In a 
fictionalized report on the First Dada World Congress in Geneva in 1919, Walter 
Serner claims there was a similarly violent reaction to a performance of 
Stravinsky’s The Song of the Nightingale [1917]: “When Serner jumped on a 
chair and exclaimed “Vive Stravinsky! Vive Dada!”, an uproar broke out which 
even the attendants could not get under control. The evening ended in street 
fights which Serner and Stravinsky escaped only by making a hasty exit by 
car.”225 By coincidence, Adorno uses the same form of words as an ironic 
exclamation (“Vive Stravinsky! Vive Dada!”), in an early review of his that is 
critical of Stravinsky, and in particular The Soldier’s Tale.226 In this piece and 
others from the same period, Stravinsky incorporates elements of popular music, 
a preference which he has in common with the Dadaists. In Zurich, Emmy 
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Hennings performed folk songs and cabaret chansons.227 In Berlin, George Grosz 
tap-danced to ragtime and jazz records.228 In Paris, Georges Auric and Darius 
Milhaud, members of the group Les Six who were loosely affiliated with the 
movement, participated in the wider avant-garde trend for jazz-influenced 
compositions.229 The Dutch Dada Tour of 1923 featured piano recitals by 
Petronella van Moorsel, whose repertoire included “Ragtime” from The Soldier’s 
Tale.230 In purely quantitative terms, Dada’s musical output was dominated by 
songs and jazz, but its populism was often more nuanced than a straightforward 
affirmation of these forms. Credited by Adorno with avoiding the pitfalls of 
folklorism and neoclassicism during the transitional phase of objectivist music, 
Stravinsky is at that stage said to attempt neither to recover an idealized lost 
authenticity, nor to reconstitute an illusory aesthetic totality, an 
uncompromisingly negative attitude which arguably brings him closer to the 
Dadaists. 
In its wider practice, Dada embraced minor arts like puppetry and 
embroidery, as well as popular media like the press and advertising. In Zurich, 
Sophie Taueber imported the low form of the marionette theatre into avant-garde 
art with her quasi-primitivist and quasi-Cubist puppets, while her embroideries 
collapsed the opposition of art and craft by placing on an equal footing geometric 
abstraction in this medium and in her contemporaneous paintings.231 In Berlin, 
Johannes Baader in particular succeeded in manipulating the press, and the group 
established a mock advertising agency, moving between the rarefied domain of 
high culture and the more prosaic realms of journalism and publicity.232 Also in 
Berlin, Hannah Höch drew on popular and commercial material for her collages 
and photomontages, radically recontextualizing the mass-produced imagery of 
fashion magazines and illustrated sports coverage in monstrous composite 																																																								
227 For an account of Hennings’ contributions as a singer and performer, see: Ruth Hemus, 
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figures, in the process subverting the idealized standards of beauty and 
athleticism propagated by these sources.233 In New York, Freytag-Loringhoven’s 
“Subjoyride” [1922] is comprised of appropriated advertising slogans, arranged 
in a poetic construction in which they are imbued with new meanings through 
juxtaposition and enjambment, while the persuasive function and commercial 
intent of the originals are distorted.234 These examples all carry some radical 
charge on account of their transgression of the disciplinary boundaries and 
internal hierarchies of the aesthetic sphere, but it is important to note that in most 
cases the culture industry is also treated critically, its productions subjected to the 
violence and deformations of an avant-gardist sensibility. This is not a one-sided 
relationship in which popular culture is mobilized to undermine pure culture, 
rather these fields are pitted against each other in a mutually transformative 
confrontation. Adorno recognizes this reciprocity, but fails to fully integrate it 
into his reading of the attempt to épater les bourgeois in Philosophy of New 
Music. 
 
BRECHT AND WEILL 
 
In the later essay “Commitment”, Dada is introduced as an aside to an 
analysis of Brecht: “[T]he process of aesthetic reduction he [Brecht] undertakes 
for the sake of political truth works against political truth. That truth requires 
countless mediations, which Brecht disdains. What has artistic legitimacy as an 
alienating infantilism [Infantilismus] – Brecht’s first plays kept company with 
Dada – becomes infantility [Infantilität] when it claims theoretical and social 
validity.”235 By association with the early Brecht, Dada is granted a degree of 
artistic legitimacy, on account of what is described as an alienating infantilism, 
echoing the language of Philosophy of New Music. His first plays, said to be 
closer to the spirit of the movement, are compared favourably with the output of 
his mature period, in which there is a tendency towards reductive didacticism. 																																																								
233 For an introduction to her use of this technique with a focus on gender, see: Dawn Ades, 
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These works are judged to be illegitimate, on political as well as artistic grounds. 
This position relies on a distinction between social impact and social import, 
with the politically motivated art which aims at the former considered inferior to 
the indirect form of critique associated with the latter. Regarding the 
collaborations with Weill, Adorno does not deal with them directly in this essay, 
but he does suggest that they precede the degeneration from infantilism to 
infantility. He refers back with approval to Mahagonny, in relation to the 
transitional Saint Joan of the Stockyards [1932]: “St. Joan is set in a Chicago that 
is a middle ground between economic data and a Wild West fairy tale of 
capitalism from Mahagonny. The more intimately Brecht involves himself with 
the former and the less he aims at imagery, the more he misses the essence of 
capitalism[.]”236 According to Adorno, Brecht goes on to advance a positive 
claim to theoretical and social validity on behalf of his alienating infantilism, an 
error it is implied is not made by the Dadaists. 
Brecht was never a member of the movement, but he had connections 
with some of the more politically committed contingent in Berlin. In his 
memoirs, Richard Huelsenbeck recalls losing Heartfield from Dada, as he fell 
under the influence of Brecht: “[T]he success of Threepenny Opera convinced 
him of Brecht’s literary and, last but not least, political value.”237 Weill was even 
further removed from the movement than Schoenberg and Stravinsky, despite 
moving in the same circles as Stuckenschmidt and Wolpe, with all three of them 
attending the private musical evenings of the November Group.238 Dada’s 
clearest link to surrealistic music, beyond these political and personal affiliations, 
is that following its dissolution in Paris, it fed directly into the creation of 
Surrealism. Ex-Dadaists founded the new movement, which in important 
respects continued the assault on aesthetic and social norms inaugurated by its 
predecessor. Accordingly, Adorno speaks of them together on a few occasions.239 
As discussed in the opening section of this chapter, Dada and Surrealism should 																																																								
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not be too hastily conflated, as this has often served to override their differences, 
as well as obscuring other significant relationships. There are nevertheless 
obvious similarities between Dada and surrealistic music, as it is characterized in 
“On the Social Situation of Music”, and by extension in “Commitment”. In 
common with Brecht and Weill, the Dadaists pursue the aggressive 
fragmentation of canonical and popular forms, with the pieces combined in new 
wholes imbued with socially critical intent, especially the collages and 
photomontages of Höch and Heartfield, produced in the most overtly politicized 
Dadaist milieu of Berlin. 
 In addition, Dada shares with surrealistic music the thoroughgoing 
negativity that differentiates the latter from the bulk of objectivist music, other 
than works like The Soldier’s Tale. This attitude is expressed in many of its 
manifestos, which enumerate its negations in list form, arguably suggesting a 
nihilism that is systematic and comprehensive, rather than reactive and 
indiscriminate. “Dada Manifesto”, published anonymously at the head of the 
collective Twenty-Three Manifestos of the Dada Movement [1920], begins with 
an attack on artists and quickly broadens its scope: “No more painters, no more 
writers, no more musicians, no more sculptors, no more religions, no more 
republicans, no more royalists, no more imperialists, no more anarchists, no more 
socialists, no more Bolsheviks, no more politicians, no more proletarians, no 
more democrats, no more bourgeois, no more aristocrats, no more armies, no 
more police, no more fatherlands, enough of all these imbeciles, no more 
anything, no more anything, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing.”240 Picabia’s 
Dada Cannibal Manifesto [1920] has a similar structure and some of the same 
targets, extending this thoroughgoing negativity to Dada itself: “DADA smells 
like nothing, it is nothing, nothing, nothing. / It is like your hopes: nothing / like 
your paradises: nothing / like your idols: nothing / like your politicians: nothing / 
like your heroes: nothing / like your artists: nothing / like your religions: 
nothing.”241 The self-critical turn of anti-art is a central theme of many of the 
texts included in Twenty-Three Manifestos of the Dada Movement, ranging from 																																																								
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blunt statements like “Art and beauty = NOTHING” in Philippe Soupault’s “Dada 
Typewriter” [1920], to subversive misspellings like “Aart” and “Poetreee” in 
Céline Arnauld’s “Dada Parasol” [1920].242 These manifestos reflect the anti-
artistic orientation on a formal level as well, iconoclastically supplanting the 
poem as the preeminent literary mode, and consciously accelerating the 
exhaustion of this form in turn, with an obvious excess of minor variations 
presented together. They were mostly written in the less overtly politicized 
Dadaist milieu of Paris, as indicated by the repudiation of proletarians and 
bourgeois alike, the blanket condemnation of politicians, and the insular focus on 
the aesthetic sphere, in the examples quoted here. However, Adorno holds that it 
is precisely a lack of commitment which guarantees the power of an absolute 
refusal, to which we might add that Dada’s thoroughgoing negativity culminates 
in the self-negation of anti-art. I believe that this is the distorted moment of 
insight behind his concession of a limited artistic legitimacy to the movement in 
“Commitment”. 
 
POPULAR MUSIC 
 
In these comments spread across his oeuvre from “Mahler Today” to 
“Commitment”, Adorno provides clues to his interpretation of Dada, which is 
broadly consistent in its main points, and coincides with much of the traditional 
art-historical account attacked by Dickerman and Hutchinson. In summary, the 
Dadaists are thought to be engaged in a struggle against artistic convention, and 
indeed against the status quo more generally. Their alleged impudence provokes 
the rage of the ruling class, as they set out to shock the bourgeoisie. The intention 
is to produce an experience of alienation in the audience, as a critical reflection 
of the alienation of art. When he writes about infantilism, Adorno uses the term 
“Infantilismus”, which designates a style dedicated to generating alienation. 
There is a pejorative charge to it, as it seems to imply some degree of retardation 
or regression, even when he takes care to distinguish it from infantility 
(“Infantilität”). Similarly, “Dada” as a word is suggestive of baby-talk, and its 																																																								
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childish repetitiveness even carries a faint echo of the infant of Sigmund Freud’s 
“Fort–Da [Gone–There]” from Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920].243 
Vladimir Lenin’s Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder [1920] may also 
be a distant reference point for Adorno, with the accusation of ultra-leftism 
arguably applicable to some of the Berlin Dadaists, though the key word in the 
title of the pamphlet was translated into German as “Kinderkrankheit”. 244 It 
would however be a mistake to equate this approach with immaturity or 
backwardness, as it is better understood as an emphatic response to modern 
conditions. The consciousness of childhood is evoked, in part as a refuge from 
alienation as with folklorism and neoclassicism, and in part because recourse to 
the infantile has shock value. There is supposed to be a risk that in focusing on 
social impact rather than social import, Dada weakens the resistance it offers, 
making itself more amenable to the forces of conformism. Adorno’s argument 
suggests that its best defence against such recuperation is to hold fast to its 
negativity, advancing no positive claims, whether to authenticity or aesthetic 
totality on the one hand, or to social or theoretical validity on the other. 
In terms of the typology of contemporary music sketched out in “On the 
Social Situation of Music”, Adorno’s Dada may be situated at the intersection of 
objectivist music and surrealistic music, tending more towards the latter. As 
noted above, Stravinsky’s The Soldier’s Tale is identified as the point of 
transition between these two types of music, preparing the way for the mutations 
of popular music in Brecht and Weill’s The Threepenny Opera and Mahagonny. 
Analysing The Soldier’s Tale in Philosophy of New Music, Adorno elaborates on 
how this work appropriates the debased forms of “the lowest and most vulgar 
music [Vulgärmusik]”, including “the march, the idiotic scraping on the violin, 
the outmoded waltz”, as well as “the current dances, tango and ragtime”: 
 
Through its affinity to this sphere of music, the infantilism [Infantilismus] 
gains a “realistic”, if negative, hold on whatever the going thing is and at 
the same time distributes shocks by cornering people so closely with this 																																																								
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familiar, popular music that they are as frightened by it as by something 
purely mediated by the market, reified, and utterly remote. Convention is 
reversed, for now it is exclusively through conventional means that music 
produces alienation. The music discovers the latent horror of inferior 
music in botched performances, in its being fitted together out of 
disorganized particles, and draws its principle of organization from the 
universal disorganization. The infantilism is the style of the worn-out and 
exhausted. Its sound can be compared to the visual aspect of painted-up 
postage stamps: fragile and yet gaplessly dense, glued-together montages, 
as threatening as in the worst dreams.245 
 
As well as containing what may be a reference to the collages of Kurt Schwitters, 
who is cited elsewhere as a pioneer of this technique in close proximity to Dada 
and Surrealism, Adorno’s phrasing here recalls the montages, incorporating 
elements of nineteenth-century bourgeois musical culture and twentieth-century 
consumer music, which are described in connection with surrealistic music in 
“On the Social Situation of Music”.246 He observes that infantilism often latches 
onto the productions of the culture industry, most typically jazz or other forms of 
contemporary dance music. These are exposed as bankrupt, as they are treated as 
interchangeable, deconstructed and manipulated, in his view befitting their status 
as commodities. This is another critically inflected mimetic adaptation, which 
utilizes distortion to lay bare the untruth of the culture industry, according to a 
footnote in Philosophy of New Music: “Stravinsky, through distortion, exposes 
what is shabby, worn out, and market enthralled in the established dance music 
of the last thirty years. He in a sense compels its shortcomings to speak, and 
transforms its standardized formulae into ciphers of disintegration.”247 Brecht 
and Weill follow their precursor in repurposing conventional means to produce 
alienation, defamiliarizing the familiar forms of popular music. 
 How far does this account of alienating infantilism correspond to the 
actual practice of the Dadaists, and does it justify the association posited by 
Adorno? I have already mentioned the affinity with some of their collages and 																																																								
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photomontages, and their engagement with popular music will be discussed at 
greater length in the next chapter, as part of a detailed analysis of its role at the 
Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich in 1916. In many respects, Dada resembles the 
description of alienating infantilism provided above, especially in its 
transformation of material that would otherwise be recognizable and reassuring 
into something remote and threatening. It is important to emphasize the 
negativity that is brought to bear on the sphere of popular culture, which is 
simultaneously exploited for its critical potential vis-à-vis pure culture, and itself 
destabilized through the countervailing force of avant-garde experimentation. 
Adorno attributes this attitude to middle-period Stravinsky and the collaborations 
of Brecht and Weill, but it also informs his interpretation of Dada. He is correct 
to highlight that thoroughgoing negativity, of which anti-art is the ultimate 
expression. There are additional dimensions to the shock effects generated by the 
movement, which his focus on alienating infantilism tends to obscure, for 
example the conscious manipulation of the dynamic between performers and 
spectators, challenging the traditional passivity of the latter. I would question the 
extent to which his reading is able to encapsulate the full breadth of these 
interventions and provocations, which go beyond the narrowly formal to 
encompass the manipulation of art-institutional mechanisms, another topic taken 
up in the next chapter. In my opinion, Dada is most reminiscent of surrealistic 
music in its opposition to aesthetic autonomy, a feature of its closest correlate 
identified but left largely unexamined by Adorno in “On the Social Situation of 
Music”. 
 
Subjective Expression 
 
DADA AND EXPRESSIONISM 
 
At its inception, Dada was a porous entity, open to a range of 
crosscurrents within the European avant-garde, including the pre-existing 
movements Symbolism, Cubism and Futurism. It went on to feed into diverse 
developments in the history of art, short-lived outgrowths such as Instantaneism 
and Tabu, and major independent tendencies like Constructivism and New 
Objectivity, as well as the much discussed connection with Surrealism. In his 
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scattered remarks about Dada, Adorno often couples and occasionally conflates it 
with Expressionism. This association is not wholly lacking in objective 
substantiation, as there was in fact a significant overlap of personnel and ideas 
between the two movements, especially nearer to the beginning of Dada in 
Zurich. Among the founding members were émigrés who previously had been 
affiliated with German Expressionism, most prominently Hennings, Ball and 
Hans Arp. Expressionist writers and artists contributed to the first issues of the 
little magazines Cabaret Voltaire and Dada, and the same continuity was evident 
in performances and exhibitions at the venues Cabaret Voltaire and Galerie 
Dada. In the crowded and contested cultural marketplace of Berlin, Dadaists 
sought to differentiate themselves aggressively from Expressionism, in 
manifestos and polemics by Huelsenbeck, Raoul Hausmann, and Grosz and 
Heartfield. The main charges against Expressionism were its alleged apoliticism 
and aestheticism, compared to the declared activist character of Berlin Dada.248 
Such a clear-cut distinction is not really tenable, as the level of politicization on 
both sides was in practice variable, and depended on the shifting historical 
context. There were substantive differences, but they were exaggerated by avant-
gardist posturing and positioning. In other centres of Dadaist activity, 
Expressionism was neither an influence nor an antagonist to the same extent as in 
Zurich and Berlin. By the time it was at the height of its fame in Paris, Dada was 
far removed from the concerns of Expressionism, notwithstanding the historic 
links of a few participants such as Max Ernst. Via Ernst and Arp in Cologne and 
Schwitters in Hannover, Dada maintained residual ties with Expressionism. The 
perceived relevance of this precursor diminishes with geographical distance from 
Germany, as demonstrated by its relative lack of purchase in the Dadaist outpost 
of New York. As we will see, Adorno consistently overstates the closeness of 
Dada to Expressionism. In what follows, I explicate what it is that for him 
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legitimizes speaking of them together, while drawing out what it is that in my 
view sets them apart. 
Comparing and contrasting Dada and Expressionism in this way perhaps 
exposes me to the accusation of playing the kind of art-historical game warned 
against by Hutchinson. Nevertheless, Adorno’s conflation of these movements is 
instructive, as it reveals a false assumption underlying his interpretation of Dada. 
He holds that both tendencies are invested in the idea of art as a medium for 
subjective expression, hinting that the Dadaists’ sound poetry should be read as 
an extreme manifestation of that principle, as we will see below. Ball’s “poems 
without words” may be what he has in mind, of which an exemplary instance is 
“Karawane” [1917]: “jolifanto bambla ô falli bambla / grossiga m’pfa habla 
horem / égiga goramen / higo bloiko russula huju / hollaka hollala / anlogo bung 
/ blago bung / bosso fataka / ü üü ü / schampa wulla wussa ólobo / hej tatta 
gôrem / eschige zunbada / wulubu ssubudu uluw ssubudu / tumba ba- umf / 
kusagauma / ba - umf”.249 Verses like these may convey a sense of the liberation 
of expressive possibilities, however they are hardly a straightforward affirmation 
of that capacity. The negative side to the process, namely the destruction of 
meaning, should not be underestimated, and will be discussed at length later in 
this chapter. By his own account, Ball is attempting to access the “innermost 
alchemy of the word”, redeeming instrumentalized language from its fate in a 
fallen world.250 This does not necessarily imply an elevation of individual 
subjectivity, and indeed inhabiting language in its elemental form could be 
experienced as a radical loss of self, as it reportedly was during one especially 
intense performance of his at the Cabaret Voltaire: “I noticed that my voice had 
no choice but to take on the ancient cadence of priestly lamentation, the style of 
liturgical singing that wails in the Catholic churches of East and West. I do not 
know what gave me the idea of this music, but I began to chant my vowel 
sequences in a church style like a recitative, and tried not only to look serious but 
to be serious.”251 Ball attributed to the word an inner significance, which he 
attempted to channel in phonetic constructions relieved of the function of 																																																								
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discursive signification, but this was conceived as an adaptation to an objective 
truth, rather than the emancipation of subjective expression. Putting aside the 
question of whether the latter is an accurate characterization of Expressionism 
either, I would suggest that Adorno underplays the extent to which the categories 
of expression and subjectivity are critically interrogated by Dada. 
Many Dadaists appear on the face of it to be working in the opposite 
direction to subjective expression, for example in the field of visual art: Arp’s 
experiments with chance were intended to remove the subjective decision of the 
artist, in favour of a method that he considered more objective; Taueber’s 
geometric abstraction minimizes the expressive impulse, instead adopting control 
and order as its guiding compositional principles; Picabia’s mechanomorphic 
drawings also suppress that urge to emote and its attendant aura of transcendental 
seriousness, with technical diagrams supplemented by puns and innuendo.252 In 
addition, Picabia displays a complex attitude towards individual subjectivity, 
belying the impression of straightforward solipsism created by his propensity for 
self-aggrandizement and his refusal to be bound by any collective identity, 
ultimately including that of Dada. His excessive egocentricity incorporates 
performative self-negation, as with the anti-Dadaist handout he distributed at an 
exhibition in Paris in 1921, featuring the slogans “FRANCIS PICABIA IS AN 
IMBECILE, AN IDIOT, A PICKPOCKET!!!”, “FRANCIS PICABIA is an idiotic spanish 
professor, who was never dada” and “FRANCIS PICABIA IS NOTHING!”253 He was 
not so much concerned with the assertion of the self, as with its continual 
transformation through erasure, as described in “Thank You Francis!” [1923]: 
“What I like is inventing, imagining, creating a new man out of myself at every 
moment, then forgetting him, forgetting everything. We should secrete a special 
eraser, rubbing out our works and any memory of them as we go along. Our 
brain should just be a black and whiteboard, or better yet, a mirror into which we 
look at ourselves for a moment so as to turn our back to it two minutes later.”254 
The absolute freedom he demanded went beyond the liberation of individual 																																																								
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subjectivity, to encompass a liberation from individual subjectivity.255 These 
counterexamples do not in themselves disprove the supposition that subjective 
expression was important to the movement, and certainly it remained a 
motivating force in some instances. However, the Dadaists’ performance 
strategies of simultaneous presentation, noise accompaniments and staged 
disruptions, their curatorial practice of overfilling an exhibition space with a 
confused jumble of artworks, promotional materials and miscellaneous objects, 
and their violation of the conventions of readability in little magazines with 
unstable page orientation and overlapping text and images, all serve to frustrate 
the access to interiority and the immediacy of experience which are the main 
supports of such an approach. What in the end distinguishes them from 
Expressionism is their thoroughgoing negativity, which climaxes in the self-
critical turn of anti-art, a difference noted but not sufficiently emphasized by 
Adorno. 
 
ABSOLUTE EXPRESSION 
 
Dialectic of Enlightenment contains a discussion of artistic style, the set 
of aesthetic conventions associated with a particular artist, movement or epoch, 
which is criticized as an external imposition on the immanent logic of the 
individual artwork. The total regimentation and standardization of cultural 
production under advanced capitalism is said to disclose the untruth of style, 
making plain how it functions repressively as the “aesthetic equivalent of 
power”.256 The unity of style, a defining feature of the art of previous historical 
periods, was always a marker of their “structures of social coercion”.257 The 
rigour of style, on the other hand, has its moment of truth, if it is brought to bear 
negatively on the “chaotic expression of suffering”.258 In advancing their 
argument that great artists have made use of this capacity of style without wholly 
conforming to its prescriptions, Adorno and Horkheimer equate Dada and 
Expressionism: 
 																																																								
255 Leslie, “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”, pp.208-209. 
256 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.103. 
257 Ibid., p.103. 
258 Ibid., p.103. 
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Even works which are called classical, like the music of Mozart, contain 
objective tendencies which resist the style they incarnate. Up to 
Schönberg and Picasso, great artists have been mistrustful of style, which 
at decisive points has guided them less than the logic of the subject 
matter. What the Expressionists and Dadaists attacked in their polemics, 
the untruth of style as such, triumphs today in the vocal jargon of the 
crooner, in the adept grace of the film star, and even in the mastery of the 
photographic shot of the farm labourer’s hovel.259 
 
The uniformity found across all sectors of the culture industry, from popular 
music to middlebrow photography, is understood as the culmination of the 
repressive logic of style, previously a polemical target of Dada and 
Expressionism. Adorno and Horkheimer do not identify members of these 
movements as great artists, reserving that canonical status for the usual favoured 
figure of Schoenberg, here joined by Pablo Picasso. Picasso and Schoenberg are 
elevated to this rank because they maintain the tension between expression and 
style, so that the poles of freedom and discipline interpenetrate productively. The 
Dadaists and the Expressionists likewise resist the constraint of established 
norms, but they fail to check the subjective moment as well. This we have to 
infer from other comments by Adorno, as there is no developed critique of their 
allegedly one-sided approach in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
In “Presuppositions”, Adorno turns to the field of literature, arguing that 
writers must reckon with the “double nature of language”, which encompasses 
the expressive impulse and the function of “discursive signification”, with the 
latter glossed as “communication first and foremost”.260 He cites as somebody 
who engages with this problematic the satirist and playwright Karl Kraus, a 
contemporary of the Dadaists and the Expressionists, who exposed the corruption 
of language by journalism and politics in his long-running publication Die 
Fackel in Vienna. In “Presuppositions”, Kraus is praised for successfully 
negotiating the conflict between expression and meaning, while a failure to do so 
is attributed to Expressionism, and to a lesser extent Dada: 
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With utter integrity, Karl Kraus, who was hostile to Expressionism and 
hence to the unqualified primacy of expression over sign in language, in 
no way relaxed the distinction between literary and communicative 
language. His oeuvre persists in trying to produce an artistic autonomy 
for language without doing violence to its other aspect, the 
communicative, which is inseparable from transmission. The 
Expressionists, on the other hand, tried to jump over their own shadows. 
They championed the primacy of expression without regard for other 
considerations. They envisioned using words as pure expressive values, 
the way colours or tone relationships are used in painting or music. 
Language put up such sharp resistance to the Expressionist idea that it 
was hardly ever realized except by the Dadaists.261 
 
When he writes about “using words as pure expressive values”, Adorno may be 
thinking of sound poetry. The Expressionists, and by extension the Dadaists, are 
accused of promoting expression at the expense of communication, in a 
simplistic attempt to institute a realm of absolute freedom linguistically. By 
contrast, Kraus is credited with preserving the claims of both sides in a state of 
tension, recognizing that though language always has an intention “above and 
beyond communication”, it nevertheless cannot do without its “significative 
moment”, or working with “concepts and meanings”.262 Compared to the 
Expressionists, the Dadaists come closer to achieving the ideal of the primacy of 
expression, but they too are ultimately unable to sustain it in the face of the 
ineradicable element of signification or communication, which acts as an 
objective limit on the aesthetic autonomy that can be won for language, 
according to Adorno.263 
“Presuppositions” is a response to a performance of experimental lyric 
poetry by Hans G Helms, a writer, composer and pupil of Adorno’s. Helms’ FA: 
M’AHNIESGWOW [1959] is described as a hybrid “music-language 
composition”, which is indebted to James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake [1939], and 																																																								
261 Ibid., p.98. 
262 Ibid., p.98. 
263 For an argument developing this aspect of Adorno’s implicit philosophy of language, which 
broadens out into a consideration of the similarity between language and music, see: Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen, Exact Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics [1997] (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999), pp.66-73. 
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also has an affinity with the serialism of Karlheinz Stockhausen.264 Joyce’s novel 
sometimes approaches sound poetry, though arguably it never abandons 
discursive signification entirely, an impossible aim if we accept Adorno’s 
account of the double nature of language. Similarly, Stockhausen is said to be 
grappling with the contemporary “crisis of meaning”, not by rejecting 
conventional musical sense altogether, but by incorporating it on a continuum 
with the most radical alternative configurations.265 Adorno reiterates his criticism 
of the Dadaists’ supposed one-sided emphasis on expression over meaning, as he 
likens Helms to Stockhausen: 
 
Helms’ conception [of language] stands in an analogous relationship to 
discursive meaning. Its continuum extends from quasi-narrative portions 
intelligible on the surface to parts in which the phonetic values, the pure 
expressive qualities, completely outweigh the semantic values, the 
meanings. The conflict between expression and meaning in language is 
not, as with the Dadaists, simply decided in favour of expression. It is 
respected as an antinomy. But the literary work does not accommodate to 
it as a homogenous mixture. It polarizes it between extremes whose 
sequence is itself structure, that is, provides the work with its form.266 
 
Adorno might once more put us in mind of sound poetry, with this reference to 
“phonetic values, the pure expressive qualities”. He recalls his own dialectical 
method, when describing how Helms seeks neither to strike a balance of 
expression and meaning, nor to steer a middle course between them, but instead 
to push both to the point where they are mediated in each other as extremes. By 
contrast, the Dadaists are judged to pursue only one of these poles, neglecting its 
interplay with its opposite, and consequently their approach is considered inferior 
to that of Helms, in the same way that they are compared unfavourably to Kraus. 
In connection with Kraus, Adorno suggests that the desire to eliminate 
signification or communication from language in favour of absolute expression 
reveals an anti-artistic orientation, which is programmatic in Dada: “Dadaism’s 																																																								
264 Adorno, “Presuppositions”, p.104. 
265 Ibid., p.104. 
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aim, in fact, was not art but its assassination.”267 This insight ought to be more 
central to his understanding of the movement, as it is in fact the anti-artistic 
orientation, albeit established on a different basis, which constitutes the dividing 
line from Expressionism. 
 
PURE SUBJECTIVITY 
 
As part of an extended argument in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno once again 
links Dada and Expressionism, this time in relation to the field of visual art: 
 
The shadow of art’s autarchic radicalism is its harmlessness: Absolute 
color compositions verge on wallpaper patterns. Now that American 
hotels are decorated with abstract paintings à la manière de… and 
aesthetic radicalism has shown itself to be socially affordable, radicalism 
itself must pay the price that it is no longer radical. Among the dangers 
faced by new art, the worst is the absence of danger. The more art expels 
the preestablished, the more it is thrown back on what purports to get by, 
as it were, without borrowing from what has become distant and foreign: 
Art is thrown back on the dimensionless point of pure subjectivity, 
strictly on its particular and thus abstract subjectivity. This tendency was 
passionately anticipated by the radical wing of expressionism up to and 
including dada.268 
 
His assessment of these movements is informed by his impression of the failure 
of the early twentieth-century avant-garde, writing some fifty years after its 
highpoint, from which perspective its protest appears to have been fully 
neutralized, its integration within the canon of modernism well established, and 
its aesthetic effects cannibalized by the culture industry. He reflects on the 
recuperation of abstract art, and the trajectory of its uncompromising claim to 
aesthetic autonomy. The drive towards radical self-sufficiency is supposed to 
repudiate all the accumulated conventions of artistic tradition, excluding 
everything extraneous to the artwork. This is said to lead to an increasing 																																																								
267 Ibid., p.98. 
268 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp.37-38. 
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reliance on the false immediacy of individual subjectivity, which is presented as 
if it were absolute. That attempt to occupy a dimensionless point culminates in 
an empty abstractness, entirely unthreatening to the given order, as with the 
mass-produced abstract art hung in North American hotels. Dada is meant to 
have prefigured this development, placing the movement in a somewhat 
unfamiliar lineage with Abstract Expressionism, which is however justified by 
the presence of abstraction in the visual art of Taueber and Arp, and in the 
experimental films of Viking Eggeling and Hans Richter. 
The passage continues: 
 
The absence of social resonance, however, was not alone to blame for the 
collapse of expressionism: It was not possible to persevere within the 
bounds of a dimensionless point; the contraction of the accessible, the 
totality of the refusal, terminates in complete impoverishment: the scream 
or the destitute, powerless gesture, literally the syllables “da-da”. This 
became an amusement for all concerned, the dadaists as well as the 
conformists they challenged, because it confessed the impossibility of 
artistic objectivation that is postulated by each and every artistic 
manifestation, whether intentionally or not; what after all is left to do but 
scream. The dadaists consistently tried to abrogate this postulate; the 
programme of their surrealist successors rejected art, yet without being 
able to shake itself free of it. Their truth was that it would be better not to 
have art than to have a false one.269 
 
Expressionism, incorporating Dada, is identified as a failure, for which there is 
both an objective and a subjective basis. Adorno is clear that a lack of social 
import fatally undermines these movements, but he also says that the extremism 
of their position is internally unsustainable. The critical force of the attack on the 
status quo is quickly exhausted, deteriorating into an expression of its own 
desperation, represented on the one hand by the scream, an allusion to Edvard 
Munch’s famous Expressionist painting The Scream [1893-1910], and on the 
other hand by the helpless pointing suggested by the repetition of the German 																																																								
269 Ibid., p.38. 
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“Da” (“There”) in “Dada”. The Dadaists’ opposition to conformism turns into a 
bitter joke shared with their antagonists, as the limitations of the approach 
become clear to all. Their defeatism arises from the inability of art to make good 
on its promise of happiness, which it has to posit but cannot fulfil, never 
transcending the aesthetic sphere to become praxis, or realizing its utopian 
potential in reality. Adorno believes that this aporia of art can only be overcome 
with a revolutionary transformation of social conditions, which is itself the 
substance of the promise. The Surrealists, descended from the Dadaists, are 
commended for embracing anti-art in recognition of this fact, though they too are 
judged to have failed in their project. 
After elaborating a little on the failure of Surrealism, Adorno returns to 
the recuperation of Dada and Expressionism: 
 
Not only did the expressionists make concessions as they became older 
and had to make a living; not only did dadaists convert to Catholicism or 
enroll in the Communist Party: Artists with the integrity of Picasso and 
Schoenberg went beyond the subjective point. Their difficulties in this 
could be sensed and feared right from their first efforts to achieve a so-
called new order. Since then these difficulties have developed into the 
difficulties of art as such.270 
 
When he refers to conversions to Catholicism, Adorno is most likely thinking of 
Hennings and Ball, who withdrew from Dadaist activity in Zurich to live in 
seclusion as practicing Christians.271 Many of the Paris Dadaists subsequently 
joined the Communist Party, in addition to becoming Surrealists: Tristan Tzara, 
and later André Breton, Louis Aragon and Paul Éluard.272 Adorno takes these 
changes in direction as confirmation of the bankruptcy of the movement, because 
for him they signify subordination to different forms of authority. He also 
highlights instances of the dimensionless point of pure subjectivity being 
surpassed, invoking the same canonical figures as in Dialectic of Enlightenment: 																																																								
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Picasso and Schoenberg. Unlike the dead end he sees in Dada and 
Expressionism, Adorno identifies the struggles of these great artists with 
progress in art as a whole, praising them for going beyond subjective expression. 
The Dadaists’ approach to that capacity is by contrast condemned as one-sided 
and unsustainable. Regardless of whether this is a fair assessment, Adorno’s 
emphasis on recuperation paradoxically has the advantage of focusing attention 
on anti-art, which in my view needs to be given greater weight in his account of 
Dada. 
 
DEICTIC GESTURE 
 
In the “Draft Introduction” to Aesthetic Theory, Dada is described as a 
deictic gesture, by which objects are referred to without being named, with the 
extreme specificity and at the same time contentless generality of demonstrative 
pronouns like “This” and “That”: 
 
Even dada, as the deictic gesture into which the world is transformed in 
the effort to shake off its conceptuality, was as universal as the childishly 
reiterated demonstrative word that dadaism took as its motto. Whereas art 
dreams the absolutely monadological, it is both happily and unhappily 
suffused with the universal. Art must contract to the geometrical point of 
the absolute τοδε τι [“a this”, “some this”, “a something”] and go beyond 
it. This imposed the objective limit to expressionism; art would have been 
compelled to go beyond it even if the artists had been less 
accommodating: They regressed behind expressionism. Whenever 
artworks on their way toward concretion polemically eliminate the 
universal, whether as a genre, a type, an idiom or a formula, the excluded 
is maintained in them through its negation; this state of affairs is 
constitutive of the modern.273 
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This passage recalls the opposition to conceptuality which is concomitant with 
the primacy of expression for Adorno, as well as again conjuring up a pointing 
gesture with the repetition of “Da” (“There”). It is worth noting in passing the 
German bias of that reading, which ignores other associations of the 
overdetermined word “Dada”, such as the French for “Hobbyhorse” and the 
Romanian for “Yes-yes”.274 Adorno presents a variation of his phrase about great 
artists going beyond the subjective point, though on this occasion it is pure 
“thisness”, the condition of being an individuated substance, which has to be 
transcended.275 He hits another familiar note by highlighting the limitations of 
Expressionism, which in his interpretation encompasses Dada. Elsewhere in 
Aesthetic Theory, Adorno presents a slightly modified version of the argument, 
emphasizing the role played by ideology: “Even dada, the purely deictic gesture, 
was as universal as the demonstrative pronoun; that expressionism was more 
powerful as an idea than in its works perhaps has its origins in the fact that its 
utopia of the pure τοδε τι is itself a fragment of false consciousness.”276 In both 
passages, Dada is understood as an extreme manifestation of the principle of 
individuation or particularization, at the boundaries of which it paradoxically 
passes over into the universal, as happens when an uncompromising commitment 
to subjective expression converges with its counterpoles objectivity and 
meaning.  
As stated above in relation to alienating infantilism, Adorno’s account of 
Dada is largely consistent over time, and this is also evident in the single thread 
of argument running from Dialectic of Enlightenment to Aesthetic Theory. He 
falsely assumes that the movement is primarily motivated by subjective 
expression, on that basis repeatedly associating it with and even assimilating it to 
Expressionism. The Dadaists and the Expressionists are said to share a one-sided 
approach, repudiating artistic style and the rigour it imposes on the spontaneous 
expression of subjective experience, rather than maintaining a productive tension 
of discipline and freedom. Adorno is right to highlight Dada’s resistance to a 
prescriptive style, but wrong to construe that opposition as consisting mainly in 
the unmediated expression of suffering. In the field of literature, the Dadaists and 																																																								
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the Expressionists are likewise accused of wholly prioritizing expression over 
meaning, when what is required is their dialectical mediation. The attempt to 
eliminate discursive signification is in any case doomed, because for him 
language has an irreducible communicative component. I do not need to address 
whether this claim about language is correct, as for my purposes a preliminary 
consideration is that his characterization of the movement is simply inaccurate. 
Far from pursuing the chimera of absolute expression as he suggests, Dada 
actually exhibits a more critical attitude, in effect negating both sides of the 
antithesis. In the field of visual art, the Dadaists and the Expressionists are 
similarly depicted as seeking to embody pure subjectivity, another unsustainable 
position, according to Adorno. Nevertheless, Dada is granted a limited artistic 
legitimacy, as the most radical faction of Expressionism. This relative advantage 
is connected to its anti-artistic orientation, an impression further sharpened by 
the retrospective assessment of these movements as a failed project, viewed from 
the perspective of their recuperation. However, Adorno is mistaken in attributing 
that anti-artistic orientation to Dada’s supposed preoccupation with absolute 
expression and pure subjectivity. The passages treating it as a deictic gesture may 
act as a summation of this erroneous interpretation, as they describe the same 
dynamic of subjective expression reaching its objective limit. He repeats the 
error of neglecting the countervailing tendencies within the movement, which 
would complicate that reading. The thoroughgoing negativity that is brought to 
bear on the categories of expression and subjectivity points us in the direction of 
the self-critical turn of anti-art. It is not my intention to fully elaborate this 
problematic yet, but we can at least gesture towards it. 
If Adorno’s Dada is known principally by its sound poetry and abstract 
art, I want to emphasize another component of its creative output, that is, its use 
of found objects in assemblages and readymades. This technique has roots in 
Cubist collage, pioneered by Picasso with Georges Braque, but it is deployed 
more extensively and taken to greater extremes by the Dadaists. In Berlin, 
Baader constructed a monumental sculpture out of a table, a chair, a barrel and a 
board, festooned it with signposts and newspapers, and mounted on it sundry 
items, including a mousetrap, a bicycle chain and a stove pipe, for his Great 
Plasto-Dio-Dada-Drama: Germany’s Greatness and Fall at the Hands of 
Schoolmaster Hagendorf, or: The Fantastic Life Story of the Superdada 
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[1920].277 In Hannover, Schwitters repurposed the refuse of the city, 
incorporating labels, bus tickets and bits of wood into his pictures, a tendency 
which culminated in the labyrinthine live-in space of his Merzbau [c.1923-
1936].278 In Tokyo, Tomoyoshi Murayama exhibited cut flowers in a pointed 
high-heeled shoe with the title Work with Flowers and a Shoe [1923], and went 
on to construct assemblages on a much larger scale such as Architectural Idea of 
the Mavo Headquarters [1924].279 In New York, Freytag-Loringhoven’s God 
[c.1917] was a cast-iron plumbing trap set upside-down on a wooden mitre box, 
and she experimented further with found objects in pieces like Cathedral 
[c.1918] and Portrait of Marcel Duchamp [c.1920].280 In New York and Paris, 
Duchamp created the readymades which are the best-known examples of this 
form, and the next chapter contains a detailed analysis of his urinal Fountain 
[1917]. There is in this widespread Dadaist practice a refusal of the false choice 
between representation and abstraction, instead inserting fragments of the 
material world directly into the artwork. It seems to reject conceptuality in favour 
of materiality, and points to empirical reality rather than seeking to reproduce it 
as faithfully as possible as in representational art, or to replace it with a sui 
generis order as in abstract art. The significance of such a manoeuvre does not 
depend solely on particularization or individuation, as the mass-produced goods 
and miscellaneous junk preferred by the Dadaists evoke the universal fungibility 
which characterizes a society organized according to the principle of exchange. 
Their assertion of non-art as art also operates on a meta-level, drawing attention 
to the art-institutional mechanisms which must be set in motion to confer that 
aesthetic status on commodities and detritus. In this sense, Dada’s approach is 
still thoroughly conceptual, replacing intuitive understanding and sensual 
appreciation with critical reflection on the functioning of the institution of art. 																																																								
277 For details of Great Plasto-Dio-Dada-Drama, see: Katharina Hoins, “Johannes Baader’s Post-
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280 For details of God, Cathedral and Portrait of Marcel Duchamp, see: Irene Gammel, Baroness 
Elsa: Gender, Dada, and Everyday Modernity – A Cultural Biography (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002), p.11, pp.218-222, pp.234-236. 
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Adorno mostly misses that aspect of the movement, in part because of his 
misguided focus on subjective expression. 
 
Anarchic Destruction 
 
NEGATION OF MEANING 
 
Though it is true to say that he gives undue weight to subjective 
expression in his interpretation of Dada, Adorno does acknowledge the other side 
to this process, which is the negation of meaning. If he is mistaken in treating the 
affirmation of expression as a necessary correlative to that destructive capacity, 
his description of the latter is still valid to a certain extent. The simultaneous 
poetry pioneered by the movement in Zurich has the effect of breaking down 
discursive signification, without obviously promoting subjective expression. A 
collaboration by Huelsenbeck, Tzara and Marcel Janco, “The Admiral is 
Looking for a House to Rent” [1916] is made up of disjointed sentences in 
multiple languages interspersed with sound poetry, all presented at once in a 
cacophony calculated to undermine intelligibility.281 The significative function is 
also deliberately frustrated on a textual level in concrete poetry, experiments 
with typography and layout which in their visual dimension approach the 
collages and photomontages of the Berlin Dadaists. Hausmann’s Green [1918] 
combines fragmentary words and letters, incorporating snatches of nonsense 
alongside recognizable semantic units, written in different styles and sizes, and 
set at wildly varying angles, in an overall arrangement which cannot be read 
linearly in any direction.282 On the other hand, Dada’s literary output includes 
slogans, statements and polemics which are straightforwardly declarative and 
imperative in tone, as well as deploying formatting innovations to convey a 
message with greater impact, such as capitalization, bold type and underlining 
for emphasis, common features of the direct mode of communication most 
associated with the movement, the manifesto form. These countertendencies are 
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largely left out of his account of the negation of meaning discussed below, but 
then he is rarely dealing directly with the topic of Dada. 
Adorno is not concerned simply with linguistic meaning, but also refers 
to musical meaning, and more broadly to aesthetic meaning. This for him 
consists in the integral structuration of the artwork, the inner-aesthetic nexus 
which indirectly invokes the extra-aesthetic sphere. He grants a privileged status 
to aesthetic form, as the site of the social import of aesthetic autonomy, 
crystallizing that truth content which exceeds the sum of internal relations 
between aesthetic elements.283 The negation of meaning, as he conceives it, is 
therefore as much an attack on coherence as it is on significance. The Dadaists 
systematically disrupt the traditional model of the artwork as an integrated and 
self-contained whole in their collages, photomontages and assemblages, and 
further undermine its autonomous status with their unorthodox approach to 
presentation in publishing, performance and curatorial practice. It is important to 
take account of variations in specific disciplines, rather than subsuming them 
under an overarching concept of art. We have seen him argue that literature, 
because its medium is language, is unable ultimately to escape the discursive 
realm, and to eliminate entirely the residuum of a significative function. The 
situation is different with music, which is held merely to resemble language, as a 
sequence of sounds articulating something greater than itself, without being 
reducible to the conceptual determinations of a sign system.284 His reading of the 
negation of meaning, in the wider sense of aesthetic meaning, is applicable to 
this field as much as to visual art and literature, and it is in relation to music that 
he makes many of his most valuable observations about Dada. In what follows, I 
examine how he alludes to the movement in connection with the composers 
Ernst Krenek and John Cage. However, Adorno never cites any actual examples 
of Dadaist music, a gap in his knowledge which this chapter has begun to 
correct. 
As is typical of Adorno, Dada is only ever mentioned in passing, yet there 
is a certain consistency to his portrayal of its negation of meaning, which is 
usually characterized as an outbreak of anarchic destruction. This impression of a 
spontaneous and chaotic destructive capacity recalls the traditional art-historical 																																																								
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account of the movement, against which we might set Hutchinson’s claim that its 
thoroughgoing negativity is in fact relatively systematic. The Dadaists’ wide-
ranging attack on morality and society, rejecting all established values and 
norms, extends to the self-negation of anti-art. They mobilize artistic means 
against art, drawing on the resources of their area of expertise to undermine its 
conditions of existence, in an attempt to destroy the aesthetic sphere from within. 
The extremes to which they pursue this end – attacking all existing artistic 
production, explicitly inviting the destruction of their own artworks, and taking 
preemptive action to resist the recuperation of anti-art as another artistic style – 
indicate a relatively systematic approach, an impression confirmed by the 
recollections of some members of the movement.285 There were of course 
differences in the salience of the anti-artistic orientation between locations and 
individuals, and certainly a number of them remained invested in the idea of the 
power of creativity to effect a renewal of art. The negation of meaning may be 
read as part of the anti-artistic project regardless of their intentions, as arguably it 
definitively forestalls the possibility of an interpretation constituted through the 
play of aesthetic elements, thereby repudiating the principle of aesthetic 
autonomy promoted by the bourgeois form of the institution of art. Its relatively 
systematic character becomes visible when we adopt a broader perspective, 
considering not just the negation of meaning construed purely in inner-aesthetic 
terms, but also negations enacted on the art-institutional level. I will defer a full 
discussion of this subject until the next chapter, for now focusing on the negation 
of meaning as it is understood by Adorno. 
 
KRENEK 
 
In order to explore the negation of meaning attributed to Dada, I need to 
return to the topic of new music, set aside earlier in favour of objectivist music 
and surrealistic music. Passing over his origins in late Romanticism, 
Schoenberg’s oeuvre, and the body of work produced by his school, can be 																																																								
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divided into two major phases, which have already been introduced. The first of 
these is the phase of free atonality, usually dated from 1908 to 1923. This 
consisted of compositions without a tonal centre, which also reject traditional 
melody and harmony. It was followed by the phase of twelve-tone technique, 
with compositions based on the organizational principle of the tone row. This 
reintroduced a degree of systematization, which later developed into integral 
serialism after WW2. Krenek participated in both phases, but retained an 
independent identity as a composer who always experimented widely. In 
Philosophy of New Music, Adorno posits an affinity between new music and 
Dada, which he locates in the free atonality of Krenek’s Second Symphony 
[1922]: 
 
If technical analysis demonstrates the emerging element of 
meaninglessness as constitutive of twelve-tone technique, this analysis 
comprehends not merely the critique of twelve-tone technique that the 
total, fully constructed – that is, fully integrated – artwork comes into 
conflict with its own idea. Rather, this analysis also indicates that by 
virtue of a dawning meaninglessness the immanent unity of the work is 
terminated. This unity consists precisely in the nexus that constitutes 
meaning. After its elimination, music transforms itself into protest. What 
becomes inexorably evident in the technological constellations was 
announced with an explosive force, akin to Dadaism, in the era of free 
atonality in the truly incommensurable early work of Krenek, especially 
in his Second Symphony. It is the rebellion of music against its own 
meaning.286 
 
Adorno believes that new music represents the most advanced stage of a process 
which, while conducted on the aesthetic plane, is historically necessary and 
socially resonant. The internal logicity of twelve-tone technique, the absolute 
rigour of its construction, eventually turns into its opposite, the appearance of 
arbitrariness. The nexus of meaning, through which the elements of the work are 
bound together in their difference, is itself suspended in response to the objective 																																																								
286 Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, p.98. 
 146 
demands of that immanent problematic. The negation of meaning emerges from 
the contradictions of the musical material, which in a mediated fashion reflect the 
contradictions of empirical reality. According to Adorno, Krenek’s Second 
Symphony, along with his other freely atonal works from the same period, 
anticipate the meaninglessness that is latent within the dodecaphonic system, but 
invest its disclosure with a spontaneity and violence prompting the comparison 
with Dada. 
Produced contemporaneously to Dada, Krenek’s Second Symphony 
shares some of its capacity to shock, though this takes different forms with the 
movement, such as a soprano mimicking the sounds of orgasm in Schulhoff’s 
Sonata Erotica for Solo Mother-Trumpet [1919], and a girl in a communion dress 
reciting obscene poetry at the opening of the exhibition Dada – Early Spring in 
Cologne in 1920.287 By rushing to assimilate Dada to Expressionism, Adorno 
brings it closer to new music during the phase of free atonality. Schoenberg and 
his school were then the chief representatives of musical Expressionism, and the 
same label has been applied to Krenek, in particular on account of his Second 
Symphony. In an argument that is distinct from yet related to his interpretation of 
the literary variant of Expressionism, Adorno contends that new music is 
engaged in a struggle to overcome the similarity of music to language, which 
culminates in a more thoroughgoing negation of aesthetic meaning. In a passage 
on the same theme from his essay “Music, Language, and Composition” [1956], 
Dada is not named explicitly, but the technique of montage associated with it is 
mentioned in connection with Krenek’s Second Symphony: 
 
The indestructible traits of music that comprise its similarity to language 
are ostracized as the alien element in music, as mere distraction from its 
immanent logic, as if they, immediately and in themselves, were its 
perversion into a system of signs. In the heroic periods of the new music, 
the vehemence of the escape attempts – comparable to the tendency of 
early radical painting to absorb materials that mock all attempts at 
subjective inspiration, the fundamental phenomenon of montage – 																																																								
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presents itself as an anarchic rebellion against the sense of musical 
coherence in general; the young Krenek’s eruptions around the time of 
his Second Symphony are a case in point.288 
 
Krenek’s “vehemence” in seeking to repudiate the resemblance of music to 
language, and the “eruptions” arising from his pursuit of this ambition, recall his 
“explosive force” from Philosophy of New Music.289 Adorno also talks about “an 
anarchic rebellion against musical coherence in general”, which likewise echoes 
his earlier reference to the “rebellion of music against its own meaning”.290 This 
terminology is deployed primarily in relation to Second Symphony, and only by 
extension or indirectly applied to Dada, but it nevertheless gives an insight into 
the view of the latter held by Adorno. He consistently foregrounds anarchic 
destruction, characterizing the negation of meaning as instinctive and aggressive, 
in keeping with the widespread perception of the movement which became a 
critical commonplace. Second Symphony fits this description, combining an array 
of musical styles and idioms, and building towards a cataclysmic climax.  
 In the same section of Philosophy of New Music, Adorno presents the 
negation of meaning effected by new music as an attack on the traditional 
artwork, which predominated prior to the advent of modernism. The “closed” or 
“organic” work is characterized by coherence and unity, with a meaning that 
appears to be immediately intuitable.291 The “disrupted” or “fragmentary” work 
reveals that supposed intuitability as illusory, and derives much of its own power 
from its violation of the norms governing the previous model. 292 The radical 
break with aesthetic meaning is brought on by a critical consciousness of the 
enduring contradiction between the semblance of reconciliation offered by art, 
and the fact that this promise of happiness cannot be fulfilled through art.293 In a 
continuation of the passage quoted above, Adorno connects the negation of 
meaning in a wider sense to the liberation of music from language, discussing 
those early compositions by Krenek, which he has just compared to Dada: 
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The nexus of these works is the negation of the nexus, and their triumph 
resides in the fact that music itself proves to be the opponent of the 
language of words in that it is able to speak meaninglessly, whereas all 
closed musical artworks stand together under the sign of 
pseudomorphosis, as the language of words. All organic music emerged 
from the stile recitativo [a recitative style between speech and song]. 
From the beginning it was modelled on speech. The emancipation of 
music today is synonymous with its emancipation from the language of 
words, and this is the lightning that flashes up in the destruction of 
“meaning”. But it concerns expression first of all.294 
 
Adorno chiefly has in mind the significative function, rather than the expressive 
impulse, when he refers to the transcended language of words. He commends 
new music, during the phase of free atonality, for eliminating the resemblance to 
this medium and speaking meaninglessly. He thereby affirms the primacy of 
expression, while recognizing that it is intimately bound up with the negation of 
meaning. Their continuing imbrication is evident in the subsequent development 
of twelve-tone technique, as well as in works such as Second Symphony: “Just as 
the absence of meaning in those pieces by Krenek accords them the most 
powerful expression, that of objective catastrophe, the inserted expressive 
elements in the most recent twelve-tone compositions indicate the loosening of 
expression from the consistency of language.”295 By asserting that the negation 
of the nexus is itself the nexus of these works, Adorno effectively contains the 
destruction of meaning, redescribing it as meaningful. 
 
CAGE 
 
In the closing essay of Quasi una Fantasia, Adorno suggests a possible 
direction for serious music to take following its development after WW2. He 
presents notes towards what he terms a “musique informelle”, which would move 
beyond the integral serialism that grew out of twelve-tone technique, without 
reverting to the free atonality that preceded it, or indeed to the tonality of the 																																																								
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common practice period. This informal music resists easy definition, but he says 
that it would reject “all forms which are external or abstract or which confront it 
in an inflexible way”, going so far as to abandon even the “system of musical co-
ordinates which have crystallized out in the innermost recesses of the musical 
substance itself”.296 He further differentiates his conception of musique 
informelle from the contemporary development of aleatory music, which is 
associated with Cage. Adorno’s assessment of this neo-avant-garde composer 
and his school is nuanced: 
 
The aspirations of Cage and his school have eradicated all topoi, without 
going into mourning for a subjective, organic ideal in which they suspect 
the topoi of maintaining an after-life. This is why to dismiss anti-art as 
pretentious cabaret and humour would be as great an error as to celebrate 
it. But such aspirations do not yet amount to a musique informelle. As a 
joke they hurl culture into people’s faces, a fate which both culture and 
people richly deserve. They do this not as a barbaric gesture, but to 
demonstrate what they have made of each other. The joke only turns sour 
when it appeals to an exotic, arty-crafty metaphysics and ends up with an 
exaggerated version of the very positivism which it set out to denounce. 
This helps to explain why the joke, which I respect, has been neutralized 
in contemporary society. The latter defends itself ideologically by 
swallowing everything. A musique informelle should also take good care 
to protect itself against revivals of Die Aktion and Dadaism, against 
Alexandrian anarchy.297 
 
Warning a musique informelle against adopting an attitude derivative of Dada, 
Adorno again couples the latter with Expressionism, here represented by the 
magazine Die Aktion, attributing to both movements the same spirit of anarchy 
identified in “Music, Language, and Composition”. Cage’s version of anti-art is 
granted a qualified legitimacy, such that it should neither be dismissed nor 
celebrated. There is an acknowledgement of its critical force, brought to bear on 
culture and people, indicting art and its public. This double-pronged attack 																																																								
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discloses their similarly degraded state under current conditions, with the 
ascendancy of the mutually reinforcing phenomena of the culture industry and 
reified consciousness. The respect accorded to the joke is however strictly 
limited, in recognition of the fact that the capacity for resistance is itself 
circumscribed under late capitalism, with its tendency to recuperate all 
opposition. We might consider the extent to which this analysis also applies to 
Dadaist anti-art, taking into account the different historical context and state of 
development of the musical material. 
What do Cage and Dada have in common, beyond the anti-artistic 
orientation assumed here? I have already highlighted the role played by chance 
in the work of many Dadaists, including in the field of music Ribemont-
Dessaignes. There are further musical connections between Cage and Dada, for 
example his rediscovery of pre-Dadaist aleatory and indeterminate compositions 
by Duchamp.298 He also championed Satie, arranging the first performance of 
Vexations [1893], which with its instruction to play a short musical theme eight 
hundred and forty times anticipates the open-ended repetition of a single note in 
Picabia’s American Nanny [1920], the only example of “sodomist music”.299 
Cage’s 4’33” [1952] was itself anticipated by Schulhoff’s “In Futurum”, an 
elaborately notated period of silence which interrupted his jazz-influenced suite 
Five Picturesques [1919].300 There are obvious similarities between the famous 
happenings in which Cage participated and the performances staged by the 
Dadaists. In the essay “Difficulties” [1964], Adorno points to the convergence of 
the apparent opposites serial music and aleatory music, while comparing Cage to 
Dada, which on this occasion is coupled with Surrealism: 
 
[I]n their effect the extremes of absolute determination and absolute 
chance coincide. Statistical generality becomes the law of composition, a 
law that is alien to the ego. Certainly the absolute indeterminacy of Cage 
and his school is not exhausted in it. It has a polemical meaning; it comes 
close to the dadaist and surrealist actions of the past. But their 																																																								
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“happenings”, in keeping with the political situation, no longer have any 
politically demolishing content and hence tend to take on a sectarian, 
séance-like quality – while everyone believes they have participated in 
something uncanny, nothing at all happens, no ghost appears. It is Cage’s 
contribution, which cannot be exaggerated, to have sown doubts 
regarding the extremes of musical logic, the blind ideal of complete 
domination over nature in music; hardly uninfluenced by “action 
painting”. What he himself offers in his most radical works is 
nevertheless not as different as one might suppose from studying the 
programme, even if his best pieces, like the piano Concerto, still emit an 
extraordinary shock that stubbornly resists all neutralization.301 
 
Also picked out as a highlight in Quasi una Fantasia, Cage’s Piano Concerto 
[1958] is here credited with “resist[ing] all neutralization”, contrary to the claim 
in the other text that the “joke […] has been neutralized”. It is reminiscent of 
Dada in its open and indeterminate score, and in the chance interaction of its 
autonomous parts. Adorno praises this type of music for its opposition to the 
domination of nature, which he thinks is simply duplicated by integral serialism. 
He also criticizes its attempt to access an illusory immediacy, which ultimately 
causes it to fall into the same trap. Returning to the topic of musique informelle 
in “Difficulties”, Adorno underlines the risk of lapsing into apolitical 
aestheticism, as he reflects on the “preponderance of extras, of the extra-musical 
in the most recent music”, or more specifically the use of “noise, bruitistic 
effects, and then optical, especially mimetic ones”, techniques taken from the 
Dadaists: “These actions […] frequently have something aimless about them. 
Dada turns into l’art pour l’art, and this is hard to reconcile with the idea of 
dada.”302 He recognizes the political orientation of Dadaist anti-art, attributing 
the relative lack of urgency and direction in Cage’s version of it to the narrowing 
of the scope for resistance in contemporary society.  
Quasi una Fantasia talks disparagingly of “exotic, arty-crafty 
metaphysics”, perhaps alluding to the composer’s interest in Eastern philosophy, 
including Zen Buddhism and the I-Ching. There is said to be an affinity between 																																																								
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this school and spiritualism, something it does share with early Surrealism, 
especially during the transitional phase of experimentation with séances 
involving many ex-Dadaists.303 Just as he describes its happenings as “séance-
like” in “Difficulties”, Adorno here highlights the “folly” of “abstract negation in 
seances with overtones of Steiner, eurhythmics and healthy living sects”, while 
pointing to the utopian moment in the “hope of escaping from the lie of 
everything meaningful, where meaning is merely subjectively postulated”.304 
This negation of meaning is predicated on the collapse of both the formal 
structures of the traditional artwork, and the unified subject which projected 
coherence onto it. Adorno connects this phenomenon to the element of 
abstruseness, which he says is a constant presence in serious music from free 
atonality and twelve-tone technique up to integral serialism and aleatory music: 
 
Perhaps the reason for this most recent abstruseness is that in contrast to 
its Dadaist grandparents it degenerates at once into culture, and it cannot 
remain unaffected by this. The assaults of Dadaism could not be accused 
of abstruseness because they were both conceived and interpreted as 
hostile to art and culture. Abstruseness degenerates into ideology and to a 
vacuous craft where its actions remain on the aesthetic plane and thereby 
submit to the very criterion of meaning – and culture is for good or ill the 
embodiment of meaning – which they have challenged. However, this is 
dictated by the impossibility today of that politics on which Dadaism still 
relied. “Action painting”, “action composing” are cryptograms of the 
direct action that has now been ruled out; they have arisen in an age in 
which every such action is either forestalled by technology or recuperated 
by an administered world.305 
 
As in “Difficulties”, Cage is associated with the action painting of the Abstract 
Expressionists, whom we have seen identified as descendants of the Dadaists in 
Aesthetic Theory. For Adorno, Dada’s anti-artistic orientation is politically 
motivated, which is what distinguishes its negation of meaning from that enacted 																																																								
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in neo-avant-garde manifestations. Cage’s version of anti-art, produced and 
received in a social situation in which every avenue of potential resistance is 
blocked, is unable to transcend aesthetic concerns. This is however an objective 
limit to all art under current conditions, which the Dadaists also ultimately run up 
against, according to other statements by Adorno. Quasi una Fantasia asserts 
that in any case “meaning is inescapable”, as it “imposes itself on works of art 
against their will”, using a phrase that echoes Philosophy of New Music: “[E]ven 
negated meaning is still meaning.”306 He understands culture essentially as the 
embodiment of meaning, even when its content is the negation of meaning, once 
again interpreting meaninglessness as meaningful. 
 
NEO-DADA 
  
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno revisits the theme of the negation of 
meaning, which is now attributed to Neo-Dada. This term reflects the resurgence 
of interest in the concerns of the early twentieth-century avant-garde, especially 
Dada, in the 1950s and 1960s. It is most associated with neo-avant-garde figures 
based first at Black Mountain College, then in New York, including Cage, Allan 
Kaprow, Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg. They overlapped with and 
reacted against the Abstract Expressionists, as well as returning to practices and 
techniques pioneered by the Dadaists. Cage’s participation in happenings and his 
experiments with chance have already been noted. We might in addition 
highlight the breaking down of the boundary between the performers and the 
audience with Kaprow, the appropriation of popular iconography by Johns, and 
the use of collage and assemblage in Rauschenberg’s “combines”.307 For 
Adorno, Neo-Dada is a contemporary manifestation of advanced art, following 
through the destruction of meaning initially undertaken by the Dadaists: 
 
In that artworks relentlessly chip away at the nexus in which meaning is 
founded, they turn against this nexus and against meaning altogether. The 
unconscious labour of the artistic ingenium on the meaning of the work as 																																																								
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on something substantial and enduring transcends this meaning. The 
advanced production of recent decades has become self-conscious of this 
issue, has made it thematic and translated it into the structure of artworks. 
It is easy to convict neodadaism of a lack of political import and dismiss 
it as meaningless and purposeless in every sense of the word. But to do so 
is to forget that its products ruthlessly demonstrate the fate of meaning 
without any regard to themselves as artworks.308 
 
As we have seen, Quasi una Fantasia and “Difficulties” give a mixed response 
to the question of whether there is any possibility for neo-avant-garde anti-art to 
resist its neutralization by advanced capitalism, though their outlook is 
predominantly pessimistic. Adorno says that these works necessarily lack “any 
politically demolishing content”, differentiating them from their precursors with 
reference to the “impossibility today of that politics on which Dadaism still 
relied”.309 He further states that “direct action […] has now been ruled out”, 
emphasizing the recuperation of all opposition by a society that “defends itself 
ideologically by swallowing everything”.310 Cage is nevertheless judged to have 
made a contribution which it is said “cannot be exaggerated”, and in particular he 
is praised for generating an “extraordinary shock” with his Piano Concerto.311 
Elsewhere in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno is sceptical about the aestheticization of 
politics by the neo-avant-garde, describing the “enthusiasm for the beauty of 
street battles” as a “reprise of futurist and dadaist actions”.312 However, Neo-
Dada is to some extent defended against charges of apoliticism and irrelevance in 
the passage quoted above, because of the uncompromising way in which it 
carries out the negation of meaning, at the expense of the aesthetic status of its 
own works. This is ultimately mimetic, a reaction to the crisis of meaning in 
contemporary society. 
Immediately following the text excerpted above, Adorno introduces the 
canonical figure of Samuel Beckett, not usually considered a Neo-Dadaist: 
“Beckett’s oeuvre already presupposes this experience of the destruction of 																																																								
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meaning as self-evident, yet also pushes it beyond meaning’s abstract negation in 
that his plays force the traditional categories of art to undergo this experience, 
concretely suspend them, and extrapolate others out of the nothingness.”313 In the 
later writings of Adorno, Beckett is often held up as one of his favoured artists, 
in this respect increasingly supplanting Schoenberg. In a note he made on 
Beckett’s Endgame [1957], during preparatory work for his essay “Trying to 
Understand Endgame” [1961], Adorno describes the playwright as a “Dadaist 
without Dada”.314 After the discussion of Beckett in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
also cites the familiar example of Cage’s Piano Concerto: 
 
The dividing line between authentic art that takes on itself the crisis of 
meaning and a resigned art consisting literally and figuratively of 
protocol sentences is that in significant works the negation of meaning 
itself takes shape as a negative, whereas in the others the negation of 
meaning is stubbornly and positively replicated. Everything depends on 
this: whether meaning inheres in the negation of meaning in the artwork 
or if the negation conforms to the status quo; whether the crisis of 
meaning is reflected in the works or whether it remains immediate and 
therefore alien to the subject. Key events may include certain musical 
works such as Cage’s Piano Concerto, which impose on themselves a law 
of inexorable aleatoriness and thereby achieve a sort of meaning: the 
expression of horror.315 
 
By contrast with this positive assessment of Beckett, Cage’s school is accused of 
remaining stuck at the stage of “abstract negation” in Quasi una Fantasia.316 In 
Aesthetic Theory, Adorno counts one of his compositions among the authentic 
artworks which critically reflect the crisis of meaning, as opposed to those which 
simply reproduce it. As with Krenek’s “expression […] of objective catastrophe” 
in Philosophy of New Music, Cage’s negation of meaning is understood in 
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relation to its counterpart expression, in this case the “expression of horror”.317 
Next, Adorno talks about montage, which he positions as central to the “process 
of destroying the artwork as a nexus of meaning”, tracing it back to “radical 
manifestations of expressionism”, a formulation which elsewhere in the book is 
identified with Dada.318 He identifies the paradox at the core of this technique: 
“Artworks […] that negate meaning must also necessarily be disrupted in their 
unity; this is the function of montage, which disavows unity through the 
emerging disparateness of the parts at the same time that, as a principle of form, 
it reaffirms unity.”319  
It is in my view reasonable to make inferences about his interpretation of 
Dada, based on his account of Neo-Dada, and in particular its representative 
Cage. A number of continuities have been highlighted here, chief among them 
the common thread of the negation of meaning, which also features as a point of 
comparison between Dada and Krenek. The main difference is that the neo-
avant-garde has less potential for social import, by virtue of a changing historical 
context, in which the space for opposition is progressively attenuated. Unlike the 
purely aesthetic rebellion which emerges in response to that development, the 
Dadaists’ political dimension informs their anti-artistic orientation, according to 
Adorno. Aesthetic Theory elaborates on the negation of meaning in advanced art, 
stressing how it is borne out of the immanent development of the artistic 
material: 
 
Artworks that divest themselves of any semblance to meaning do not 
thereby forfeit their similitude to language. They enunciate their 
meaninglessness with the same determinacy as traditional artworks 
enunciate their positive meaning. Today this is the capacity of art: 
Through the consistent negation of meaning it does justice to the 
postulates that once constituted the meaning of artworks. Works of the 
highest level of form that are meaningless or alien to meaning are 
therefore more than simply meaningless because they gain their content 
[Gehalt] through the negation of meaning. An artwork that rigorously 																																																								
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negates meaning is by this very rigour bound to the same density and 
unity that was once requisite to the presence of meaning. Artworks 
become nexuses of meaning, even against their will, to the extent that 
they negate meaning.320 
 
This is an expanded exposition of an attitude hinted at in previous quotations 
from Philosophy of New Music and Quasi una Fantasia. The resemblance of 
music to language is likewise extended, so that all art is treated as a repository of 
meaning, up to and including the point at which it embraces meaninglessness. 
Adorno construes it as a form of negative meaning, which still shares the 
characteristic features of positive meaning, being described in terms of its 
“determinancy”, “density” and “unity”, and praised as “consistent” and 
“rigorous”. His conception of the artwork gives priority to its integral 
structuration as a nexus of meaning, even as that principle is repudiated by the 
Dadaists. He remains committed to the category of aesthetic autonomy, himself 
neutralizing the critical force of anti-art by judging it according to the criteria it 
attempts to overcome. There are political stakes to this tendency to contain the 
negation of meaning as itself meaningful, as his perspective tends to reinforce the 
dominant values of the institution of art, as reflected in the notion of meaning 
constituted through the multi-directional play of aesthetic elements in a formally 
autonomous artwork. My point is not that we should simply affirm 
meaninglessness instead, but rather that the potentially productive tension 
between Dadaist anti-art and Adorno’s aesthetics ought to be accentuated. 
 
POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
 
Deriving Adorno’s interpretation of Dada from incidental references to it 
made in connection with Krenek, Cage and Neo-Dada, I have cast doubt on his 
characterization of the negation of meaning as an outbreak of anarchic 
destruction, instead pointing to the relatively systematic anti-artistic project, 
which encompasses a self-reflexive critique of its own institutional basis. In 
addition, I have criticized him for automatically treating that negation of 
meaning in terms of the affirmation of expression, and for neglecting 																																																								
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countertendencies within Dada’s creative practice which mobilize 
straightforward signification and direct communication. The negation of meaning 
includes the negation of linguistic meaning and the negation of musical meaning, 
discipline-specific variations on the negation of aesthetic meaning, which for him 
consists in the repudiation of the integral structuration of the artwork, the internal 
logic of a formal complex, and the play of aesthetic elements. This conception of 
meaning implicates his aesthetics in the dominant values of the institution of art, 
above all the principle of aesthetic autonomy, which is rejected by the Dadaists 
as central to the bourgeois ideology of art, but maintained by Adorno as a 
necessary condition for social import. He holds that language has an irreducible 
significative or communicative component, and similarly that music always 
retains a residual resemblance to discursive articulation, assertions of objective 
limits which correspond to his claim that the negation of meaning is itself 
meaningful. These theoretical manoeuvres are themselves limiting, arguably 
reflecting his investment in aesthetic autonomy, which admittedly is complicated 
by his critical awareness of its ideological aspects. He grants a measure of artistic 
legitimacy to the movement, chiefly on account of the vehemence with which it 
strives after a political effect, enacting the destruction of meaning as part of its 
anti-artistic project. That political dimension to anti-art is a consistent theme of 
his interpretation of Dada, which might constitute a moment of insight, if it is 
repurposed to put pressure on his framework of aesthetic judgement.  
 As we have seen, Adorno often highlights the political orientation of the 
movement, but he does not elaborate it much beyond an undefined antagonism to 
the status quo, as in the following observation about the Symbolist poet Stéphane 
Mallarmé from Aesthetic Theory: “Out of his desire for a utopian art free of 
everything art-alien [Kunstfremden], Mallarmé was apolitical and therefore 
extremely conservative. But by his rejection of the sort of unctuous message as 
preached by every conservative voice today, he converges with his political 
counterpole, dadaism[.]”321 In Zurich during WW1, Dada was militantly pacifist, 
internationalist and anti-bourgeois. Its political sympathies arguably inclined 
towards anarchism, especially in the case of its co-founder Ball, who studied the 
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works of Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin.322 In solidarity with communist 
revolutions in Budapest and Munich in 1919, Richter, Arp, Eggeling, Hennings 
and Janco joined with others in an Association of Revolutionary Artists, a short-
lived outgrowth of Dada.323 In Berlin, Dada pledged allegiance to revolutionary 
communism in one of its main manifestos, while simultaneously parodying the 
rhetoric of political demands.324 There were differences of emphasis within this 
branch of the movement: Grosz, Heartfield and Wieland Herzfelde were 
members of the Communist Party; Höch, Hausmann and Baader would be better 
classified as unaffiliated anarcho-communists.325 Schwitters was excluded for 
being politically disengaged, perhaps part of the reason for establishing the 
separate identity of Merz in Hannover.326 Cologne Dada split over the question 
of how far aesthetic radicalism should be sacrificed to make art accessible to the 
masses, with members in favour of clarity and simplicity leaving to form the 
rival group Stupid.327 In Paris and New York, Dada conformed most closely to a 
strand of individualist anarchism which can be traced to the influence of Max 
Stirner.328 This is the sense in which the description of its destructive capacity as 
anarchic could be said to be correct. Overall, Dada’s political orientation is 
uneven, varying in prominence, intensity and character, vacillating between 
anarchism and communism, with the occasional outlier like the proto-fascist 
Julius Evola in Rome. Adorno’s reading of the movement does not accommodate 
these nuances, but it is correct in positioning the movement broadly on the 
radical left. 
At another point in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno again refers to Dada’s 
political orientation without specifying its content, when discussing the 
renunciation of semblance by advanced art, and the neutralization of its critical 
potential in contemporary society: “[E]ven those works that renounce semblance 
are cut off from real political effect, which was the original inspiration for the 																																																								
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rejection of semblance by dadaism.”329 I think that he is wrong to construe 
Dadaist anti-art as being concerned primarily with political effect, as he does in 
the passages quoted here. Rather, Dada’s renunciation of semblance – like its 
negation of meaning, insofar as both contribute to the wider anti-artistic project – 
actually works more on the level of social import than social impact. The 
movement for the most part does not seek to further a cause by propagandistic 
means, nor does it attempt to implement social change directly, though there are 
notable exceptions, particularly in Berlin. Its political orientation typically takes 
a mediated form, with the art-institutional dimension acting as a point of contact 
between the realms of the aesthetic and the social, so that through its subversive 
interventions into that network of institutions, discourses and practices it might 
reach beyond the aesthetic sphere to a critique of the social system as a whole. 
The field of culture is an integral component of that broader reality, co-
constructed and continuous with other social structures, and its complicity with 
the given order is disclosed and attacked by Dadaist anti-art. There is a greater 
political resonance to the systematic destruction of the dominant ideas which 
shape the production and reception of artworks, by virtue of their relation to the 
social situation in which they circulate, immanently permeated by it even in the 
case of aesthetic autonomy itself. I delve deeper into this problematic in the next 
chapter, focusing on the disruption of the modes of attention considered 
appropriate to art, in a detailed analysis of the First International Dada Fair in 
Berlin in 1920. Adorno explains that the renunciation of semblance, which for 
him involves a higher-order semblance of reconciliation articulated on the level 
of form, is borne out of a recognition that the artwork cannot transcend aesthetic 
concerns to realize this promise of happiness, an aporia of art which has only 
sharpened over time. If Dada is commended retrospectively for its clear-
sightedness in violently rejecting art on the basis of that falsity, its artistic 
legitimacy is still strictly limited, with its negation of meaning presumably 
falling short of the standard of a critical reflection of the general tendency 
towards meaninglessness. In my view, Adorno misreads the movement in crucial 
respects, and his scepticism about politically motivated art, combined with his 
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investment in aesthetic autonomy, prevent him from grasping the full 
significance of anti-art, which also has implications for his own aesthetics. 
 
Dada Contra Adorno 
 
 In this chapter, I have reconstructed Adorno’s interpretation of Dada, 
building on his scattered remarks about the movement. These are supplemented 
by a wide range of examples of its creative practice, introduced to complete and 
complicate that picture. He mainly focuses on the techniques of montage, sound 
poetry and abstract art, to which have been added accounts of its performances, 
manifestos and found sculptures, as well as other experiments in a variety of 
media. His characterization of the movement as a spontaneous and chaotic 
destructive force coincides with the established art-historical narrative criticized 
by Dickerman and Hutchinson. For Adorno, Dada is concerned primarily with 
shock, an effect it seeks to generate by enacting the destruction of the unified 
subject and the unified artwork, in collages and photomontages that violently 
reconstitute traditional and popular source material. His model of alienating 
infantilism is unable to accommodate the diversity of tactics in fact adopted by 
the movement in pursuit of its objective of shocking the bourgeoisie, nor does he 
emphasize sufficiently its critical relation to the popular culture which is 
mobilized against pure culture as part of that endeavour. He incorrectly identifies 
subjective expression as the main motivation for Dada, an error evident from his 
repeated conflation of it with Expressionism. The refusal to be bound by the 
discipline of a consistent artistic style is falsely construed in terms of an 
unchecked overflow of the experience of suffering, an accusation of one-
sidedness which recurs in his discussions of the movement. Its sound poetry is 
said to deny the irreducible discursive component of language to embrace an 
unattainable ideal of absolute expression, while its abstract art supposedly strives 
towards an equally chimerical dimensionless point of pure subjectivity, 
paradoxes neatly encapsulated by the interpenetration of extreme specificity and 
contentless generality in the deictic gesture. He overstates the importance of 
subjective expression to the movement, and neglects the ways in which it 
critically interrogates the categories of subjectivity and expression. This bias 
affects his evaluation of the negation of meaning, which is treated reductively as 
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conditioned by the expressive impulse, and further misrepresented as a form of 
anarchic destruction, when in reality it is often self-conscious and relatively 
systematic. On the face of it, Adorno is unfairly dismissive of Dada. However, I 
believe that there is scope to derive an alternative interpretation from the 
comments collected here, which would draw out the ambiguities in his position, 
and cast the movement in a more favourable light. 
Continuing with the focus on music, I will distil this summary into a 
playlist of the compositions cited in connection with Dada by Adorno: 
Stravinsky’s Renard and The Solider’s Tale; Brecht and Weill’s The Threepenny 
Opera and Mahagonny; Krenek’s Second Symphony; and Cage’s Piano 
Concerto. These are all by figures about whom he is sharply critical in a number 
of places, though interestingly he tends to accord greater artistic legitimacy to the 
pieces of theirs that he considers proximate to Dada. In particular, the Stravinsky 
of Renard and The Solider’s Tale and the Brecht and Weill of The Threepenny 
Opera and Mahagonny are praised for their thoroughgoing negativity, 
repudiating respectively the ideals of authenticity and aesthetic totality, and 
claims to social and political validity, illusions they are said to affirm at other 
points in their careers. Stravinsky is described as “preoccupied with 
considerations of effect”, while Weill is credited for his “social-polemic 
impact”.330 This imputed preference for political effect over political resonance, 
or alternatively social impact over social import, is thought to carry with it an 
increased risk of recuperation, and it is the degree of negativity they are able to 
maintain which guards against such an outcome, with more critical force 
attributed to surrealistic music than objectivist music on that basis. Generally, 
Adorno is sceptical of art which pursues a political end or attempts to bring about 
social change, and even when it is restricted to producing an effect of alienation, 
or relies solely on the impact of infantilism, the same perceived problems arise. 
We might be tempted to explain the partial exceptions made for The Threepenny 
Opera and Mahagonny, and to a lesser extent Renard and The Solider’s Tale, by 
pointing to the correspondence between the thoroughgoing negativity he 
identifies in these works and the central role played by negation in his own 
dialectical method, a negative orientation also shared by Dada. In relation to 																																																								
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Brecht and Weill, Adorno states that this uncompromising attitude extends to the 
repudiation of aesthetic autonomy, a stance which has ramifications for his 
aesthetic theory. 
Turning to Krenek’s Second Symphony and Cage’s Piano Concerto, I 
want to emphasize the singular status granted to these compositions, noting that 
their creators do not fit easily within Adorno’s account of the evolution of 
advanced art. Krenek’s experimental disposition, his refusal to be confined to a 
set artistic trajectory, conflicts with a model that asserts the absolute necessity of 
free atonality at a certain historical stage. He later progressed to a version of 
twelve-tone technique, debating it in correspondence with Adorno, but diverged 
from that path with his jazz-influenced opera Jonny Plays [1927], anticipating 
the populist style of The Threepenny Opera and Mahagonny.331 Cage’s aleatory 
and indeterminate music is arguably the antithesis of the integrated and closed 
works produced within the dodecaphonic system, though like them it is deeply 
rooted in the immanent development of the musical material. He was radically 
opposed to integral serialism as well, notwithstanding the ultimate convergence 
of chance and determination as extremes which is posited by Adorno. 
Nevertheless, Second Symphony and Piano Concerto seem to exercise a peculiar 
power for him, originating in qualitatively unique aesthetic experiences. As a 
young man he attended an early performance of the first piece in Kassel in 1923, 
a year before he met Krenek. It is reported to have made a profound and lasting 
impression on him, and he strives to capture the initial sense of shock in his 
subsequent reflections highlighting the “vehemence” and “explosive force” of 
Second Symphony.332 In Quasi una Fantasia, Adorno recalls a similarly 
significant encounter with Piano Concerto in Cologne in 1958: “I was […] 
deeply moved by a single hearing of Cage’s Piano Concerto played on Cologne 
radio, though I would be hard put to define the effect with any precision. Even at 
the best of times precise definition is anything but straightforward with works of 
this kind.”333 Of course, Adorno’s difficulty in defining the effect of Piano 
Concerto, and in adequately conveying the impact of Second Symphony, is bound 
up with the enigmaticalness of art, and as such essential to aesthetic experience. 																																																								
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We might still speculate whether his hesitation in the face of these works 
suggests that on some level he intuits the fundamental challenge to his 
framework of aesthetic judgement which they represent, a critical potential also 
latent in Dada. Indeed, Adorno implies that their peculiar power may be 
attributed in part to this very capacity to unsettle his model of advanced art. 
The key concept here is anti-art, a semi-submerged theme of Adorno’s 
interpretation of Dada. In my reading, I have sought to bring it to the surface, 
following the lead taken by Hutchinson. Via the association with middle-period 
Stravinsky and the collaborations of Brecht and Weill, Adorno recognizes the 
thoroughgoing negativity of the movement, but in my view he does not 
appreciate the full extent of it, as manifested in the self-critical turn of anti-art. 
He acknowledges that the anti-artistic orientation is a distinctive feature of Dada, 
but it is treated almost as accidental, falling out of the attempt to eliminate 
discursive meaning from language, when it is introduced in “Presuppositions”. 
Highlighting the link with the Surrealists, Aesthetic Theory contains a qualified 
endorsement of their anti-art, locating its truth content in the justified rejection of 
an art that is incapable of realizing its utopian potential as praxis, an insight they 
inherited from Dada. Identifying the movement as an antecedent of Cage, Quasi 
una Fantasia again concedes a measure of artistic legitimacy to anti-art, arguing 
in a typically nuanced fashion that it should not simply be dismissed, any more 
than it ought to be celebrated uncritically. In both instances, Adorno depicts the 
anti-artistic project as a failure, with its oppositional capacity quickly exhausted 
or neutralized, increasingly so given the limited scope for resistance under 
advanced capitalism. By comparison, Dadaist anti-art is implicitly granted a 
greater degree of critical force, largely due to the urgency and direction conferred 
by its alleged political orientation, less obviously untenable in that different 
historical context, which is thrown into relief by the focus on recuperation. 
Drawing on Bürger, I have proposed that the movement can be better understood 
as grounded in a critical awareness of the institutionality of art, and it is on this 
level that its true political resonance or social import crystallizes, through the 
incorporation of art-institutional mechanisms into the play of aesthetic elements 
making up the artwork. If it is reconstellated in this way, Adorno’s interpretation 
of Dada reveals its moment of truth, which is the artistic legitimacy accorded to 
it on account of the thoroughgoing negativity of its anti-artistic orientation. This 
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aspect of the movement in turn calls into question some of his central 
assumptions, a critical insight which in my view he fails to reckon with fully. 
 At the end of the previous chapter, I set out a preliminary assessment of 
Adorno’s blindnesses, which would provisionally seem to have been confirmed 
by my reconstruction of his interpretation of Dada. To recapitulate, Adorno fails 
to give sufficient weight to the critical potential of popular culture vis-à-vis pure 
culture, especially with regard to the strategic incorporation of elements of the 
former into the domain of the latter that was widely practised by the historical 
avant-garde. The appetitive and instrumentalizing modes of attention associated 
with the culture industry can be embodied by the figures of the voluptuous and 
the partisan, evoked respectively by the critically inflected populism and the 
politically motivated anti-art which he attributes to the Dadaists. He does not 
appreciate the full complexity of their relationship with popular culture, which is 
reciprocally negated through avant-garde experimentation at the same time as it 
is mobilized against pure culture. He also misunderstands the nature of their 
political orientation, which by engaging the art-institutional dimension operates 
more on the level of social import than social impact. His model of advanced art, 
privileging the formally autonomous artwork, is insufficiently negatively 
mediated by these excluded modes of attention, which refuse aesthetic autonomy 
by insisting that art have a purpose, such as pleasure or commitment. The 
Dadaists further violate aesthetic autonomy by integrating their critical relation 
to the institution of art into the inner-aesthetic nexus in which meaning consists, 
thereby negotiating the dialectic of the aesthetic and the social in a different 
manner than he envisages. Their manipulation of art-institutional mechanisms 
demands an expansion of his conceptions of aesthetic experience and aesthetic 
form, a need which has already been identified through my immanent analysis of 
his aesthetic theory. That development is blocked by his investment in aesthetic 
autonomy, also the principle underpinning the traditional aesthetics of the 
bourgeois institution of art, which he sets himself against, but with which he 
shares a Kantian inheritance. He repeatedly redescribes the negation of meaning 
as meaningful, which is in practice a defensive manoeuvre, deflecting its critical 
charge. He evaluates anti-art using the same framework of aesthetic judgement 
as it attacks, thereby reasserting the ultimate priority of aesthetic autonomy, even 
as he recognizes its ideological aspects. This bolsters his conception of aesthetic 
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meaning as the dynamic mutual interaction of the elements of a formally 
autonomous artwork, as well as the concentrated and immersive engagement 
which he advocates as appropriate to advanced art, rather than accentuating the 
pressure brought to bear on them by anti-art. In these respects, Adorno’s 
blindnesses can be seen to have contributed to his misreading of the movement, 
and the alternative interpretation gestured towards here suggests some areas to be 
explored in greater detail in the next chapter, which contains case studies of the 
Cabaret Voltaire, Duchamp’s Fountain and the First International Dada Fair. 
Once again circling around the figure of the philistine, I will probe deeper into 
the relationship with popular culture, the manipulation of art-institutional 
mechanisms, and the disruption of the dominant modes of attention, to complete 
this process of reimagining Dada contra Adorno.
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Dada’s Philistine: 
The Destruction of Art by Artistic Means 
 
 
Before further elaborating my interpretation of Dada, I should briefly 
gloss the concept of the institution of art, which has already been introduced, but 
takes on greater prominence here. This preparatory note is an extremely 
truncated overview of its theoretical development, marking out the broad 
contours of a provisional definition, which is further refined in the course of the 
chapter through case studies foregrounding the art-institutional dimension of the 
movement. The institution of art was first explicitly theorized as such within the 
discipline of analytic philosophy, in classificatory exercises conducted by Arthur 
Danto and George Dickie.1 They separately set themselves the task of identifying 
what is specifically aesthetic about the artwork, both solving that puzzle with 
reference to an artworld which has the power to confer aesthetic status. Danto 
highlights participation in an aesthetic discourse comprising art theory and art 
history, while Dickie puts more stress on institutions and practices, though 
neither of them provides much concrete detail concerning the structure of the 
institution of art.2 Their accounts are abstract and apolitical, especially compared 
to the alternative put forward by Bürger. Emerging from the traditions of critical 
theory and the social history of art, Theory of the Avant-Garde traces the 
evolution of the institution of art over time, from sacral art through courtly art to 
bourgeois art, with the last of these fully established by the end of the eighteenth 
century, reaching its apogee with programmatic aestheticism a hundred years 
later. It is characterized by the increasing detachment of art and life, and the 																																																								
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creation of a specialized sphere of aesthetic experience, which set the stage for 
the self-reflexive critique of the institutionality of art by the historical avant-
garde, in particular the Dadaists. This narrative has been criticized as 
insufficiently empirically grounded, and the category of life is left largely 
untheorized, but a critical consciousness of art as an institution is indeed key to 
understanding the movement. Combining Danto’s emphasis on aesthetic 
ideology with Dickie’s focus on actual institutions, Bürger states that the 
institution of art encompasses the dominant ideas in circulation which shape the 
production and reception of artworks, as well as distribution apparatuses like the 
publishing industry and the gallery system, however he does not really expand on 
that high-level summary.3 
If we shift discipline again, Bourdieu furnishes us with a more complex 
model of the institution of art in his sociological writings on art and culture, 
among other texts Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste 
[1979] and “The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World 
Reversed” [1983].4 The field of cultural production is said to be relatively 
autonomous from the fields of power and class relations, which nevertheless 
contain and condition it. It is internally divided into a field of large-scale 
production which is subject to heteronomous principles of legitimacy imposed by 
the market, and a field of restricted production which relies on autonomous 
principles of legitimacy like recognition from respected peers. The former is 
equivalent to the culture industry, while the latter contains the realm of the avant-
garde, a sub-field that is itself constituted by the struggle between the opposed 
factions of the emerging avant-garde and the consecrated avant-garde, according 
to Bourdieu.5 He shows little interest in individual artworks except as examples, 
tending to generalize to an overarching account of the institution of art. In what 
follows, Bürger and Bourdieu are used selectively as sources for a vocabulary to 
describe the art-institutional dimension of Dada, without adopting wholesale 
their externally oriented paradigms, or wholly displacing immanent analysis with 
attention to the social functions served by art. These few figures obviously do not 																																																								
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exhaust the theorization of the institution of art, which has also yielded valuable 
insights into how institutional spaces construct art and its audience, and a 
growing body of research on the economics of art and the question of value, 
including a recent book-length contribution by Beech.6 In this chapter, I touch on 
some of these aspects of the topic where they are relevant to my argument, but 
do not pretend to a systematic theory of the institution of art, instead approaching 
that concept principally via its instantiation in Dadaist anti-art. 
 
The Philistine Against Philistinism 
 
According to Tzara, Dada’s central objective was the “destruction of art 
by artistic means”.7 This phrase is suggestive of the paradoxical position of the 
anti-artist, who is opposed to the institution of art, but operates inside it, aiming 
to effect its immanent negation. The resources of artistic practice and aesthetic 
discourse are mobilized to undermine their own conditions of existence. This 
self-critical turn extends to the activity of the anti-artist, who reflects on their 
position in relation to the institution of art, and attempts to destabilize that nexus 
of the aesthetic and the social from within. The destruction of art by artistic 
means is concentrated in the Dadaist against Dada. This formulation appears 
often in their body of work, where it is intended to convey the uncompromising 
character of their negation of the aesthetic, setting themselves against all art 
including their own. For example, Tzara announces in his “Dada Manifesto on 
Feeble Love and Bitter Love” [1920]: “Antidadaism is a disease […] But the real 
Dadas are against DADA.”8 The Dutch Dada Tour undertaken by Schwitters and 
Theo van Doesburg, respectively associated with Merz and Constructivism, was 
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styled as anti-Dadaist.9 In Zagreb, Virgil Poljanksi, a member of the leading 
avant-garde movement there known as Zenitism, produced an anti-Dadaist 
manifesto for the spoof magazine Dada-Jok, which parodies this approach and in 
fact exactly reproduces its logic under the title “Dada Antidada” [1922].10 The 
complement to this auto-destructive dynamic is the pose of the philistine against 
philistinism. This variant of the anti-artist is itself comprised of two components, 
which are inherently contradictory. The philistine is frequently invoked as an 
object of abuse by members of the movement, such that this figure might seem to 
be the principal target or ideal audience for their interventions and provocations. 
This tendency is countered by the anti-artist inhabiting the role of the other of art, 
adopting many of the traits commonly attributed to the philistine. The term is 
even applied as a self-description in the titles of Dadaist pieces like Grosz’s 
Twenty-Four Dada Philistines [Dada-Spiesser] Climbing a Pudding [c.1920], 
and his collaboration with Heartfield The Philistine [Spiesser] Heartfield Run 
Wild [1920]. In this chapter, I explore the destruction of art by artistic means, 
with reference to the Dadaist against Dada and the philistine against philistinism.  
The theorization of the philistine against philistinism is derived from 
Leslie’s “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset” [2002], the only contribution to 
the philistine controversy which gives sustained attention to Dada. Bull’s “The 
Ecstasy of Philistinism” and Beech and Roberts’ “The Philistine and the Logic of 
Negation” both touch on the movement, and these arguments are rehearsed 
below. Her analysis is more extensive in this regard, though it is largely 
restricted to Berlin Dada. She places the movement in a tradition of anti-
philistinism which is recognizably German, descending from Romanticism 
through Expressionism. The Dadaists denounce culture as the true bearer of 
philistinism, while themselves willingly taking on the mantle of the philistine: 
 
In one guise, the philistine is the Dadaist and appears as traditional art’s 
undoing, the vanquisher of value. The philistine Dadaist, mobilized under 
the banner of anti-art, trashes the transcendent claims for art voiced by 
academy artists, some of whom were Expressionists who had themselves 																																																								
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been motivated by the traditional Romanticism-tinged anti-philistine 
impulse. In another guise, the anti-artist unmasks the defence of art as the 
real philistinism, for it turns out to be a defence of property. The Dadaist 
is the philistine against philistinism.11 
 
Discussing Grosz and Heartfield, as well as Höch and Hausmann, and more 
tangentially to Dada Willi Baumeister, Leslie concentrates on the techniques of 
collage and photomontage developed during WW1 and the Weimar Republic, 
and later deployed covertly for purposes of cultural resistance under Nazism. She 
sees the cutting up of mass-produced images as an iconoclastic gesture, a direct 
intervention in ideological mystifications in order to reconstitute them critically. 
The Dadaists’ tendency to reuse their own work as source material for collages 
and photomontages is described as self-corrective, and explicitly connected to 
the figure of the Dadaist against Dada: “It is as if the Dada practice – which is, in 
effect, a philosophy or ideology – of alteration of found materials (or correction 
of reality) has to spill over into Dada’s own productions, rendering them truly 
provisional, non-eternal, subject to revision. Dadaists were, of course, anti-
Dadaists.”12 
As evidence of the double-sided construction of the philistine against 
philistinism, Leslie cites a short text by Hausmann, published in the second issue 
of the little magazine Der Dada, “The German Philistine [Spiesser] Gets Upset” 
[1919].13 This polemic begins with a question as to the identity of the philistine, 
while making clear that they exist in an antagonistic relationship with Dada: 
“Who is the German philistine [Spießer] that he should be upset by dadaism?”14 
The answer comes immediately that it is the “German writer” and the “German 
intellectual”, recalling Nietzsche’s cultivated philistine.15 Hausmann’s chief 
representative of this type of philistinism is the Expressionist Herwath Walden, 
who ran the journal Der Sturm, and the associated Galerie Der Sturm: “[A] 
typical German philistine [Spießer] who believes it necessary to wrap his 
																																																								
11 Leslie, “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”, p.204. 
12 Ibid., p.208. 
13 Ibid., pp.209-210. 
14 Hausmann, “The German Philistine Gets Upset”, p.482. 
15 Ibid., p.482. 
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transactions in a Buddhistic-bombastic little cloak.”16 The purported proximity of 
the spiritual and the transactional within culture is reinforced by the ironic salute 
to Walden’s “business genius”, and by the critique of Expressionism as a “small, 
profitable war industry” and the “aesthetic harmonization of bourgeois notions of 
property”. 17 Hausmann’s anti-artistic rhetoric extends beyond an intra-avant-
garde attack on the Expressionists to encompass culture as such: “[W]e do not 
give a hoot for culture, which was no tangible affair. We wish an end to it and 
with it an end to the philistine writer [Spiesserdichter], the manufacturer of ideals 
that were nothing but its excrement.”18 The philistine is here located at the heart 
of culture, to which they are conventionally opposed, not merely because art has 
been contaminated by contact with the commercial, but rather because art serves 
on a more fundamental level as an aestheticization of and justification for 
capitalism. The Dadaists’ deep-seated antipathy towards art, couched in terms of 
anti-philistinism, leads them to adopt the persona of the philistine, thereby 
fulfilling the role of the philistine against philistinism. 
The related concept of the Dadaist against Dada makes a number of 
appearances in “The German Philistine Gets Upset”. Early on in this text, 
Hausmann warns the German philistine “not [to] attack us”, because “we are 
already our own enemies”, exclaiming: “Dada! For we are – anti-dadaists!”19 He 
aligns the movement with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, adopting the 
attitude towards art attributed to the former, said to be clear-sighted about the 
fact that this realm of activity emanates from and serves the interests of the 
latter.20 This prompts a far-reaching repudiation of the aesthetic, including its 
concepts of beauty and feeling, the metaphysical associations of which are 
undercut by equating them with a quotidian item of food: “And we are anti-
dadaists to such an extent that when some fellow among us wants to exhibit 
something beautiful or aesthetic – a securely bounded good little feeling – we 
will knock his well-smeared sandwich out of his hand into the garbage.”21 There 
is a logic of escalation at work, which pushes to an extreme the principle of 
opposition to the institution of art, culminating in the self-critical turn of the anti-																																																								
16 Ibid., p.482. 
17 Ibid., p.482. 
18 Ibid., p.483. 
19 Ibid., p.482. 
20 Ibid., p.483. 
21 Ibid., p.483. 
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artist. It is part of an ongoing process of deaestheticization, to which Hausmann 
is committed as a self-declared Dadaist against Dada: “And we are anti-dadaists 
because for us the dadaist still possesses too much feeling and aesthetics.”22 This 
double-sided construction is complementary to that of the philistine against 
philistinism, and these positions taken together articulate the thoroughgoing 
negativity of the movement. 
As noted above, Leslie discusses iconoclasm as a stylistic principle, 
focusing on the destructive rather than the constructive aspects of collage and 
photomontage. On the cover of the same issue of Der Dada, Hausmann places a 
collage of images and text, including the word “Spiesser!”23 As it appears in this 
context, “Spiesser!” is not typographically identical to any use of it overleaf in 
“The German Philistine Gets Upset”, the closest match in size, format and choice 
of “ss” or “ß” being the final slogan appended to the statement: “Down with the 
German philistine [Spiesser]!”24 Hausmann has incorporated into this collage 
various excerpts from his own publications, and the resemblance between these 
two instances of the term on successive pages of the magazine gestures towards 
the same procedure. This might be understood as a form of self-portrait through 
self-mutilation, turning the symbolic violence of the technique on the artist, an 
impression reinforced by the presence of his name among the fragments, next to 
the truncated title of his essay “The Notion of Property in the Family and the 
Right to Own One’s Body” [1919]. The collage also draws on the manifesto he 
co-authored with Huelsenbeck, “What is Dadaism and What Does It Want in 
Germany?” [1919], which had been included in the first issue of Der Dada.25 In 
being seen to cut up his own work and previous issues of the magazine, 
Hausmann visibly assimilates iconoclasm as a stylistic principle, consistent with 
the pose of the philistine against philistinism argued for by Leslie, though she 
does not analyse this collage in “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”. 
She does however cite “The Art Scab” [1920], another polemical text by 
Grosz and Heartfield, published in a radical leftist magazine with close links to 
Dada, Der Gegner. Writing in the immediate aftermath of violent clashes 																																																								
22 Ibid., p.483. 
23 Raoul Hausmann, [Collage] [1919], Der Dada 2: 
http://sdrc.lib.uiowa.edu/dada/derdada/2/index.htm [accessed 16 April 2019], cover. 
24 Raoul Hausmann, “Der deutsche Spiesser ärgert sich”, Der Dada 2 (1919): p.1; Hausmann, 
“The German Philistine Gets Upset”, p.483. 
25 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, pp.101-102. 
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following the Kapp Putsch, Grosz and Heartfield launch an attack on the 
Expressionist Oskar Kokoschka, branding him an “Art Scab”. Based in Dresden, 
Kokoschka had sent a letter to forty newspapers the previous month, appealing to 
revolutionaries on left and right to ensure that their political activities did not 
endanger cultural artefacts: “Certainly the German people will later find more 
joy and meaning in these preserved pictures than in the collected views of the 
politicized Germans of today.”26 This conservative call to preserve the cultural 
heritage came in response to news that during fighting in the city a stray bullet 
had damaged Peter Paul Rubens’ Bathsheba at the Fountain [1635] in the 
Zwinger Museum.27 By contrast, Grosz and Heartfield react to this incident 
enthusiastically: “With joy we welcome the news that the bullets are whistling 
through the galleries and palaces, into the masterpieces of Rubens, instead of into 
the houses of the poor in the working-class neighbourhoods!”28 For Grosz and 
Heartfield, Kokoschka’s apolitical stance is obviously untenable in this charged 
context, but his ascription of elevated status and enduring significance to cultural 
artefacts is also theoretically suspect. They extend the critique of culture as an 
elite pursuit dependent on the extraction of surplus value through the exploitation 
of the proletariat, and as a propaganda apparatus for the bourgeoisie, promoting 
its ideology, distracting the opposition, and beautifying an unjust society. This 
political position underpins their support for iconoclasm. 
In addition, Leslie highlights the instances of actual art vandalism, 
directed at reproductions of consecrated artworks, which were perpetrated by the 
Dadaists: “[D]esecration of reproductions was as close as the Dadaists got to 
effecting their manifesto pledges of destroying art.”29 The First International 
Dada Fair included examples of “corrected masterworks” by Grosz and 
Heartfield. Pablo Picasso, The Happy Life: Corrected Masterwork! [1920], a 
photomontage based on a reproduction of Girl’s Head with Small Bird [1913], is 
																																																								
26 Oskar Kokoschka, cited in Grosz and Heartfield, “The Art Scab”, p.484; Sabine T Kriebel, 
“Radical Left Magazines in Berlin: Die Pleite (1919, 1923-4); Der Gegner (1919-22); Der 
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Europe 1880-1940, ed. by Peter Brooker, Sascha Bru, Andrew Thacker, Christian Weikop 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.842. 
27 Kriebel, “Radical Left Magazines in Berlin”, p.842. 
28 Grosz and Heartfield, “The Art Scab”, p.485. 
29 Leslie, “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”, p.209. 
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mentioned in “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”.30 She might also have 
listed, among other pieces in the exhibition: Hausmann’s An Old Masterwork 
[c.1920], which corrected Rubens’ Bacchanal [1615]; Grosz’s Disregard of a 
Masterwork by Botticelli [c.1920], in which he literally crossed out Primavera 
[c.1482]; and, going still further back in art history, a series of “improved 
masterworks of classical antiquity” by Rudolf Schlicter.31 There is of course a 
reference in the article to the most famous act of iconoclasm associated with 
Dada, a version of which was exhibited at the First International Dada Fair, but 
which was originally executed in Paris by Duchamp: L.H.O.O.Q. [1919], a 
postcard of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa [c.1503-1506], to which he added in 
black pencil a moustache and goatee beard, as well as the otherwise meaningless 
letters of its title, which when read aloud sound like “Elle a chaud au cul [She 
has a hot ass]”.32 These interventions conjure up the image of the philistine as an 
art-smashing brute.  
In summary, Leslie argues that the Dadaists give expression to their anti-
artistic orientation by mobilizing the philistine, while the culture to which they 
are opposed is itself denounced as a bastion of philistinism. They adopt the 
posture of the philistine principally through their embrace of iconoclasm, which 
might take rhetorical form in their manifestos, symbolic form in their collages 
and photomontages, or concrete form in their vandalism of artworks. They want 
to destroy art because they understand it to be deeply invested in the current 
social order, a creation of the bourgeoisie which ultimately defends the idea of 
private property. They accuse art of philistinism on this political basis, but their 
own identification with the philistine consists in the prioritization of politics over 
aesthetics, according to Leslie. She maps out this complex of relations, which 
comprises the philistine against philistinism: 
 
Heartfield, Grosz and Hausmann have reversed the conventional meaning 
of philistine. The philistine is not the person who dislikes art or cannot 
comprehend culture. The philistine is not the destroyer of artworks. The 
philistine is the culture lover, the one who believes in art and its power. 																																																								
30 Ibid., p.208. 
31 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, pp.240-241. 
32 Leslie, “Philistines and Art Vandals Get Upset”, p.208. 
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This belief in art, though, was unmasked as self-interest. The philistine is 
the art lover who is able to worship art because he is cushioned 
financially, and because in elevating art, his spiritual commodity, he 
boosts his own investment. The Dada artist, in the guise of anti-artist, is 
the anti-philistine as philistine: all values are questioned in the face of 
unvarnished political positions.33 
 
With this reference to “unvarnished political positions”, Leslie’s narrow focus on 
Berlin Dada becomes apparent, and we might ask whether it limits the 
applicability of her theorization of the philistine against philistinism. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Dadaists in this context sometimes made an 
explicit commitment to revolutionary communism part of their programme, but 
many members of the movement remained politically unaffiliated, and in other 
branches the greatest affinity was with individualist anarchism. For example, 
Duchamp’s correction of the Mona Lisa is not overtly politically partisan in the 
way envisaged here, though he undoubtedly seeks to puncture the pretensions of 
the bourgeois cult surrounding this painting. In my opinion, it is Dada’s critical 
relation to the institution of art, rather than its positive political identifications, 
which is the key to apprehending its social import. This interpretation is still 
compatible with the theorization of the philistine against philistinism. 
 In this chapter, I do not exhaustively enumerate all the uses of the term 
“Philistine” by the Dadaists. Instead, I examine how different versions of this 
figure map onto their anti-artistic practice, drawing on contributions to the 
philistine controversy, as well as the dialectical conception which emerged from 
my immanent analysis of Adorno’s aesthetic theory. First, I consider the notion 
of the philistine as wholly appetitive, a consumer partaking of popular pleasures. 
The next part of the chapter deals with the philistine as peculiarly insensitive, 
defined by their inability or unwillingness to differentiate between art and non-
art. Finally, Dada’s philistine is interpreted as a destructive force, with regard to 
the dominant modes of attention to art. These variants of the philistine are 
evaluated in terms of their compatibility with the immanent negation of art, a 
model previously developed in relation to Adorno. The appetitive, insensitive 																																																								
33 Ibid., p.211. 
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and destructive aspects of the philistine are separated out here for explanatory 
purposes, explored in case studies focusing on specific instances of Dadaist anti-
art in which they are particularly prominent, respectively the Cabaret Voltaire, 
Duchamp’s Fountain and the First International Dada Fair. There are however 
cross-references to the other characteristics of the philistine dotted throughout 
the chapter, testifying to the fact that they are in practice always combined, 
though in varying proportions. They are also subsumed under the formulation of 
the philistine against philistinism, in which the anti-artist adopts whichever of 
these features of the philistine might best disclose the philistinism of the 
institution of art. It is on this art-institutional level that the full political 
significance of the movement becomes apparent, as the self-reflexive critique of 
the institutionality of art engages indirectly with the wider social structures in 
which it is embedded. In the concluding section of this chapter, I pit this 
understanding of Dada’s philistine against Adorno’s model of culture, art and 
aesthetics. 
 
Culture 
 
POPULAR PLEASURES 
 
 As we have seen, Beech and Roberts’ “Spectres of the Aesthetic” 
inaugurated the main phase of the philistine controversy, including disputes with 
Bernstein and Bowie, over the contested legacy of Adorno. However, Roberts’ 
“Mad For It!” was the starting point for another strand of debate, comprising 
rows with Stallabrass and Home, about the aesthetic and political value of the 
YBAs. He focuses in particular on the art collective Bank, among whose 
members was Beech. He defends their attitude towards mass culture – which 
they accept as a shared context within which they work and their output is 
received – as a corrective to the perceived censoriousness and sterility of the 
previously hegemonic institutional critique. He praises them for not simply 
reverting to blurring the boundary between high and low art, said to be a 
redundant theme since postmodernism. 34 By contrast, Stallabrass was a trenchant 
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critic of the YBAs, depicting them as facile, relativistic and vulnerable to 
recuperation.35 “Phoney War” [1997] accuses Roberts of pandering to the anti-
theoretical tendency among contemporary artists, by inserting into his own 
overtly theoretical writing superficial gestures of allegiance to the popular.36 
Stallabrass continues to speak against the theorization of the philistine as a 
justification for the YBAs in High Art Lite: The Rise and Fall of Young British 
Art [1999], where he disparagingly dubs Beech and Roberts the “Clement 
Greenbergs of Fuck Suck Spank Wank”, alluding to an artwork with that title by 
Sam Taylor-Wood.37 Separately, Home also took issue with “Mad For It!” in 
“The Art of Chauvinism in Britain and France” [1996]. He argues that 
postmodernism has not in fact dissolved the distinction between high and low art, 
but instead has reinstated it surreptitiously with the faux democratization of 
culture represented by the YBAs.38 Roberts responded with “Home Truths” 
[1996], in turn eliciting another broadside from Home, “From Arse to Arsehole: 
John Roberts and the Spectres of Philistinism” [1997].39 In truth, Beech and 
Roberts’ approach to the question of philistinism and populism is more complex. 
They are at pains to distinguish their model of the philistine from the postmodern 
celebration of mass culture in two subsequent essays, “Tolerating Impurities” 
and “The Philistine and the Logic of Negation”. 
 “Tolerating Impurities” contends that philistinism cannot be equated 
definitively with a particular class or social group, any more than it should be 
imagined as the undifferentiated repository of all the exclusions of aesthetic 
discourse. The latter interpretation is attributed to the anti-artists who have taken 
on the mantle of the philistine over the years, including Duchamp.40 It is 
suggested that a more nuanced version of the philistine, opposed to both populist 
and elitist conceptions of art, might offer a solution to the impasse in the debate 
between cultural studies and critical theory, about mass culture conceived either 
as a site of resistance or as a mechanism of subjugation. This dispute can be 
traced back to the exchange between Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age 																																																								
35 Julian Stallabrass, “In and Out of Love with Damian Hirst”, New Left Review 1.216 (1996): 
pp.153-160. 
36 Stallabrass, “Phoney War”, pp.15-16. 
37 Stallabrass, High Art Lite, pp.118-124.  
38 Home, “The Art of Chauvinism in Britain and France”. 
39 Roberts, “Home Truths”; Home, “From Arse to Arsehole”.  
40 Beech and Roberts, “Tolerating Impurities”, pp.130-132. 
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of its Technological Reproducibility” [1936] and Adorno in “On the Fetish 
Character in Music and the Regression of Listening” [1938]. That legacy has 
since polarized into a crude dichotomy of consumers seen as passive recipients 
of dominant ideology on the one hand, or as active agents of radical change on 
the other, according to Beech and Roberts. The critical theorists attack the output 
of the culture industry, but from a position which leaves them open to the charge 
of elitism, whereas cultural studies exerts itself to uncover the potential for 
resistance in these productions, but in doing so is insufficiently critical. 
“Tolerating Impurities” desires a critical stance that does not entail elitism, and 
points to the philistine as the vehicle for realizing it.41 
 In “The Philistine and the Logic of Negation”, Beech and Roberts clarify 
that their opposition to the new aestheticism does not automatically ally them 
with postmodernism. This entails once again correcting the impression that their 
conception of the philistine is no more than a modification of the postmodern 
challenge to the hierarchy of high and low art. They assert that their use of this 
figure is instead intended to disclose how all cultures, whether dominant or 
dominated, are ultimately violated by that relation of domination. The negation 
of the dominant culture, through recourse to the dominated culture, is 
characterized in dialectical terminology as a bad sublation. What is required is 
the negation of the social division underlying the dynamics of domination, but it 
is precisely this primary violation that is obscured by postmodernism. The 
promotion of marginalized cultural forms, and the incorporation of what has 
previously been excluded from the definition of art, are criticized for merely 
bringing about the symbolic resolution of secondary violations. By contrast, 
Beech and Roberts make the primary violation of social division central to their 
notion of aesthetic autonomy. The autonomy of art is said to be predicated on its 
immanent permeation by non-art, and the philistine is therefore advantageously 
positioned to give an account of violation as the basis of the aesthetic subject. 
They argue that the philistine contains the violation suppressed by the 
postmodern emphasis on inclusivity, and must be mobilized to reintroduce the 
dynamics of social division into the debate.42 
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There is an unevenness to their depiction of the philistine, across their 
contributions to the philistine controversy from “Mad For It!” to “The Philistine 
and the Logic of Negation”. They later stress that their version of this figure is 
anti-populist as well as anti-artistic, but the early texts come much closer to 
uncritically affirming popular pleasures than they would like to admit, including 
at times in “Spectres of the Aesthetic”. “The Philistine and the Logic of 
Negation” attempts to sharpen the distinction between philistinism and populism 
with a consideration of the avant-gardist philistine, giving as an example Dada: 
“What was philistine about Dada was not its immersion in popular pleasures but 
its systematic negation of art and aesthetic values. […] Art drained of artisticness 
is a model of philistinism that invariably produces the nonpopular – unpopular, 
even – because it is based on self-violation and violation, not on the inclusion or 
assimilation of the culturally “other”.”43 They exclude populist elements from 
their interpretation of the movement, instead highlighting the anti-artistic stunts 
of Duchamp, Picabia and Tzara. Dada did in fact mobilize a critically inflected 
populism, as an integral part of its anti-artistic project. This aspect of its creative 
practice is not necessarily about disclosing the underlying dynamics of social 
division, but neither is it just a question of championing the forms marginalized 
by the bourgeois institution of art. In my view, Dada’s philistine is appetitive, as 
well as insensitive and destructive, and the following case study examines the 
role played by cabaret with that supposition in mind. 
 
CABARET VOLTAIRE 
 
 Let us now focus on a key example of Dada’s engagement with popular 
culture, which to a certain extent remains the template for subsequent 
manifestations of its populist orientation, but is also atypical in one important 
respect, discussed further below.44 The Cabaret Voltaire was established by 
Hennings and Ball in Zurich, soon after they had fled from Germany to neutral 
territory to escape WW1. This was the context in which the enterprise was 
undertaken, against the backdrop of a conflict actively opposed by them both. It 																																																								
43 Ibid., pp.290-291. 
44 In what follows, I draw on my analysis of the Cabaret Voltaire in Ingram, “Songs, Anti-
Symphonies and Sodomist Music”, pp.4-6. 
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was in operation for six months between February and July 1916, during which 
time it served as the official birthplace of Dada, notwithstanding independent 
developments in New York. A regular performance troupe of émigrés quickly 
coalesced around the two founders, comprising Arp, Huelsenbeck, Janco and 
Tzara. They infused the cabaret with the spirit of the avant-garde, drawing 
inspiration from other movements, with innovations such as simultaneous poetry 
and sound poetry, primitivist chants, masked dances, and a bruitist nativity play. 
This was however only a portion of the material presented, which generally has 
been given disproportionate emphasis in Dada scholarship. There is a tendency 
to relegate the less obviously radical contributions to the margins, despite their 
quantitative preponderance. These popular songs and canonical works, and the 
myriad idiosyncratic acts facilitated by the open stage policy, in my opinion 
deserve greater attention, as does the overall approach to the programme at the 
Cabaret Voltaire. Though it may appear at first sight to embrace popular culture 
in a relatively uncomplicated way, Dada’s populism is actually much more 
ambitious than a straightforward endorsement, attempting to effect the 
destruction of art by artistic means, by pitting one sector of the field of cultural 
production against another. 
 The Cabaret Voltaire largely conformed to the cabaret format, with a 
commitment to variety, and a prominent role for popular music. There were 
cabaret chansons, folk ballads and soldiers’ songs, as well as recitals of works by 
established composers such as Claude Debussy, Franz Liszt, Sergei 
Rachmaninoff and Camille Saint-Saëns. A notice in the press announcing the 
venture highlights its musical dimension, alongside the expected emphasis on 
literature: “The idea of the cabaret will be that guest artists will come and give 
musical performances and readings at the daily meetings. The young artists of 
Zurich, whatever their orientation, are invited to come along with suggestions 
and contributions of all kinds.”45 This ethic of inclusivity, partly born of 
necessity with only three days until the first night, translated into the open stage 
policy, which gave rise to a wide range of acts. These included dancing banjo 
and mandolin players, an impromptu balalaika orchestra, and a socialist choir, as 
well as diverse poetry and prose, readings of famous authors and amateur 																																																								
45 Cited in Ball, Flight Out of Time, p.50. 
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offerings by members of the audience. This extreme heterogeneity, in particular 
the mix of aesthetic seriousness with light-hearted entertainment, was itself 
intended to be iconoclastic. In his diary, Ball makes this point with reference to 
Voltaire, a touchstone for iconoclasm who ironically also represents the 
denigrated culture of the Enlightenment: “The ideals of culture and of art as the 
programme for a variety show – that is our kind of Candide against the times.”46 
This juxtaposition of high and low forms diminishes the status of the former 
through the elevation of the latter, in the process exceeding the limits of 
legitimate taste. The Dadaists violate the sanctity of the aesthetic realm by 
bringing it into contact with popular culture, thereby protesting against the 
broader social situation, in which the institution of art is implicated. 
Acclaimed in a contemporary review as the “star” of the Cabaret 
Voltaire, Hennings performed popular songs, usually accompanied on the piano 
by Ball.47 The most celebrated of their collaborations is probably “Dance of 
Death” [1916], Ball’s bitter anti-war poem parodying the drinking song “This is 
How We Live”, which she delivered with a cheery demeanour to the jaunty 
military tune “The Old Dessauer”: “This is how we die, this is how we die. / We 
die every day, / Because they make it so comfortable to die.”48 This jarring of 
registers, the satirical purpose of which is clear, underlines the fact that the 
function of popular music was not simply to provide relief from the more 
challenging material at the Cabaret Voltaire. In addition to the incongruous 
combination of form and content here, Hennings’ subversive intent was also 
evident in her unconventional style of performance, as acknowledged, somewhat 
patronisingly, by Richter: “[H]er performances were not artistic in the traditional 
sense, either vocally or as interpretations. Their unaccustomed shrillness was an 
affront to the audience, and perturbed it quite as much as did the provocations of 
her male colleagues.”49 Hennings’ unsettling shrill voice is confirmed in other 
sources, along with a reported repertoire of obscure gestures.50 She played with 
the expectations of the audience, defamiliarizing familiar forms through avant-
garde experimentation, even as the critical force of populism was mobilized in 																																																								
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opposition to a narrowly defined musical tradition. The effect of this approach is 
to collapse the hierarchical distinction between art music and popular music, in 
such a way that both sides are transformed by their interpenetration. At the 
Cabaret Voltaire, Dada’s anti-artistic orientation is expressed primarily through 
the destabilization of the canon, but it extends to a self-reflexive critique of the 
populist methods used to secure that destabilization as well. 
 We can understand this dynamic in terms of the philistine against 
philistinism, where the embrace of popular culture may be taken as evidence of 
an appetitive philistinism, but is itself subject to an anti-artistic orientation which 
might be characterized as philistine. It goes beyond mixing high and low forms, 
and applying a critical attitude to both sides, as it works on the art-institutional 
level as well, with the movement situating itself in a venue outside the rarefied 
world of pure culture. As Debbie Lewer has written, the Cabaret Voltaire was 
based in a backroom at a Dutch bar and restaurant called the Holländische 
Meierei, in the insalubrious Niederdorf quarter of Zurich. This area was known 
for its many drinking establishments, with entertainment including singers, 
dancing girls and freak shows. The clientele at the cabaret, charged only a small 
cloakroom fee to enter, would have been overwhelmingly male, mainly working-
class or students, and more likely than not drinking heavily. It was undoubtedly a 
rowdy atmosphere, with a transitory and variable crowd, to which the open stage 
policy added a further layer of unpredictability.51 Subsequent soirées organized 
by the core group excluded this unplanned element, taking place in the 
comparatively staid art gallery setting of the Galerie Dada, and at upmarket 
concert halls like the Zunfthaus zur Waag, the Zunfthaus zur Meise and the 
Kaufleutensaal. It is arguable how far this shift in milieu, with the movement 
now occupying the consecrated spaces of the bourgeoisie, in fact sharpened its 
iconoclastic edge, as suggested by Lewer.52 The radicalism of the reverse 
approach, bringing the innovations of the avant-garde into the realm of 
entertainment, ought not to be underestimated either. Regardless of which 
position one favours, I would maintain that this art-institutional dimension is the 
																																																								
51 Debbie Lewer, “From the Cabaret Voltaire to Kaufleutensaal: “Mapping” Zurich Dada”, in 
Crisis and the Arts, Volume 2, pp.47-51, pp.53-54. 
52 Ibid., p.46, pp.52-55. 
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most distinctive aspect of the engagement with popular culture during the initial 
phase of Dada. 
 
THE APPETITIVE PHILISTINE 
 
 In my view, Beech and Roberts are mistaken in progressively excluding 
the voluptuous from their theorization of philistine, and also in denying the 
importance of a critically inflected populism to Dada. The appetitive philistine, 
incorporating the voluptuous, may serve as the symbolic representation of this 
variant of anti-art, which violates official taste with recourse to mass-produced 
entertainment, and applies non-sanctioned modes of attention derived from that 
sphere to advanced art. This sense of philistinism can be traced back to the class-
based animosity of seventeenth-century town and gown disputes and the “hollow 
gut” of Goethe, but it comes to prominence in the twentieth century as part of the 
elitist backlash against the rise of the culture industry, as summarized in the 
Introduction.53 Despite often being accused of such elitism himself, Adorno 
actually rarely describes the masses in this way, and his principal focus is the 
cultivated philistine, conforming to a more conventional characterization of the 
philistine as bourgeois. As with the voluptuous in Beech and Roberts, Adorno’s 
treatment of the vulgarian is uneven, but ultimately dismissive. He portrays them 
as a consumer whose archetypal disposition towards the artwork is to eat it, 
distinguishing this degraded form of aesthetic experience from the art-alienness 
of the philistine. His use of the latter term does not preclude the appetitive aspect 
entirely though, as he sometimes evokes the imagery of eating the artwork in 
relation to philistinism as well. I have suggested that it would be better to follow 
his practice rather than his theory on this point, and choose not to maintain too 
strictly the distinction between the vulgarian and the philistine. The appetitive 
philistine, incorporating the vulgarian, stands for the critical potential of popular 
culture vis-à-vis pure culture. My first case study has explored this component of 
Dadaist anti-art in the specific context of the Cabaret Voltaire. 
In the last chapter, I reconstructed Adorno’s interpretation of Dada, on 
the basis of the limited textual evidence available. One theme clearly emerging 
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from his comments about contemporary composers, who are tangentially linked 
to the movement, concerns its relationship with popular culture. This realm is 
used as a source for montages, in the service of an alienating infantilism, 
according to Adorno. The familiar is made strange through deformation and 
juxtaposition, generating an uncanny effect which he argues has a critical 
mimetic function. As we have seen, the Dadaists do engage extensively with 
popular culture, not least at the Cabaret Voltaire. Their populism includes the 
selection of material for collages, photomontages and assemblages, but it extends 
to other techniques and media as well, in particular the songs and jazz which 
dominate their musical output. The enthusiastic embrace of heteronomous forms 
is fairly common among avant-garde movements at the time, as a reaction to the 
development of the culture industry. That populism is given a negative character 
and incorporated into the anti-artistic project by the Dadaists. Adorno perhaps 
focuses too narrowly on montage, but he is right to highlight how popular culture 
is critically reconstituted rather than simply endorsed by the movement. The 
concept of alienating infantilism is however unable to encapsulate the full 
complexity of this relationship. Crucially, Adorno’s interpretation largely 
overlooks the art-institutional dimension of Dada. 
There are undoubtedly moments when the sphere of entertainment 
appears to be uncritically celebrated by the movement, but even these instances 
necessarily involve a transgression of the hierarchical structure of the field of 
culture. By virtue of their positioning as part of the avant-garde, the Dadaists 
belong to the domain of pure culture, or the field of restricted production. They 
nevertheless recognize the complicity of that system with the unjust organization 
of society, most evident in the class character of its opposition to popular culture, 
or the field of large-scale production. Their response is a self-critical turn, 
attacking the institution of art by mobilizing popular culture against pure culture, 
exploiting the critical potential of the former to disclose the exclusions which are 
constitutive of the latter. This iconoclastic impulse, intersecting with an ethic of 
inclusivity, motivates the mix of high and low art at the Cabaret Voltaire. The 
Dadaists continue to adopt the cabaret format for their performances in other 
locations, with the programmes often including popular music, humourous skits 
and variety acts alongside the more obviously radical material. The elements of 
popular culture which they assimilate are themselves subject to the 
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thoroughgoing negativity of the anti-artistic orientation, typically presented with 
some ironic distance, in ways which impede straightforward consumption. The 
full range of techniques of distortion developed by the avant-garde is applied to 
negate folk forms and the productions of the culture industry, as with the 
subversive strategies deployed to that end by Hennings. This is a reciprocal 
negation, working in both directions, with the elevated diminished, and the 
familiar defamiliarized. It is therefore more than a mere celebration of popular 
culture, and it also goes beyond simply blurring the boundary with pure culture, 
to invoke two criticisms which we have seen levelled at postmodernism. 
Theorizing Adorno’s philistine with and against the rival versions of this 
figure which are put forward by Beech and Roberts and Bull, I described them as 
embodying the immanent negation of art, which can now be read as the 
immanent negation of the institution of art. In terms of its relationship with 
popular culture, Dada’s distinguishing feature at the outset was its institutional 
location, the fact that it was actually based within the milieu of cabaret. The 
movement later shifted strategy, bringing heteronomous forms into the art 
galleries and concert halls of pure culture. There was first an attempt to escape 
the institution of art, by moving into another sector of the field of cultural 
production. This was followed by an attempt to undermine the institution of art, 
staying inside its confines but importing material from elsewhere. It has been 
proposed that the interventions in consecrated spaces are superior in this regard, 
because they directly confront their target. There is though much to be said for 
the counter-position that the original approach constitutes a more emphatic 
repudiation of pure culture. In this interpretation, the Cabaret Voltaire represents 
a fundamental breach with the institutional basis of high art, albeit one which is 
short-lived and incomplete. The earlier strategy was never entirely given up: 
Tokyo Dada showed its works and staged manifestations in the streets; Cologne 
Dada held an exhibition in a public tavern; Paris Dada brought its performances 
to establishments dedicated to the leisure and education of the working class.54 
However, Dada’s appetitive philistine is arguably able to mobilize the 
oppositional force of popular culture only to the extent that it separates itself 
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Liberation”, p.52; Sanouillet, Dada in Paris, pp.111-114. 
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from pure culture, and it therefore resembles not the immanent negation of art, 
but the non-immanent negation of art, earlier attributed to Bull. 
 
Art 
 
ART AND NON-ART 
 
As Beech and Roberts write in “Spectres of the Aesthetic”: “Given that 
no one attends to art without sensitivity or knowledge at all – but with different 
sensitivities and knowledge – the constitutive insensitivity of philistinism must 
be a particular form of insensitivity: namely, of being insensitive to what is 
established as appropriate to art.”55 The insensitivity of philistinism, which 
corresponds to the failure or refusal to recognize the distinction between art and 
non-art, is often taken to be its defining feature. In “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, 
Bull elaborates on the same aspect of the concept, drawing on the typology of 
objects in Michael Thompsonʼs Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction 
of Value [1979]. The three main types of object enumerated in this book are 
those with a value that is durable and increases over time, for example antiques; 
those with a value that is transient and decreases over time, for example 
commodities; and those with no value whatsoever, for example rubbish. Bull’s 
philistine contends neither that the durable aesthetic value of consecrated 
artworks is in fact transient, nor that the transient aesthetic value of mass-
produced entertainment should be elevated to the status of timelessness at their 
expense, but rather that all objects are permanently aesthetically valueless. The 
implication is that there is no specifically aesthetic basis on which we might 
differentiate objects from one another, or make comparative judgements about 
them.56 Bull emphasizes how total this perspective is for the philistine: “[T]he 
idea that other people might discern aesthetic differences between objects and 
evaluate them accordingly would seem intrinsically absurd.”57 He construes the 
philistine as the direct and absolute negation of art and aesthetics. By contrast, 
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56 Bull, “The Ecstasy of Philistinism”, pp.50-51. 
57 Ibid., p.51. 
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Beech and Roberts’ philistine is imagined relationally, as reiterated with regard 
to sensitivity and knowledge in “Spectres of the Aesthetic”. 
For Bull, Dada does not quite conform to his model of the philistine: 
 
Dada certainly gave expression to the philistine impulse, but although its 
rhetoric was vigorously anti-aesthetic, what actually happened in the 
creation of a ready-made was something that had the transient aesthetic 
value of a machine-produced object or was even an object of no value at 
all was then treated as though it were a durable of lasting aesthetic value. 
It is therefore misleading to suggest that the ready-made says “art is 
junk”; what it says is only that “junk is art”.58 
 
Given his focus on the question of art and non-art, Bull’s choice of the 
readymade as an example of Dadaist activity is hardly surprising, as this form of 
sculpture seems particularly well suited to illuminating the peculiar insensitivity 
of the philistine to aesthetic value. His assessment of the movement does 
however fall short of this aim, according to the criteria he has established. The 
Dadaists do not actually deny the status of art, instead merely extending the 
application of this category to objects constituted non-artistically, according to 
Bull. He describes this as the “inclusive extrapolation of value”, as opposed to its 
“direct negation”, criticizing the “promiscuous pan-aestheticism of Dada”, as an 
inversion of the “absolute negation of the aesthetic”.59 
 “The Ecstasy of Philistinism” continues: 
 
To demonstrate that art is junk, Dada would have had to work in the 
opposite direction. Duchamp certainly contemplated this: “At another 
time, wanting to expose the basic antinomy between art and “ready-
mades”, I imagined a reciprocal ready-made: use a Rembrandt as an 
ironing board.” However, neither he nor the other Dadaists did so, and the 
museums of the world were never turned into laundry rooms. In 
consequence, although art galleries are now filled with objects that might 
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have been taken from rubbish tips, rubbish tips remain barren of objects 
taken from art galleries.60 
 
The reciprocal readymade is here treated as a special type of iconoclasm in the 
literal sense of art vandalism, where artworks are repurposed as everyday 
functional items, or even discarded as rubbish. It involves essentially the same 
transgression of the boundary between art and non-art as with the regular 
readymade, only this time in reverse. Bull takes this difference to be decisive, 
judging the revaluation of art as non-art properly philistine, while disqualifying 
the assertion that non-art is art which he ascribes to Dada. This interpretation of 
the readymade overlooks how, regardless of the direction of the transgression, its 
effect is to focus critical attention on the policing of the boundary between art 
and non-art.  
In “The Philistine and the Logic of Negation”, Beech and Roberts also 
invoke the readymade, identifying it with the philistine. They claim that the 
introduction of non-art as art is anti-art, which suspends conventional ideas of the 
artwork and the artist, and demands new modes of attention from the spectator.61 
As already established, I consider their version of the philistine to be 
insufficiently negative, as they understand its impact on the norms of the 
institution of art to be transformative rather than destructive. For his part, Bull is 
wrong to present this figure as an external force acting on the aesthetic sphere, 
instead of as its immanent negation. He is right to insist on the uncompromising 
negativity of the philistine, though he denies this quality to Dada. His brief 
account of the movement is much more critical than the similarly cursory 
assessment in “The Philistine and the Logic of Negation”. There, Beech and 
Roberts have no hesitation in incorporating Dada into their model of the 
philistine.62 “The Ecstasy of Philistinism” does not share this positive attitude, 
but the two texts do coincide in their misconception that the philistine is simply 
affirmed as an ideal by the movement. In fact, Dada has a more complex 
relationship with this concept, as we saw above with the double-sided 
construction of the philistine against philistinism in Leslie. In any case, Bull’s 																																																								
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62 Ibid., pp.290-294. 
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typology of objects is hardly the best framework within which to address the 
problematic of art and non-art, because it does not give enough emphasis to the 
art-institutional mechanisms by which aesthetic status is secured. The result is 
that the readymade is taken at face value as asserting that “junk is art”, or 
alternatively for the reciprocal variant “art is junk”. In what follows, I develop a 
different interpretation, which takes as its point of departure the inability or 
unwillingness to distinguish between art and non-art embodied by the insensitive 
philistine. 
 
FOUNTAIN 
 
 Of all his readymades, Duchamp’s Fountain, a porcelain urinal set on its 
back, is the most well-known, and will serve as our second case study, informed 
throughout by the historical research of William A Camfield.63 It is actually a 
fairly unusual example, in that this mass-produced item was designated an 
artwork with the intention of having it exhibited, unlike most of the other 
readymades, which at the time were displayed only in his studio.64 The attempt to 
insert the object into the gallery system is in my estimation an important part of 
any adequate account of it, which ought not to be artificially circumscribed to a 
narrow consideration of the physical thing. There have been many interpretations 
emphasizing its formal features, comparing it to other artworks on that level, and 
grafting onto it religious, psychoanalytic and sexual symbolism based on visual 
cues.65 These critics can sometimes appear faintly ridiculous, as if they have 
themselves become the butt of the joke, by being drawn into statements that are 
bathetically undercut by the object itself. In my opinion, Fountain is inherently 
unsuitable as a subject for immanent analysis, conducted solely in terms of its 
inner-aesthetic properties, because it explicitly engages its extra-aesthetic 
institutional context. This dimension is integral to its meaning, requiring a 
reading which goes beyond the aesthetic structure internal to the sculpture, to 																																																								
63 William A Camfield, “Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain: Its History and Aesthetics in the Context 
of 1917” [1987], in Marcel Duchamp: Artist of the Century, ed. by Rudolf Kuenzli and Francis 
M Naumann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989), pp.64-94. In what follows, I also 
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64 There were a few exceptions, as noted in Camfield, “Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain”, p.66, p.87. 
65 For a typical argument in favour of an “aesthetic” reading of the readymade, see: Camfield, 
“Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain”, pp.79-86. 
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incorporate the institutional structure enframing it. The assertion of non-art as art 
necessarily directs us to the forces within the field of culture which have the 
power either to accept or reject that claim to legitimacy. With Fountain, 
Duchamp makes this procedure the substantive content of an artwork. He is not 
merely highlighting the aesthetic qualities of a functional item, elevating the 
everyday to the status of art. This is no positive message of creative liberation, 
promoting the idea that anything can be art, and that therefore anyone can be an 
artist. Rather, Fountain prompts us to focus critically on the art-institutional 
mechanisms which confer recognition on artworks as such. 
In the spring of 1917, Duchamp purchased a urinal from an ironworks 
showroom in New York, added the pseudonym and date “R. Mutt 1917”, and 
under that name submitted it to the inaugural exhibition of the Society of 
Independents. He was himself one of the directors of this organization, recently 
established by supporters of the cause of modern art in the USA. The 
Independents imposed no restrictions on the right to exhibit, other than the 
payment of a nominal membership fee, a measure designed to guarantee artistic 
freedom. This submission was nevertheless rejected by a majority of the board 
members present at a hastily convened meeting, a decision which led to the 
resignation of Duchamp, along with his fellow director and major patron Walter 
Arensberg.66 The Independents thereby served as a proxy for the power of the 
institution of art as a whole, as he tested the limits of its supposedly democratic 
selection criteria, revealing how the policing of aesthetic value was still in 
operation behind that progressive front. It is perhaps significant that he chose to 
attack a branch of the institution of art to which he belonged, dedicated to the 
promotion of the emerging avant-garde. Although he was not affiliated with the 
movement at the time and always maintained a certain distance from it, 
Duchamp with this act epitomizes the auto-destructive logic of the Dadaist 
against Dada. Relatedly, Fountain suggests philistine insensitivity to the 
difference between art and non-art, in opposition to the philistinism of the 
institution of art, thereby fulfilling the role of the philistine against philistinism. 
Working with collaborators, Duchamp effectively staged the exclusion of 
the urinal from the institution of art as a spectacle. This spectacle itself depended 																																																								
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on art-institutional mechanisms to function, making use of the network of 
patrons, independent galleries and little magazines which usually sustain 
emerging avant-gardes. After it was recovered from the Independents, Fountain 
was moved to the 291 Gallery, where it was photographed by Alfred Stieglitz. 
His picture appeared in the little magazine The Blind Man, edited by Duchamp, 
Henri-Pierre Roché and Beatrice Wood. The exhibition tag of the rejected 
sculpture is visible in the bottom-left corner of the carefully composed image, 
which is presented alongside the caption: “THE EXHIBIT REFUSED BY THE 
INDEPENDENTS”.67 On the opposite page, Wood’s unsigned defence of the 
readymade likewise dramatizes its rejection by the Independents: “They say any 
artist paying six dollars may exhibit. Mr. Richard Mutt sent in a fountain. 
Without discussion this article disappeared and never was exhibited.”68 There is 
also a longer text arguing in favour of Fountain by Louise Norton, and a poem 
dedicated to Richard Mutt by Charles Demuth.69 In addition to this material 
promoting the sculpture to the relatively narrow artworld and high-society 
readership of The Blind Man, Duchamp’s resignation from the Independents 
generated sufficient controversy to attract some coverage in the mainstream 
press, another tactic typical of emerging avant-gardes.70 His intervention 
therefore exemplifies the destruction of art by artistic means, understood as the 
destruction of art as an institution by art-institutional means. 
Soon after the events recounted here, Fountain was either mislaid or 
destroyed, disappearing into obscurity for over thirty years, notwithstanding 
Breton’s efforts to promote it.71 From 1950 to 1964, Duchamp authorized a 
number of replicas of the urinal, with the largest batch manufactured rather than 
purchased, modelled as closely as possible on the version in the photograph by 
Stieglitz.72 This approach might appear to be at odds with the spirit of the 																																																								
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sculpture, which problematizes the notions of authorship and the original 
seemingly fetishized here. In fact, Duchamp further developed the initial idea, 
provoking another artworld scandal with his challenge to the myth surrounding 
the lost artwork that was propagated by the neo-avant-garde. The multiples 
facilitated its circulation within the network of galleries and museums to which it 
had famously been denied entry, while the artisanal turn pushed back against its 
established meaning as a mass-produced item. The physical reproduction of the 
sculpture was coterminous with its discursive reproduction, which accompanied 
the resurgence of interest in Dada and Duchamp in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
volume of scholarly commentary on this object has risen exponentially since 
then, and it has now been firmly installed in the canon, variously as an icon of 
the avant-garde, the ultimate anti-artistic gesture, and the beginning of 
conceptual art. The recuperation of the sculpture does not consist in the 
assimilation to the field of culture of an object previously located outside of it, 
but more precisely in its transition from the sub-field of the emerging avant-
garde to that of the consecrated avant-garde, within the field of restricted 
production. The significance of the readymade is that it makes visible and calls 
into question the power of the network of institutions, discourses and practices 
which imbue objects with aesthetic value. This attack on the institution of art was 
always internal to it, itself drawing on the art-institutional resources available, an 
insight which might prompt us to reconfigure the over-rehearsed narrative of 
resistance and recuperation. We could ask whether the sculpture continues to 
fulfil the same function, even as its position within the field of culture, and 
indeed the structure of that field as a whole, are transformed over time. 
Arguably, Fountain retains its critical force after its alleged recuperation, insofar 
as it still points to the extra-aesthetic institutional context conditioning its 
aesthetic status, by its very presence in galleries and museums casting doubt on 
the processes which have conferred such critical and commercial approbation on 
what is still, on one level, a urinal. 
 
THE INSENSITIVE PHILISTINE 
 
 As we have seen, Beech and Roberts consider the insensitivity of the 
philistine to be constitutive of the category, and certainly this assertion is well 
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established in its history. The Introduction referred to insensitivity to the beauty 
of nature, to sweetness and light, and to the aesthetic, but it is also consistent 
with the general portrayal of this figure as obtuse, incurious and imperceptive. 
The OED defines the philistine as “hostile or indifferent to art and culture”, with 
no mention of insensitivity.73 As in Adorno’s description of the “assaults of 
Dadaism” as “hostile to art and culture”, I would ascribe hostility chiefly to the 
destructive philistine, while indifference is best represented by the cultivated 
philistine who responds to radical art by shrugging that they do not understand 
it.74 These both sound like attitudes consciously or unconsciously adopted, 
whereas insensitivity is naturalized as a fundamental incapacity, as with the 
association of this figure and blindness. The philistine simply cannot perceive 
what is beautiful, illuminating or specifically aesthetic about an artwork, and the 
distinction between art and non-art is therefore not operative for them. It is on 
this basis that they are identified as the absolute negation of art and aesthetics, as 
compared to the vulgarian and the dilettante, who represent degraded forms of 
aesthetic experience. This emphasis on the thoroughgoing negativity of the 
insensitive philistine is echoed by Bull, though he disputes that their critical 
potential is successfully harnessed by either Adorno or Dada. In my opinion, 
Adorno’s dialectical conception of the philistine is superior to his, though it does 
require further theoretical development. Dada’s insensitive philistine will now be 
assessed in relation to Fountain. 
In his analysis of the movement, Adorno barely alludes to the 
readymades, despite their radical refusal of the distinction between art and non-
art, paying more attention to the opposition of expression and meaning, which 
for him reflects the double nature of language. The Dadaists are accused of 
denying this underlying reality, seeking to establish through their sound poetry a 
realm of absolute expression in the field of literature. This tendency has its 
analogue in the field of visual art, where he describes the drive to greater 
abstraction as an attempt to realize a condition of pure subjectivity. In advance of 
my case study of Fountain, I cited a number of counterexamples, which already 
went some way to demonstrating how this interpretation is limited. Bull’s 
reading has the advantage of setting aside the alleged primacy of subjective 																																																								
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expression, of which we see little evidence in the readymades. Fountain is not 
concerned with conveying the inner emotional state of the empirical person who 
is its creator, but rather with exploring how the marker of the name of the artist 
functions within the field of culture. The centrality of the artist to the production 
of meaning is challenged, and indeed this figure is made into a caricature, 
reduced to their minimal symbolic representation as a signature, with the slightly 
comical invented name “R. Mutt”. Duchamp’s gesture might be understood as 
buttressing the status of the creator, as he appears to exercise the power of 
asserting that non-art is art, but crucially this claim is contested, and it is the 
institution of art which settles it.  
Arguably, Adorno is himself insensitive to the self-reflexive critique of 
the institutionality of art which is central to my alternative interpretation of Dada. 
As acknowledged above, Fountain is relatively atypical in that it was produced 
with exhibition in mind, but the other readymades also intersect with the art-
institutional dimension in various ways, whether by mimicking the classical 
arrangement of sculpture and base by mounting a bicycle wheel on a stool in 
Bicycle Wheel [1913], or with the iconoclastic addition of facial hair to the Mona 
Lisa in L.H.O.O.Q. The point of such interventions is not to broaden the range of 
material which may be appropriated for the aesthetic sphere, nor even to assert 
that consecrated masterpieces in fact have no lasting value, contrary to the 
opposition set up by Bull. Instead, Duchamp’s readymades disclose the 
otherwise invisible functioning of the institution of art, specifically its arbitration 
of the question of art and non-art. His professed indifference to the aesthetic 
qualities of the functional items he selected for readymades reinforces the 
impression that strictly formal considerations have been supplanted by a focus on 
the art-institutional mechanisms which guarantee its status as art.75 These 
become part of its integral structuration, the multi-directional play of elements 
which constitutes its meaning. Adorno neglects that art-institutional dimension, 
perhaps because he relies on too narrow a conception of form, bracketing off the 
extra-aesthetic institutional context. 
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His philistine, fully realized in the manner set out earlier, represents the 
immanent negation of art, or the immanent negation of the institution of art. On 
the basis of this case study, Dada’s insensitive philistine does not fully succeed 
in achieving that sublation. With the preceding analysis, I have shown how the 
critique of the institution of art which the readymade represents remains internal 
to its target, utilizing the art-institutional resources of the emerging avant-garde. 
This has led me to propose a modification to histories of the reception of the 
sculpture which are couched in terms of resistance and recuperation. Departing 
from this explanatory framework, I have suggested that there may be no 
fundamental shift in the way the readymade operates as it moves from the sub-
field of the emerging avant-garde to that of the consecrated avant-garde. What 
has changed, in this reading, is only the configuration of the institutional 
complex to which it directs our attention. It continues to fulfil this critical 
function, by virtue of its location on the boundary of art and non-art, a liminal 
position reaffirmed by the coexistence of urinals installed in the exhibition space 
and in the male toilets at contemporary galleries. However, I want to stress that 
this proposed interpretation of the recuperation of the sculpture ought not to be 
taken as an unqualified endorsement. The relatively smooth transition of the 
object to the status of a renowned artwork should instead alert us to the question 
of how resistant it ever was to the institution of art. From this perspective, 
Fountain makes no serious attempt to transcend the aesthetic sphere, preferring 
to subject it to an attack from within which falls short of effecting the destruction 
of art by artistic means. If this is correct, Dada’s insensitive philistine is closer to 
the immanent non-negation of art, previously associated with Beech and Roberts. 
 
Aesthetics 
 
MODES OF ATTENTION 
 
 In the three essays making up the core of their contribution to the 
philistine controversy, Beech and Roberts repeatedly return to the modes of 
attention which official culture designates appropriate to art, and the alternative 
forms of engagement which they associate with the philistine. For the latter, 
“Spectres of the Aesthetic” uses the phrase “inexpert modes of attention”, 
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without defining these much beyond their opposition to the modernist norm of 
the “deferral of happiness”.76 This insight about the refusal of the postponement 
of pleasure is attributed to Frederic Jameson, who discusses the importance of 
the philistine to the aesthetic theory of Adorno in Late Marxism: Adorno, Or, 
The Persistence of the Dialectic [1990].77 At this stage in the development of 
their theorization of the philistine, Beech and Roberts are still folding into it the 
figure of the voluptuous, with an emphasis on bodily gratification which 
becomes less prominent as their position is further refined.78 Signalling an 
ambition to go into greater detail in a future essay, “Tolerating Impurities” for 
now lists “distraction, dissipation, relaxation and idle thrills”, and gives examples 
of ““inalert” and leisurely forms of attention associated with TV viewing, radio 
listening, movie going, watching football and sex-shop browsing”.79 There is 
also a reference to the philistine adopting “disparaged modes […] such as Kant’s 
“appetite” and Adorno’s “distraction””.80 Although the shift from a typological 
figure to a set of practices is intended to guard against too restrictive an 
identification with particular classes or social groups, Beech and Roberts clearly 
draw inspiration from the realm of popular culture for their sense of philistine 
modes of attention, as well as directly negating aesthetic discourse.81 Finally, 
“The Philistine and the Logic of Negation” cites the “appetitive and partisan 
spectator of art”, as counterpole to the “bourgeois notion of the disembodied 
beholder”.82 Tony Bennett’s Culture: A Reformer’s Science [1998] is the source 
of a discussion of the role played by nineteenth-century cultural institutions in 
regulating the conduct of the public, prohibiting behaviour such as picnicking in 
museums and running through galleries, in order to train the working class in the 
bourgeois values of detachment and self-discipline. Beech and Roberts 
reinterpret that historical moment as a missed opportunity for the 
democratization of art, and for the liberation of philistine modes of attention.83 
																																																								
76 Beech and Roberts, “Spectres of the Aesthetic”, pp.43-44. 
77 Ibid., p.43; Jameson, Late Marxism, pp.151-154.  
78 Beech and Roberts, “Spectres of the Aesthetic”, pp.45-46. 
79 Beech and Roberts, “Tolerating Impurities”, pp.159-160. 
80 Ibid., p.157. 
81 Ibid., pp.156-157. 
82 Beech and Roberts, “The Philistine and the Logic of Negation”, p.284. 
83 Ibid., pp.282-286. 
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This concept requires clearer definition than it is given in their essays, a task for 
which we might consult Bourdieu. 
In Distinction, Bourdieu provides an empirically grounded description of 
the dominant modes of attention, which are dubbed the “pure gaze” or the 
“aesthetic disposition”.84 This way of appropriating an object is bourgeois, 
established as dominant and therefore normative by the power of that class. It is 
shaped by the distance from necessity which is the privilege of economic 
security, resulting in an orientation towards life based on the values of the 
“gratuitous” and the “disinterested”.85 The principal model is the attitude of the 
aesthete, naturalized as a “quasi-creative power which sets the aesthete apart 
from the common herd by a radical difference which seems to be inscribed in 
“persons””.86 This perspective is applied outside the aesthetic sphere, as a 
“generalized capacity to neutralize ordinary urgencies and to bracket off practical 
ends”.87 The most distinctive feature of the pure gaze is a preoccupation with 
form, according to Bourdieu: 
 
The aesthetic mode of perception in the “pure” form which it has now 
assumed corresponds to a particular state of the mode of artistic 
production. An art which, like all post-Impressionist painting, for 
example, is the product of an artistic intention which asserts the absolute 
primacy of form over function, of the mode of representation over the 
object represented, categorically demands a purely aesthetic disposition 
which earlier art demanded only conditionally. The demiurgic ambition 
of the artist, capable of applying to any object the pure intention of an 
artistic effort which is an end in itself, calls for unlimited receptiveness of 
the part of an aesthete capable of applying the specifically artistic 
intention to any object, whether or not it has been produced with aesthetic 
intention.88 
 
																																																								
84 Bourdieu, Distinction, pp.20-24, pp.26-27, pp.42-55. 
85 Ibid., p.48. 
86 Ibid., p.23. 
87 Ibid., p.47. 
88 Ibid, p.22. 
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This might put us in mind of the readymades, which can be read as exercising the 
capacity of the pure gaze to transform objects not constituted artistically into 
artworks, provided that the institutional character of the aesthetic disposition and 
its interaction with other art-institutional mechanisms are taken into account. 
These found sculptures also prioritize form over function, by transposing 
functional items into the aesthetic realm, where they will be assessed in formal 
terms, though once again this should be an expanded concept of aesthetic form 
incorporating the art-institutional dimension. The privileging of form here refers 
to a shift in focus away from the thematic content of artworks, and from the 
social functions they fulfil, instead emphasizing their specifically aesthetic 
features, understood in terms of an intrinsic history of art, and a synchronic 
universe of other artworks. Bourdieu’s aesthete is further characterized by 
distance and detachment, which are the guarantee of distinction. 
Criticizing Bourdieu in “Tolerating Impurities”, Beech and Roberts assert 
that philistinism cannot be understood through sociological analysis, even with a 
method as relational and reflexive as his. He is accused of redescribing the 
absence of taste as the presence of alternative tastes, when according to them the 
philistine is not otherly cultured, but emphatically uncultured. This figure may be 
identified with any number of classes or social groups, but they should be 
defined chiefly by the negation of the dominant modes of attention. The 
philistine is conceptualized as a real absence, derived from a refusal of legitimate 
taste, rather than based on an affirmation of marginalized perspectives.89 By 
contrast, Bourdieu locates the pure gaze within a conflictual field of perceptual 
frameworks which correspond to different class positions, presenting it as the 
inverse of the popular aesthetic in its anti-Kantianism: 
 
It is no accident that, when one sets about reconstructing its logic, the 
popular “aesthetic” appears as the negative opposite of the Kantian 
aesthetic, and that the popular ethos implicitly answers each proposition 
of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” with a thesis contradicting it. In order 
to apprehend what makes the specificity of aesthetic judgement, Kant 
ingeniously distinguished “that which pleases” from “that which 																																																								
89 Beech and Roberts, “Tolerating Impurities”, pp.132-133. 
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gratifies”, and, more generally, strove to separate “disinterestedness”, the 
sole guarantee of the specifically aesthetic quality of contemplation, from 
“the interest of the senses”, which defines “the agreeable”, and from “the 
interest of Reason”, which defines “the Good”. By contrast, working-
class people, who expect every image to fulfil a function, if only that of a 
sign, refer, often explicitly, to norms of morality or agreeableness in all 
their judgements.90 
 
The Kantian maxim of disinterested contemplation prohibits the perspectives of 
the voluptuous and the partisan, associated respectively with bodily pleasure and 
cultural contestation. Bourdieu ascribes these attitudes to the working-class 
philistine, who is counterposed to the bourgeois ideal of a disembodied spectator. 
This recalls the class basis of the opposition of pure culture and popular culture, 
as distinct from the dialectic of art and its other, which as we have seen is largely 
an intra-bourgeois struggle for Adorno. Beech and Roberts’ insistence on an 
approach which treats philistinism as a construct of aesthetic discourse, instead 
of searching for analogues in empirical reality, is belied by the popular models 
they adopt for their version of philistine modes of attention. We might however 
hypothesize a philistine gaze, which negates the values behind the pure gaze, 
without substituting for them judgements made on the basis of morality and 
agreeableness, or for that matter vague invocations of popular culture. 
 From Beech and Roberts’ inchoate formulation of the philistine gaze, I 
would pick out the themes of appetite and partisanship, while noting that the 
bodily gratification linked to the voluptuous retreats from view as their 
theorization of the philistine is developed. This figure is said to reject the 
bourgeois value of political neutrality as well, but the question of partisanship 
does not actually feature much in their account of philistine modes of attention, 
whereas the prioritization of politics over aesthetics is central to the anti-artistic 
orientation for Leslie. She ascribes a political motivation to the Dadaists’ 
embrace of iconoclasm, seeing their opposition to aesthetic autonomy as 
informed by a commitment to revolutionary communism, and their collages and 
photomontages as correctives to the dominant culture embedded in the source 																																																								
90 Bourdieu, Distinction, p.33. 
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material. Beech and Roberts set themselves against Adorno’s insistence on 
concentrated engagement, and the submission of the self to the logic of the 
artwork. They turn to the distraction and relaxation which he associates with the 
culture industry, promoting inalertness and leisureliness over self-discipline and 
detachment. Bourdieu enables us to delineate the pure gaze with greater 
precision, confirming that distance and disinterestedness, adding to it a 
preoccupation with form, and the widespread application of this perspective 
outside the aesthetic sphere. The philistine gaze might instead be constructed on 
the basis of its direct negation of aesthetic discourse, central to which would be 
its anti-Kantianism. It is possible to distinguish the philistine gaze from the 
popular aesthetic, which despite sharing in the opposition to pure culture is not 
simply synonymous with philistinism, contrary to what we might infer from 
Bourdieu. In my final case study, Dada’s radical curatorial strategies are 
analysed in terms of the perspectives of the voluptuous and the partisan, and as a 
purely destructive philistine gaze. 
 
FIRST INTERNATIONAL DADA FAIR 
 
The First International Dada Fair, held at the Galerie Otto Burchard in 
Berlin in July and August 1920, is the focus of my analysis here, drawing on the 
extensive account of it provided by Hanne Bergius.91 A dealer specializing in 
east Asian art and French furniture, Burchard had taken over the ground floor of 
an apartment building renovated in upper-middle-class Wilhelmine style, which 
he decided to open as a small commercial gallery, similar to other establishments 
dedicated to the display of new art which were already in existence in the city, 
such as the abovementioned Galerie Der Sturm. The venture was short-lived and 
in financial terms a failure, as he invested the significant sum of a thousand 
marks in the only major exhibition mounted there, banking on the novelty and 
notoriety of the Dadaists. There was a relatively high admission fee, ensuring a 
predominantly bourgeois audience, but it still failed to recoup costs. As indicated 
by the word “Fair [Messe]”, the First International Dada Fair was in part 																																																								
91 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, pp.231-282. Included as an insert in Crisis and the 
Arts, Volume 5, Bergius’ reconstruction of the full catalogue, based on preliminary work by 
Helen Adkins, has proven invaluable. 
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modelled on a trade show, offering artworks for sale, with little success.92 This 
enterprise was not merely commercial in nature however, as it also sought to 
raise the profile of a particular faction within the emerging avant-garde. The 
widespread press coverage was useful in this regard, though most of it was 
negative. The ensuing court case over the alleged insult to the military probably 
added to that prestige, according to the inverted logic of the field of restricted 
production.93 Publicity for the First International Dada Fair comprised press 
announcements, and posters and stickers put up around the city. It intruded into 
the exhibition itself, with a proliferation of Dadaist paraphernalia including 
promotional material, little magazines, book covers, photographs, and so on.94 
This was simultaneously self-promotion and a satire of the close relationship 
between art and capitalism, refusing to respect the nominal separation between 
the aesthetic and commercial spheres, while calling into question the notion of 
value in both senses. The catalogue states programmatically: “Dada will lead to 
the cancellation of the art trade.”95 With this destructive intent, the First 
International Dada Fair pits the philistine anti-artist against the philistinism of the 
art market. 
The Dadaists simultaneously protest about and seek to hasten the decline 
of an autonomous realm for artistic production and reception, which is central to 
the bourgeois ideology of art. The First International Dada Fair was a large-scale 
undertaking, with over two hundred works crammed into two rooms. The 
collection included a diverse range of objects, many of which might not have 
been readily recognizable as belonging to the domain of art, instead evoking the 
domestic sphere, such as an entry for a cooking competition by Max Schlicter, 
cushions by Maud E Grosz, and dolls by Höch.96 There were also pieces by the 
workers of a stencil factory (“Berlin Cliché Factory”) and teenagers (“The Dada 
Youth Group”).97 The involvement of amateur artists violated the 
professionalized standards of the artworld, while the use of heteronomous forms 
exceeded its disciplinary boundaries. The ideal of aesthetic autonomy was further 
problematized by the political commitment common among members of this 																																																								
92 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, pp.232-235, p.267, p.279. 
93 Ibid., pp.273-280. 
94 Ibid., p.236, pp.242-243, p.272. 
95 Cited in Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, p.232. 
96 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, p.236, p.239, p.259. 
97 Ibid., p.233, pp.257-259, p.269. 
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branch of the movement, evident from their propaganda and sloganeering. One 
of the most striking features of the show upon arrival would have been the 
outsized picture-posters of the organizers, Grosz, Heartfield and Hausmann. The 
Dadaists are depicted either shouting or in stern profile, accompanied by slogans 
which express their intention to destroy art and their partisanship: “Down with 
art”, “Dada is the deliberate subversion of bourgeois terminology”, “Dada is on 
the side of the revolutionary proletariat”.98 A number of slogans, in a large 
uniform typeface, also dominated the first room, repeating the same themes, in 
particular reaffirming the rhetorical allegiance to anti-art: “Art is dead / Long 
live the new machine art of Tatlin”, “Some day photography will supersede and 
replace all of painting”, “Dilettantes [Dilettanten] rise up against art!”99 This call 
to action was inspired by the subtitle of the Cologne Dada journal Die 
Schammade, “Dilettantes [dilettanten] Rise Up”.100 The Dadaists interpellate the 
audience as dilettantes and exhort them to revolt against art, which we might 
compare to an insurgent philistinism.  
The anti-artistic orientation translates into a conscious attempt to subvert 
the perspective of the spectator, insofar as it is shaped by the imperatives of the 
institution of art. The First International Dada Fair systematically frustrated the 
modes of attention an audience would have expected to apply in a bourgeois art 
salon, which conform to the description of the pure gaze in Bourdieu. This was 
achieved partly by incorporating appetitive and partisan alternatives, proscribed 
by the Kantian maxim of disinterested contemplation. The inclusion of a recipe 
among the exhibits conjures up the idea of eating the artwork, while the cushions 
and dolls suggest non-sanctioned forms of engagement like relaxation and play. 
The political slogans also cancel the distance and detachment on which the 
aesthetic disposition depends, addressing the spectator in a way which demands 
their active participation. It is however the overall organization of the space, as 
much as the objects contained within it, which constitutes the negation of the 
pure gaze. The pictures were hung close together, arranged in haphazard fashion, 
overlapping with other items. Some boasted kitsch frames, and some were 
affixed directly to the cluttered walls, in one case propped up on an easel in front 																																																								
98 Ibid., pp.238, insert: p.67. 
99 Ibid., p.237, insert: p.67. 
100 [Title Page], Die Schammade 1 (1920): http://sdrc.lib.uiowa.edu/dada/die-
schammade/index.htm [accessed 16 April 2019], p.1. 
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of a door. Suspended from the ceiling was a dummy dressed as a soldier with the 
face of a pig, Heartfield and Rudolf Schlichter’s Prussian Archangel [1920].101 If 
the pure gaze is reinforced by the established practice of presenting artworks 
discretely against a neutral background, in order to allow for their individual 
contemplation while encouraging aesthetic distance, then that approach is 
emphatically rejected here. By overspilling the constraints of conventional 
curatorial practice like this, the Dadaists effectively preclude the concentrated 
engagement with an individual artwork which is characteristic of the aesthetic 
disposition. 
There is a similar strategy behind some of the sculptures, such as the 
gargantuan assemblage almost filling the second room, Baader’s Great Plasto-
Dio-Dada-Drama. Subtitled “Dadaist Monumental Architecture in Five Floors, 
Three Facilities, One Tunnel, Two Elevators, and One Cylindrical Top”, Great 
Plasto-Dio-Dada-Drama comprises a vast array of miscellaneous junk organized 
in ascending levels which correspond to the spiritual development of the 
Superdada Baader. Its sheer scale and complexity forces the spectator to explore 
it spatially, so that it approaches the status of architecture, in line with the 
background of the artist.102 In this respect it anticipates Schwitters’ Merzbau in 
Hannover, and subsequent iterations during his exile in Norway and Britain. As 
with these walk-in installations, Great Plasto-Dio-Dada-Drama leaves little 
scope for the bourgeois detachment which informs the pure gaze. Representative 
of the Dada group in Dresden, Otto Lasker-Dix’s Montage of Movable Figures 
[c.1920] takes this a stage further, with a breach of the prohibition on touching 
usually in place at galleries and museums. The piece depicts male and female 
figures which can be manipulated by hand, with interactivity encouraged by the 
adjacent slogan “Just grab it and hold onto it”.103 This is a radical departure from 
the conventional separation between the audience and the artwork, which echoes 
the instruction to use the axe provided to destroy an exhibit at Dada – Early 
Spring, a precursor to the First International Dada Fair. Though it is less 
obviously destructive than this earlier stunt, Montage of Movable Figures 
																																																								
101 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, pp.235-236, p.240, p.256. 
102 Ibid., pp.263-264, insert: pp.65-66. 
103 Bergius, Crisis and the Arts, Volume 5, insert: p.43, p.67. 
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likewise disrupts the dominant modes of attention, encouraging the spectator to 
abandon the bourgeois self-discipline underpinning that perspective.  
Höch’s Cut with the Kitchen Knife Through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly 
Cultural Epoch of Germany [1919-1920], analysed in detail by Maud Lavin, 
challenges the preoccupation with form, conceived in inner-aesthetic terms, 
which is another marker of the pure gaze. This large photomontage is made up of 
material taken from newspapers and magazines, predominantly pictures of public 
figures, the masses and machinery, and fragments of text including the slogans 
“Join Dada” and “Dada triumphs!” There are thematic clusters of images, such as 
the political and military leaders of the Weimar Republic, who appear together in 
the top-right quadrant under the phrase “The anti-Dadaist movement”. This gives 
way to a collocation of revolutionaries and artists in the bottom-right quadrant 
labelled “World revolution / Dadaists”, later amended to the less overtly political 
“The great Dada world / Dadaists”. These loose groupings are matched 
respectively by representations of scientific progress in the top-left quadrant, and 
by photographs of crowds of people in the bottom-left quadrant, though the 
proportions of the sections are actually irregular, and their contents overlap and 
interact. Cut with the Kitchen Knife is organized roughly centrifugally, as it 
pivots on the body of a female dancer, who is ringed by wheels, cogs and rolling 
bearings, from which the different sections fan out, creating an effect of dynamic 
motion.104 It is hardly possible to apprehend the design of the whole at once, due 
to the excess of constituent parts, and the calculated disjunctiveness of their 
arrangement, which resist attempts to read this work as an integrally structured 
formal complex. The photomontage necessarily refers outside of itself to its 
extra-aesthetic sources, and the way in which these elements are reconfigured in 
this instance also gestures beyond the frame. That impression would have been 
reinforced by the consistency of style between the piece and the space in which it 
was displayed, with the composition reflecting the apparent rejection of order at 
the curatorial level, seeming to participate in the montage-like organization of 
the exhibition as a whole. The First International Dada Fair thereby promotes a 
philistine gaze, based on the direct negation of aesthetic discourse, as well as 
admitting the perspectives of the voluptuous and the partisan. 																																																								
104 Lavin, Cut with the Kitchen Knife, pp.19-25. 
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THE DESTRUCTIVE PHILISTINE 
 
 This chapter has made destruction one of its central themes, through the 
overarching formulation of the destruction of art by artistic means, or more fully 
the destruction of art as an institution by art-institutional means. The destructive 
philistine is also a specific mode of the philistine against philistinism, a 
counterpart to the appetitive philistine and the insensitive philistine, who together 
comprise a multifaceted figure, adaptable enough to embody diverse 
manifestations of Dadaist anti-art. In my brief history of the philistine, the 
Biblical Goliath was proposed as the archetype for the destructive variant, which 
has a modern equivalent in the art-smashing iconoclasm adopted by anti-artists in 
the twentieth century. As we saw above, Leslie identifies iconoclasm as a 
stylistic principle and a guiding ideology for the Dadaists, citing their collages 
and photomontages and alluding to the instances of art vandalism displayed at 
the First International Dada Fair. There are many other examples of the 
movement exhibiting a destructive approach, besides its rhetorical, symbolic and 
concrete embrace of iconoclasm. In his fragmentary interpretation of Dada, 
Adorno refers to its destruction of the unified subject, as well as repeatedly 
highlighting the destruction of meaning. My final case study has explored how 
meaning is negated both within individual artworks and through the radical 
curatorial strategies applied to them collectively, as well as explicating the 
destructive approach to the dominant modes of attention at the First International 
Dada Fair. 
As set out in the last chapter, Adorno defines aesthetic meaning in formal 
terms, though in its rigorous adherence to an internal logic it gestures towards the 
extra-aesthetic sphere. The integral structuration of the artwork, on which the 
social import of aesthetic autonomy is said to depend, is forcefully rejected by 
the Dadaists. Their collages, photomontages and assemblages deconstruct this 
model of meaning, also problematized by the general approach to presentation at 
the First International Dada Fair. Adorno characterizes the negation of meaning 
as instinctive and anarchic, whereas it is in fact relatively systematic. To adapt 
his description of advanced art, Dada repudiates surface coherence and the 
appearance of harmony, extending beyond the frame to encompass the context of 
reception, as in Höch’s Cut with the Kitchen Knife. Adorno insists that the 
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negation of meaning is itself meaningful, thereby circumventing that challenge. 
His continued investment in the model of meaning under attack causes him to 
rely on a framework for interpretation which is inappropriate to the object in this 
instance, effectively abandoning the sympathy required by his method of 
immanent analysis. The destructive impact of collages, photomontages and 
assemblages is blunted as a result, while the critical relation to the art-
institutional dimension is mostly missed in his account. It has been emphasized 
here, focusing on the strategies to subvert the aesthetic disposition which were 
adopted by the Dadaists. This aspect of their anti-artistic practice is not restricted 
to the First International Dada Fair, with notable experiments with the format of 
exhibitions taking place in Cologne and Paris. It is also evident in other media, 
with the ability of the audience to apply their usual perspective frustrated by 
unexpected interventions, cacophonous performances, and the disorienting 
layouts of little magazines. 
My theorization of the philistine positions them as the immanent negation 
of the institution of art, building on Adorno’s model of the dialectic of art and its 
other. At the First International Dada Fair, the Dadaists launch an assault on the 
dominant ideas governing the production and reception of artworks, and they 
also intervene directly in a gallery space, as well as in other institutional 
formations like the art market, the mainstream press, and even the legal system. 
The movement remains immanent to the institution of art, participating to a 
limited extent in commercial competition, and to a much greater extent in non-
commercial struggles for distinction within the field of restricted production. It 
recognizes its own institutionality and seeks to subvert it in a self-critical turn, 
with a range of techniques including the disruption of the modes of attention 
generally considered appropriate to art. This component of the anti-artistic 
orientation guards against recuperation, anticipating the depoliticizing effect of 
the pure gaze, which as we have seen is capable of transforming any material, no 
matter how recalcitrant or rebarbative, into an object suitable for aesthetic 
meditation. It is probably not possible to arrest that process altogether, as 
evidenced by the new artistic forms which this exhibition promotes in spite of 
itself, such as installation art and interactive art. The determinate negation of the 
perspectives conventionally applied in a bourgeois art salon nevertheless 
represents a significant escalation of the destruction of art by artistic means. In 
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comparison to the appetitive philistine and the insensitive philistine, Dada’s 
destructive philistine comes closest to approximating the immanent negation of 
art. 
 
Adorno, Dada and the Philistine 
 
In the concluding section of this chapter, I expand on the relationship 
between Adorno’s dialectic of art and its other and Dada’s destruction of art by 
artistic means, both of which, in their fullest realization, may be construed as an 
immanent negation of art. The philistine has in each case served as the vehicle 
for elaborating that critical potential, whether in the form of Adorno’s dialectical 
conception of them, or as the symbolic representation of Dada’s anti-artistic 
orientation. This figure has been deployed in a number of guises throughout my 
thesis, but broadly they function as the bearer of the thoroughgoing negativity 
that is shared by Adorno’s dialectical method and Dada’s self-critical turn. As 
with Dada’s variants, Adorno’s philistine exhibits appetitive, insensitive and 
destructive aspects, but then these modulations of the concept are long-
established, already featuring as recurring themes of the brief history in my 
Introduction. Notwithstanding such correspondences, Adorno’s and Dada’s 
versions of the philistine also conflict with one another in important respects, 
with the latter ultimately completing the former. Crucially, Dada’s philistine 
gaze incorporates the perspectives of the partisan and the voluptuous which 
earlier emerged as a possible corrective to Adorno’s blindnesses, as well as going 
beyond them to encompass a self-reflexive critique of the institutionality of art, 
and attempts to frustrate the dominant modes of attention. Conversely, Adorno’s 
model of an immanent negation of art provides a framework for critically 
evaluating examples of Dadaist anti-art. In what follows, I further develop my 
theorization of the philistine out of that productive tension between Adorno and 
Dada, occasionally drawing on Beech and Roberts, Bull and Leslie. 
This theorization of the philistine adheres to the amended model of the 
immanent negation of the institution of art, registering a far-reaching repudiation 
of its values and apparatuses, but one which is situated squarely within artistic 
practice and aesthetic discourse. Through the dialectic of art and its other, 
Adorno envisages an aesthetics conscious of how it is implicated in the unjust 
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organization of society, still insisting on the necessity of aesthetic autonomy, 
while acknowledging that this category is itself a social fact, and seeking to 
combat its ideological aspects with the critical insight of the philistine. He fails 
to fully realize that model in practice, limiting the incorporation of the truth-
claims of the philistine, and acting in effect to neutralize the destruction of art, as 
when he redescribes the negation of meaning as meaningful. To their credit, 
Beech and Roberts and Bull are alert to these weaknesses of his, but their 
respective constructions of the philistine nevertheless revert to the opposed 
positions which he has already sublated, an immanent non-negation that is 
insufficiently critical, and a non-immanent negation that is alien to its object. 
Potentially, Dada’s philistine could help to fulfil the promise of the model, in 
conjunction with an alternative interpretation of the movement, concentrating on 
those areas of its activity which his biases prevent him from properly 
appreciating. The destruction of art by artistic means, understood as the 
destruction of art as an institution by art-institutional means, likewise 
approximates an immanent negation, though its precise form and its degree of 
critical force vary. This variability is reflected in the different manifestations of 
the philistine presented here. 
At the outset of this chapter, I took over the formulation of the philistine 
against philistinism from Leslie, following her in connecting it to the pose of the 
Dadaist against Dada, with both of these double-sided constructions reproducing 
the structure of the destruction of art by artistic means. She sees the movement as 
politically motivated, with its iconoclasm driven by a communist-inspired 
critique of art as complicit in exploitation and domination, providing ideological 
cover for the perpetuation of bourgeois property relations. In his comments about 
Dada, Adorno also highlights its political orientation, to which he attributes 
much of its force and urgency, at least compared to the neo-avant-garde revival 
of anti-art, operating in an even more attenuated space for resistance than its 
precursor. He is generally suspicious of artists who are preoccupied with political 
effect or social impact, detecting a surreptitious positivity behind their 
commitment, which dilutes the thoroughgoing negativity that is supposed to 
guard against recuperation. This is consistent with his opposition to the 
philistinism of art with a cause, in which the requirements of the artistic material 
are subordinated to political aims, while the approach to aesthetics is similarly 
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reductive and instrumentalizing, characterized above all by insensitivity to form. 
The partisan is however a plausible candidate for the role of the philistine, still 
somewhat abstractly conceived in his argument as a strategically positioned 
counterweight to the connoisseur, who disrupts their sympathetic immersion in 
the internal logic of the formally autonomous artwork by inquiring bluntly as to 
its purpose. That purpose might be identified as the prioritization of politics over 
aesthetics emphasized by Leslie, while noting that this attitude is 
unrepresentative of Dada as a whole. In my view, Adorno does not go far enough 
in admitting the perspective of the partisan into his aesthetic theory, which is 
what his model of the dialectic of art and its other demands.  
Beech and Roberts pair the partisan with the voluptuous, and the latter 
should also form part of my theorization of the philistine, focusing now on their 
appetitive aspect. In the previous chapter “Adorno’s Philistine”, I explored the 
opposition he sets up between pure culture and popular culture, which begins to 
break down with the rise of the culture industry. The figure of the vulgarian, 
depicted emblematically eating the artwork, is considered more pertinent to this 
phenomenon than the philistine. He does not call the consumers of mass-
produced entertainment philistines, typically reserving that charge for the elite 
who promote these products to them. He tends to represent the philistine as 
bourgeois, and their attack on art and aesthetics as an intra-bourgeois conflict. He 
shows the cultivated philistine, rather than the appetitive philistine, successfully 
negating advanced art, in his illustrative sketch of this key confrontation. The 
vulgarity he associates with the masses is not entirely distinct from philistinism, 
but in the main the dialectic of art and its other is imagined as internal to the 
sphere of pure culture. “Adorno’s Blindnesses”, a coda to the same chapter, built 
on the preceding analysis with a preliminary assessment of the blindnesses, 
aporias and exclusions of his aesthetic theory, including a claim that he neglects 
the critical potential of popular culture, failing to fully exploit its status as the 
antithesis of pure culture, especially with regard to the elements of the lower 
realm incorporated into radical art by the avant-garde. The modes of attention 
associated with the appetitive philistine might be applied as a corrective to that 
blindness, via the critically inflected populism of the Dadaists. 
I would argue that Dada’s nuanced use of heteronomous forms like 
cabaret stands as a riposte to Adorno’s lack of attention to the oppositional 
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capacity of popular culture vis-à-vis pure culture. His profound scepticism about 
the possibility of aesthetic truth inhering in the productions of the culture 
industry, and what he perceives to be the political consequences of the relaxation 
and distraction provided for the masses, are perhaps what lead him to overlook 
genuinely innovative ways of engaging with that realm, such as are undertaken 
by the Dadaists. The Cabaret Voltaire combines high and low art with 
iconoclastic intent, undermining the hierarchical structure of the field of culture. 
The elevated aesthetic of pure culture is deliberately contaminated, by the 
calculated addition of the popular and the commercial. The familiarity and 
accessibility of popular culture are themselves negated, with the distorting 
techniques of the avant-garde brought to bear on material with a wider appeal. 
There is an institutional foundation to this dual manoeuvre, as initially the 
movement occupies the structures of the sphere of entertainment, carrying out its 
negation of art and aesthetics from that external location. If Adorno grants Dada 
artistic legitimacy on the strength of its thoroughgoing negativity, then it ought to 
be commended for maintaining a critical stance towards the heteronomous forms 
it mobilizes against the institution of art, though this example still falls short of 
my theorization of the philistine, in the sense that it is non-immanent. 
 The anti-artistic orientation is also channelled through the insensitive 
philistine, defined by their art-alienness, constitutively incapable of perceiving 
aesthetic value, and utterly impervious to the distinction between art and non-art. 
“Adorno’s Philistine” set out his model of advanced art, using philistinism to 
delineate it negatively. The philistine critics denounce it as incomprehensible, 
whereas for him that alleged incomprehensibility is evidence of a formally 
autonomous artwork, highly attuned to the state of development of the artistic 
material, rigorously pursuing its own law of construction. The philistinism of art 
with a cause is accused of treating its medium reductively, illegitimately 
instrumentalizing it for extra-aesthetic ends, at the expense of its immanent form. 
The philistinism of art for enjoyment on the other hand remains inwardly 
focused, but its absolutism in this regard, concomitant with isolation from the 
social situation, is itself potentially ideological. The philistinism of art with a 
cause and the philistinism of art for enjoyment are the negative poles of the 
dialectic of the social and the aesthetic, which in his preferred version of 
modernism are mediated as extremes, just as the perspectives of the philistine 
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and the connoisseur should be combined without compromise. “Adorno’s 
Blindnesses” listed some of the shortcomings of his aesthetic theory, chief 
among them his failure to allow the philistine gaze to exert sufficient 
counterpressure on the modes of attention of the connoisseur, in order to reveal 
the moment of falsity in a knowledgeable and sympathetic disposition based on 
an affinity for art. This blindness may be corrected partly by augmenting the 
concept of philistinism with the figures of the partisan and the voluptuous, but 
that is not the full extent of Dada’s challenge to Adorno. 
 The readymade demonstrates the stakes involved in anti-art appropriating 
the inability or unwillingness to distinguish art and non-art, that is, the critical 
potential of the insensitive philistine misrecognized by Bull. Contra Adorno, 
Fountain posits an alternative negotiation of the dialectic of the social and the 
aesthetic, focused on another point of contact between them, namely the art-
institutional dimension. The philistinism of art with a cause is inapplicable here, 
as there is no explicit political imperative, only an indirect attack on the given 
order, mediated through resistance to the institution of art, on which more below. 
The sculpture does not conform to the philistinism of art for enjoyment either, 
because rather than turning its back on empirical reality, and restricting itself to 
narrowly formal concerns, it merges these levels by drawing the extra-aesthetic 
institutional context into the inner-aesthetic nexus of the artwork. The multi-
directional play of elements which constitutes aesthetic meaning incorporates the 
manipulation of art-institutional mechanisms, whether that is staging the 
exclusion of the object, making the spectacle visible to a wider audience, or 
ironically accentuating its subsequent recuperation. The urinal hardly approaches 
the integrally structured formal complex that is expected in the case of advanced 
art, unless the conception of form is expanded to accommodate the self-reflexive 
critique of the institutionality of art. The locus of aesthetics is still the dynamic 
mutual interaction of the parts and the whole, though in this instance the 
cognitive processes set in motion in response to that aconceptual knowledge 
include critical reflection on the functioning of the institution of art. With 
Fountain, Duchamp discloses the power to confer aesthetic status which is 
invested in this network of institutions, discourses and practices, by working on 
them so as to calibrate their effects relative to other aspects of the artwork, in the 
same manner as an artist might treat the physical properties of their material. 
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However, I have questioned whether by remaining so enmeshed in these 
structures, and never really seeking to transcend them, this famous example of 
anti-art also falls down against my theorization of the philistine, being immanent 
but insufficiently negative. 
 Adorno’s notion of aesthetic experience, his theory of the artwork, and 
his technique of immanent analysis can all be elaborated in relation to the figure 
of the philistine. “Adorno’s Philistine” reconstructed his aesthetics, beginning 
with the first of these components, tracing the influences of Kant and Hegel. 
From the former, Adorno takes the maxim of disinterested contemplation, and 
the distance and detachment it entails. The latter is the source of the self-
discipline of the subject in adapting to the logic of the artwork, in a concentrated 
and immersive engagement with it. These orientations, which might appear 
contradictory, are combined through their opposition to the philistine attitudes of 
expecting to get something out the artwork, and subjectively projecting meaning 
onto it. As discussed above, Adorno gives a decisive role to form in his 
aesthetics, as the element of the artwork in which all the others consist, and 
through which the meaning of the whole is crystallized. This model of the 
artwork demands a method of interpretation specially adapted to it, which is his 
version of immanent analysis, holding fast to the principle of immanence without 
it becoming absolute. He argues that critics should comport themselves both 
internally and externally to the artwork, in order to grasp its truth content, the 
social import that ultimately depends on aesthetic autonomy. The sympathy he 
believes is necessary to avoid imposing an alien perspective must be offset by a 
critique of art, in recognition of the fact that while the formally autonomous 
artwork may articulate an alternative to the given order, it is false in that it is 
unable ever to realize its negative utopianism. His conceptions of aesthetic 
experience and immanent analysis are respectively the philosophical and 
technical expression of the modes of attention he recommends for advanced art, 
which it is worth noting share the distance, detachment and self-discipline, and 
the prioritization of form over function, identified as key features of the pure 
gaze by Bourdieu. In “Adorno’s Blindnesses”, I suggested that his aesthetics 
sticks too closely to this type of aesthetic comportment, failing to enact properly 
the self-critical turn he envisages. There is a further potential corrective in 
Dada’s negation of the dominant modes of attention that are promoted by the 
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bourgeois institution of art, insofar as this aesthetic disposition does indeed 
resemble Adorno’s approach to the artwork. 
 Analysing Dada’s concerted effort to disrupt the pure gaze brings into 
view the destructive aspect of the philistine, previously invoked in relation to 
iconoclasm by Leslie. Adorno’s over-reliance on an aesthetic disposition based 
on disinterested contemplation, concentrated engagement, and the submission of 
the self to the logic of the artwork has been shown to be an impediment to the 
correct interpretation of the movement. At the First International Dada Fair, the 
Dadaists agitate against disinterested contemplation, through their political 
commitment conveyed in declarative and imperative slogans. They violate the 
conventions normally observed in museums and galleries, such as the discrete 
presentation of exhibits, rendering impossible any sustained focus on an 
individual artwork. This reinforces the immanent tendency to direct attention 
beyond the frame in pieces like Hoch’s Cut with the Kitchen Knife. There are 
provocative and interactive elements, cancelling the traditional passivity of the 
audience, and pushing back against the idea of a surrender to the aesthetic law of 
form. Baader’s Great Plasto-Dio-Dada-Drama and Lasker-Dix’s Montage of 
Movable Figures further resist distance and detachment with their spatial and 
tactile character. The slogans also explicitly encourage dilettantism instead of 
self-discipline, a rhetorical allegiance matched by the inclusion of amateur artists 
and non-sanctioned forms of art at the First International Dada Fair. These 
examples are a good indication of how thoroughgoing the negativity of the anti-
artistic orientation is in this instance, anticipating the recuperating effect of the 
pure gaze, combatting it partly by drawing on the perspectives of the partisan and 
the voluptuous, partly through a direct negation of aesthetic discourse. In respect 
of the latter, Dada’s destructive philistine most resembles the model of an 
immanent negation of art.  
At the end of the opening section of this chapter, I suggested that the full 
significance of the Dadaists’ political orientation consists not in their positive 
commitment, but in an indirect critique of the social situation, conducted on the 
art-institutional level. Their consciousness of the institutionality of art, at odds 
with the ideal of aesthetic autonomy, translates into the self-critical turn of anti-
art. The institutional formations under attack are developed historically, bound 
up with other such structures, which work in conjunction with the aesthetic 
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sphere, like the education system and the market in luxury goods. These in turn 
are integrated into a wider network of institutions, discourses and practices less 
obviously connected to the culture industry, and ultimately into the false whole 
of contemporary society as it is theorized by Adorno. The anti-artistic stunts 
perpetrated by the movement, including the majority lacking an explicitly activist 
character, are nevertheless political by virtue of this relation to the social 
situation, and the antagonistic attitude towards the status quo which is exhibited 
within the more limited context. The Dadaists’ assaults on their immediate 
institutional supports hint at the kind of struggle he thinks is necessary to resist 
the totalizing logic of advanced capitalism, characterized by a thoroughgoing 
negativity that extends to rigorous self-critique, seeking relentlessly to 
undermine its own conditions of existence. This expanded sense of political 
resonance or social import, as opposed to political effect or social impact, 
engages the social situation in a highly mediated way. If Adorno’s aversion to 
the philistinism of art with a cause inclines him to see reductive and 
instrumentalizing tendencies in the Dadaists’ political orientation, then 
reconfiguring this problematic in art-institutional terms perhaps makes them 
compatible with his notion of aesthetic truth, and therefore better able to act as a 
corrective to his blindnesses. 
Overall, Adorno leans too heavily on the modes of attention of the 
connoisseur, which according to his version of the dialectic of art and its other 
ought to be reciprocally negated by the perspective of the philistine. This figure 
is left a little underdrawn in his account of their interplay with the connoisseur, 
but they can be fleshed out with reference to the partisan and the voluptuous, 
given concrete form in the cultural contestation and bodily pleasure incited by 
the Dadaists. The movement deepens our understanding of this concept by 
developing its appetitive, insensitive and destructive aspects, as well as further 
complicating it with the paradox of the philistine against philistinism. In 
addition, Dada’s self-reflexive critique of the institutionality of art has 
ramifications for Adorno’s aesthetic theory, calling into question his investment 
in aesthetic autonomy, and his narrow conception of aesthetic form. The 
strategies to subvert the pure gaze also cast light on how much of this way of 
appropriating an object is retained in his approach to the artwork, a moment of 
falsity which in my view is not counteracted by invoking the art-alienness of the 
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philistine as he does, in the abstract and to a strictly limited extent. In these areas, 
Dada’s philistine is brought to bear critically on Adorno’s blindnesses. The 
reverse is also true, as his model of an immanent negation of art is applied to 
criticize the examples of Dadaist anti-art explored in my case studies. It is not 
that a failure to conform to this model is in itself a problem, more that the model 
provides a useful framework for articulating the danger of either only being able 
to mount a critique of the institution of art by operating outside it, or remaining 
too entangled to oppose it emphatically. With this final manoeuvre, Adorno and 
Dada have been mutually transformed through their interpenetration, in the 
process refining my theorization of the philistine as the immanent negation of the 
institution of art. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The central argument of this thesis has now been substantially completed, 
worked out in detail in the closing sections of previous chapters, and it need only 
be briefly summarized here. If the critical encounter between them is 
successfully realized, Adorno and Dada are dialectically mediated, beginning 
with a reconstruction of his aesthetic theory, which produces a preliminary 
assessment of his blindnesses. These blindnesses cause him to misconstrue the 
movement in crucial respects, and my provisional alternative interpretation, 
emerging out of a dialogue with his defective reading, provides a basis for 
further investigation into the semi-submerged theme of anti-art. In case studies 
showcasing different manifestations of the anti-artistic orientation, Dada’s 
critically inflected populism, its manipulation of art-institutional mechanisms, 
and its disruption of the dominant modes of attention are first analysed on their 
own terms, then extended to conclude the critique of Adorno. Concretely, Dada 
may act as a corrective in this way because it mobilizes popular culture against 
pure culture, necessitates an expanded conception of form, and negates the 
aesthetic disposition associated with the connoisseur, thereby redressing some of 
the weaknesses identified in his approach. With the Cabaret Voltaire, Duchamp’s 
Fountain and the First International Dada Fair, the Dadaists adopt overlapping 
but distinguishable strategies, varying in the extent to which they operate inside 
the institution of art, and also in the seriousness with which they attempt to 
destroy it, only occasionally achieving an adequate combination of closeness to 
the object and a critical attitude towards it. Just as Adorno’s model of culture, art 
and aesthetics is revised as a result of the confrontation with Dadaist anti-art, so 
Dada’s diverse experiments are subject to a standard of judgement originally 
derived from Adorno. This is the model of the philistine as the immanent 
negation of the institution of art, employed to critically interrogate both sides of 
the exchange, highlighting his insensitivity to the art-institutional dimension of 
the movement, while articulating the difficulty it experiences in remaining 
immanent to the institution of art without sacrificing thoroughgoing negativity. 
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These in broad outline are the theoretical manoeuvres which constitute the 
mutually transformative interpenetration of Adorno and Dada. 
I have deferred discussion of methodological questions until the end, so 
as not to preempt the unfolding form of the argument, which is co-constructed 
with the content in the course of the thesis, in keeping with his insight that 
philosophy cannot be neutral with regard to its presentation.105 It is explicitly 
stated at the outset that what is envisaged is a dialectical analysis, but the 
meaning of this formulation is left open, avoiding the error of a formalism which 
determines the shape of thought in advance, and applies it mechanically as an 
inflexible schema, indifferent to the specific qualities of its object. This 
incidentally is a criticism we have seen levelled at Lukács by Adorno.106 
Certainly, Adorno’s dialectical method informs my approach, in particular his 
practice of mediating opposites in their extremity, instead of attempting to strike 
a balance or settle on a compromise, though it should be stressed that this is a 
general tendency in his work, rather than a prescriptive maxim. Insofar as it may 
be identified as a characteristic technique of his, I can be seen to follow him in 
pursuing the poles of an antithesis to the point where they converge, with the 
reciprocal negation of Adorno’s aesthetic theory and Dadaist anti-art described 
above. The underlying assumption on his part is that truth cannot be expressed 
positively in the false whole of contemporary society. Accordingly, Adorno 
foregrounds the moment of negativity in his version of dialectics, whereas 
totality is the most salient category for Lukács. He renders illegitimate the 
Hegelian manoeuvres whereby the negation of the negation is transmuted into a 
positive, and identity and non-identity are subsumed under a greater identity.107 
This negative orientation is broadly reflected in my focus on the philistine and 
the anti-artist as the others of art, but there is no direct translation of his 
dialectical method, and even using this shorthand to refer to it risks falling into 
the kind of identity thinking which he criticizes for obscuring the irreducible 
difference between concepts and what they cover.108 I do not conform to reified 
methodological principles extracted from his philosophy, rather the form of the 
																																																								
105 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.18. 
106 Adorno, “Extorted Reconciliation”, pp.218-219. 
107 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.7, pp.158-161, p.318. 
108 Ibid., pp.4-6. 
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argument is elaborated reflexively and dynamically, in a continuous process of 
correction and recalibration. 
This is apparent in the overall structure of the thesis, which is influenced 
by his notion of constellational thinking, with the problematic of art and 
aesthetics successively reconfigured in shifting combinations of repeated 
elements: Adorno’s aesthetic theory is elucidated through the figure of the 
philistine; Dada’s anti-artistic orientation is emphasized in opposition to 
Adorno’s tendency to downplay it; Dada’s philistine is brought to bear critically 
on Adorno’s blindnesses; Adorno’s philistine is further developed as a means of 
evaluating Dadaist anti-art. This mode of organization reveals different aspects 
of the object, facilitating an immersion in its details and their interrelations, 
without attempting an exhaustive treatment, or foreclosing alternative 
arrangements. Inspired by Benjamin, Adorno rejects the total system and the 
chain of deductive reasoning, preferring models of thought which are open and 
non-linear, attuned to the anomalous and the fragmentary. The elements of the 
constellation are concretized through their dynamic mutual interaction, a process 
arrested in the blinding insight that flashes up briefly as a dialectical image or a 
moment of truth, when a particular configuration crystallizes into a force field. 
Compared to Benjamin, Adorno relies more on negation to hold the various 
components in a state of tension, typically seeking to show how they expose the 
moment of falsity in each other.109 This is the dominant note in my argument as 
well, for the most part accentuating the conflicting tendencies of Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory and Dadaist anti-art. There are also coincidences and 
correspondences, resemblances and affinities, such as the shared commitment to 
thoroughgoing negativity itself. This constellation illuminates the problematic of 
art and aesthetics, with its elements repelled and attracted in multiple directions, 
in a web of connections which is consciously shaped in response to the subject 
matter. 
If the thesis is ultimately concerned with art and aesthetics in a broader 
sense, then its primary object is Adorno’s aesthetic theory. This is the starting 
point for my investigation, which initially takes the form of an immanent 																																																								
109 Ibid., pp.162-163; Adorno, “The Essay as Form”, pp.9-20; Walter Benjamin, The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama [1963], trans. by John Osborne (London: Verso, 2009), pp.27-38; 
Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” [1950], in Illuminations, pp.254-255. 
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analysis, a close but critical reading of his body of work, presented as a mosaic 
of quotations bound together by the organizing principle of the philistine. It is a 
technique loosely derived from his own practice, discussed as part of my 
exposition of his aesthetics, in which it is recommended over approaches which 
impose meaning from above, or else merely replicate what is already there. He 
embraces it as especially appropriate to the formally autonomous artwork, which 
categorically demands to be understood inner-aesthetically, and moreover 
participates in a myth of radical self-sufficiency which requires deconstructing 
from within. The advantage of an immanent analysis in this instance, where it is 
applied to critical and theoretical writing, is that his aesthetics is subject to a 
critique conducted in terms that it itself establishes, which is therefore better 
placed to articulate its internal tensions. His claim that any theory of art must be 
rooted in actual aesthetic experiences and the contemplation of qualitatively 
unique artworks prompts me to test his model on the concrete example of Dada. 
My interpretation of the movement fills the gaps in his account of it, and 
develops those aspects of its creative practice which might act as a corrective to 
the blindnesses of his aesthetics. This should be thought of chiefly as an 
extension of the immanent analysis already underway, rather than an exercise in 
its own right, and even the case studies are to a certain extent determined by that 
framing. The key concept of the institution of art is not some external addition to 
his aesthetic theory, in fact emerging organically as a resolution of its inherent 
contradictions, with the potential to reconfigure the dialectic of the aesthetic and 
the social so that the problem of their mediation disappears. This is analogous to 
the effect of the commodity structure on the thing-in-itself problem, posited in 
one of his earliest illustrations of constellational thinking, which draws 
inspiration from Lukács and Benjamin.110 
What this amounts to is a set of highly specific conclusions, forged 
through the interpenetration of the main conceptual blocs making up the thesis, 
which cannot easily be detached from the preceding argument and presented as 
standalone truths with general applicability. We might nevertheless reflect on the 
stakes involved, in particular the question of the correct approach of aesthetics to 
an avant-garde distinguished by its self-reflexive critique of the institutionality of 																																																								
110 Theodor Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy” [1931], trans. by Benjamin Snow, Telos 31 
(1977): pp.126-129. 
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art. As we have seen, Adorno proceeds by dialectically reconstructing the 
dominant categories of philosophical aesthetics, as well as undertaking a number 
of analyses of individual artists and artworks. The extra-aesthetic context in 
which these pieces are created, and the various social functions they fulfill, are 
not his principal interest. He does of course comment on the art-institutional 
dimension, most famously with his polemical treatment of the culture industry, 
and there are also miscellaneous reflections on the conditions governing the 
production and reception of different branches of high culture. It is though 
comparatively rare for him to make these issues central to his aesthetic theory, 
and in his analyses of individual artists and artworks the extra-aesthetic context 
is usually bracketed off in favour of a focus on form. By contrast, Dada puts its 
own institutional character front and centre, thereby seeming to direct attention 
outwards. This might tempt us to adopt an explanatory framework conceived 
externally to the object, standing apart from the bourgeois ideal of aesthetic 
autonomy by historicizing and sociologizing it, as in the accounts of the 
institution of art in Bürger and Bourdieu. In my view, Adorno does remain too 
invested in aesthetic autonomy, despite his recognition of its ideological aspects, 
and his inner-aesthetic orientation should indeed be subject to greater 
counterpressure than he allows. However, I would dispute that this necessarily 
implies abandoning formal concerns and reducing the aesthetic to the social, as at 
its best the movement engages with that wider realm in a far subtler way, 
working centripetally rather than centrifugally to make the functioning of the 
institution of art an integral part of the multi-directional play of elements which 
for him constitutes aesthetic meaning. 
We can sketch out the revised version of Adorno’s aesthetics that is 
suggested by this argument, with the proviso that it should not be taken as a 
guide to the correct interpretation of artworks in general, but instead as the 
singular result of this critical encounter with Dada. Specifically, Adorno’s 
assumption that the possibility of aesthetic truth is restricted to the realm of pure 
culture overlooks how that rarefied domain is immanently permeated by the 
opposing sphere, while the movement exploits this tension by assimilating 
elements of popular culture and the culture industry, which are themselves 
distorted and defamiliarized through avant-garde experimentation. This doubly 
critical manoeuvre avoids simply affirming heteronomous forms, which would 
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have delegitimized it for an approach that values thoroughgoing negativity as a 
philosophical orientation and as a defence against recuperation in radical art. It 
allows us to reshape his aesthetics while respecting his topography of the field of 
culture, producing a model still centred on advanced art, but more receptive to 
nuanced populism. In addition, Adorno’s account of the dialectic of the aesthetic 
and the social, in which they are mediated through a negative mimesis of the 
given order conducted on the level of form, neglects the art-institutional 
dimension highlighted by Dada as an alternative point of contact between these 
extremes. Where the movement succeeds in integrating the manipulation of art-
institutional mechanisms into the formal complex of the artwork, and insofar as 
its indirect relation to the wider network of institutional formations constitutes 
social import, it is consistent with aesthetic meaning as he understands it. What is 
required in order to apprehend this truth content within the purview of his 
aesthetics is an expanded conception of form, which can accommodate the 
institutionality of art in cases where it is incorporated by the avant-garde. With 
its attempts to disrupt the dominant modes of attention, Dada indicts Adorno’s 
tendency to fall back on the default position of the connoisseur, which is rooted 
in a Kantian tradition, and promoted by the bourgeois institution of art. The 
movement problematizes the pure gaze by admitting the perspectives of the 
partisan and the voluptuous, and by undertaking the direct negation of aesthetic 
discourse. If his investment in aesthetic autonomy is undermined by the 
introduction of the seemingly incompatible concept of the institutionality of art, 
then it paradoxically enables the full realization of the dialectic of art and its 
other he envisages, including the self-critical turn he fails to properly enact. 
Nevertheless, Adorno is right to insist on the importance of what is specifically 
aesthetic about the artwork, justifying the corresponding focus on form, and the 
close attention paid to its internal logic, without which aesthetic reflection would 
lose touch with its object. My revised version of Adorno’s aesthetics retains 
those features of it, now transformed through their immanent negation, and so 
suitably adapted to the task of interpreting Dada. 
How far would it be valid to extend this approach beyond the context in 
which it has been created, or must we conclude that its only legitimate object is 
Dada? In the Introduction, I briefly invoked the tradition of the avant-gardist 
philistine, citing among other key figures Duchamp. My reading of the 
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movement cements its position as a foundational moment in that tradition, 
despite its hostility to the continuity of art history. The avant-gardist philistine is 
defined more precisely than it was before, in terms of an anti-artistic orientation 
premised on a critical consciousness of the institutionality of art. This points us 
towards radical tendencies in twentieth- and twenty-first-century art, which in 
various ways continue to reckon with the central insight of the historical avant-
garde, in the wake of its perceived failure and recuperation. One line of descent, 
furthering the project of the destruction of art by artistic means, encompasses 
Lettrism, the Situationist International and Fluxus, as well as splinter groups and 
subterranean currents including the Provos, Kommune 1, Black Mask, Up 
Against the Wall Motherfucker and King Mob.111 Their anti-artistic stunts at 
times shaded into direct action, bringing artistic innovations like happenings into 
the realms of politics and protest, but this violation of the borders of the aesthetic 
sphere also worked in the opposite direction. Guerilla Art Action Group, Art 
Workers Coalition and Guerilla Girls instead applied activist tactics to the 
institution of art, issuing demands to museums and galleries, organizing 
exhibition boycotts and art strikes, and manipulating the media to amplify 
criticisms of unequal representation and complicity with power. Art brut and 
outsider art situated themselves on the boundary of art and non-art, destabilizing 
the canon, challenging its exclusions, and calling into question the processes 
whereby aesthetic status is granted or denied.112 Some elements of conceptual art 
and performance art were contrived so as to resist their incorporation into the 
institution of art, and the desire to escape its structures altogether can be 
identified as an impulse behind land art, street art and community-based art. 
There are also diverse instances of alternative networks and micro-communities, 
established outside of and in opposition to the artworld and its distribution 
apparatuses, such as mail art, zine culture and early net.art. A different approach 
to this problem is the practice of institutional critique, which approximates an 
immanent negation, making visible and critically interrogating its own conditions 
of existence, the complex of institutions, discourses and practices in which it 
																																																								
111 This tradition is chronicled in Stewart Home, The Assault on Culture: Utopian Currents from 
Letrrisme to Class War [1988] (Stirling: AK Press, 1991).  
112 Lucienne Peiry provides the most comprehensive account of this tradition in Art Brut: The 
Origins of Outsider Art [1997], trans. by James Frank (Paris: Flammarion, 2006). 
 224 
remains embedded.113 These examples are too wide-ranging to be corralled into a 
coherent counter-narrative of art history, and certainly it is nowhere near an 
exhaustive list, but it at least gives an indication of areas which might be 
explored in the light of my amended model of Adorno’s aesthetics. They all 
engage with the tension between aesthetic autonomy and the institutionality of 
art, and to that extent a form of interpretation focused on this dynamic may be 
appropriate, though it would of course need to be adapted to the specific contours 
of each case. In the Introduction, I mentioned the relatively recent literary trends 
of flarf poetry and conceptual writing, and it is hoped that the argument 
elaborated here could help alert us to significant developments bearing on the 
same issues in the present moment, provided that changes in the structure of the 
field of culture since he was writing are taken into account. Regardless of 
whether that intuition proves correct, Adorno and Dada have been presented in 
an original constellation, contributing to the critical conversation around both of 
them, while advancing the theorization of the philistine. 
  
																																																								
113 For reflections on institutional critique by a key second-generation practitioner, who explicitly 
acknowledges the theoretical influence of Bourdieu, see: Andrea Fraser, “An Artist’s 
Statement” [1992], in Museum Highlights: The Writings of Andrea Fraser, ed. by Alexander 
Alberro (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp.3-15; Andrea Fraser, “It’s Art When 
I Say It’s Art, or…” [1995], in Museum Highlights, pp.37-44; Andrea Fraser, “What’s 
Intangible, Transitory, Mediating, Participatory, and Rendered in the Public Sphere? Part II” 
[1997], in Museum Highlights, pp.55-78; Andrea Fraser, ““To Quote,” Say the Kabyles, “Is to 
Bring Back to Life”” [2002], in Museum Highlights, pp.81-86. 
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